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PREFACE 
This field manual provides guidance to commanders and staffs of military intelligence (MI) 
and other units responsible for technical intelligence (TECHINT) or having an association with 
TECH INT. It provides general guidance and identifies the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTP) used in the collection, exploitation, and dissemination of TECHINT in satisfying the 
warfighter's requirements. 
TECHINT is an integral part of the overall battlefield operating system (BOS) and supports 
Army operations through the analysis and exploitation of foreign equipment, weapons, and other 
war materiel. 
This field manual describes the TECHINT process at all echelons and identifies 
responsibilities. It further describes the MI TECHINT organizations, other services, and the 
strategic level intelligence agencies supporting the process. 
On today's battlefield, Army forces will likely deploy as part of a joint or combined military 
operation. For that reason, while this manual supports Army operations, it does so in the context 
of Army operations as part of a joint or combined task force. 
This field manual applies to all Army personnel, to include Active Component (AC) and 
Reserve Components (RC) commanders and their staffs, US Army Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) Centers and Schools, and MI elements. 
The proponent of this publication is US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 
(USAIC&FH). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended 
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center 
and School, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-D, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. 
The doctrine in this publication conforms with and supports the principles in FM 34-1 and 
FM 100-5. This manual does not implement any international standardization agreements but 
complies with the following Standardization Agreements: 
STANAG 1059 - National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces (Edition 6). 
STANAG 2014 - Operations Plans, Warning Orders, and Administrative/Logistics Orders 
(Edition 7). 
STANAG 2044 - Procedures for Dealing With Prisoners of War (Edition 5). 
STANAG 2084 - Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents 
(Edition 5). 
STANAG 2097 - Nomenclature and Classification of Equipment (Edition 6). 
STANAG 2143 - Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance/Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(Edition 4). 
STANAG 2389 - Minimum Standards of Proficiency for Trained Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal Personnel (Edition 1). 
STANAG 2834 - The Operation of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical 
Information Center (EODTIC) (Edition 2). 
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer 
v 
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exclusively to men. The use or mention of any commercial or private organization's name or 
trademark and the organization's services and/or funds by the US Army does not express or imply 
an endorsement of the sponsor or its products and services by the US Army. 
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Chapter 1 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND SUPPORT 
GENERAL 
MISSION 
This chapter describes the TECHINT mission, how it supports the 
warfighter, and presents TECHINT in a historical perspective. TECHINT 
results from the collection, evaluation, and analysis of foreign warfighting 
equipment and associated materiel. At the strategic level, the exploitation 
and interpretation of foreign weapons systems, materiel, and technologies 
is referred to as scientific and technical intelligence (S& TI). This S& TI 
covers-
• Foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied 
engineering techniques. 
• Scientific and technical (S& T) characteristics, capabilities, and 
limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, 
and material. 
• Research and development (R&D) related to these systems and the 
production methods employed for their manufacture. 
The TECHINT mission ensures that the warfighter has a clear 
understanding of the full technological capabilities residing in his 
opponent's equipment. With this knowledge, the warfighter adopts 
countermeasures, operations, and tactics, as necessary, to be successful 
in any assigned mission. 
TECHINT SUPPORT TO THE WARFIGHTER 
STRATEGIC LEVEL: 
The US has relied on its military strength as a strategic deterrent to war. 
The strength of the US military lies, in part, to the diversity and extent of its 
technology base. While the US aspires to be the leader in integrating 
technology, the actual products are available to any buyer. An adversary 
can achieve temporary technological parity or advantage by acquiring 
modern systems or capabilities. The world arms market is willing to provide 
these advanced systems to countries or individuals with the resources to 
1-1 
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pay for them. A concerted TECHINT program is vital to providing precise 
direction and purpose within the US R&D process to ensure that this parity 
or advantage is neutralized quickly and efficiently. 
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL: 
For the Army, technology is changing how we organize, how we train and 
develop leaders, and how we conduct operations. Advances in electronics, 
communications, automation, reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S), 
contamination avoidance, precision-guided munitions, and the exploitation 
of space-based capabilities have increased the lethality, range, accuracy, 
and reliability of our weaponry. 
Operational and tactical commanders rely on this technological advantage 
to successfully synchronize and execute complex modern Army operations. 
The introduction of a surprise technological capability by an adversary 
causes confusion and delay mission accomplishment until the capability is 
understood and countered. TECHINT is the key to the early identification of 
an adversary's technical capabilities and the development of 
countermeasures for the operational and tactical commander. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
1-2 
In the 1920's, Germany was developing the weapons and systems it would 
use against the Allies in the 1940's. Because Allied nations did not 
integrate TECHINT into peacetime collection efforts, German S& T 
advances went largely unnoticed. When information did come to light, 
Washington and London ignored or ridiculed it. Later, when 
the Germans fielded their advanced weapons and systems in war, the 
resulting technological surprise on the battlefield was devastating. 
WORLD WAR II: 
During the air battle for Europe, the British used TECHINT to counter the 
German antiaircraft and night-fighter defenses. This was accomplished by 
exploiting captured aircraft radios and a captured radar station. (See below 
a discussion of the Bruneval Raid.) 
The Allies captured many German and Italian weapons in North Africa. 
This collection led to the publishing of new technical material, such as-
• Technical manual E9 series handbooks on enemy weapons. 
• Special series publications on German weapons. 
• Training aids. 
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• Updates to handbooks on the German and Italian armies. 
TECHINT exploitation of captured German Tiger and Panther tanks led to 
several important battlefield countermeasures. One of these was the 
adoption of new armor tactics while another was the development of more 
powerful antitank rockets. 
The United States started a successful TECHINT program in the fall of 
1943 called the ALSOS mission. This unit was made up of 
Counterintelligence (CI) Corps agents, scientists, and interpreters. Their 
mission was to capture and exploit personnel and material of S& T value. 
The successes of this unit included: 
• Exploitation of Italian and German nuclear scientists. 
• Removal of significant quantities of uranium ore from the Albert Canal. 
• Recovery of the international radium standards from what was to be 
the Soviet occupied sector of Germany. 
Throughout the remainder of the 1940's a Foreign Materiel Intelligence 
Branch at the Ordnance Center, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD, 
continued to conduct exploitation work on captured German and Japanese 
equipment. 
THE RAID ON BRUNEVAL-AN OFFENSIVE TECHINT OPERATION: 
At 2100Z on 27 February 1942, 119 British soldiers of Company C, 2nd 
Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, parachuted into a drop zone near the 
small village of Bruneval, in Occupied France. The company's mission was 
to raid a suspected German radar site on a cliff a few hundred yards from 
an accessible beach to bring back an item of extreme TECHINT 
interest-the WUERZBURG radar. 
The WUERZBURG radar was believed to be a mobile, short-range, high-
precision radar responsible for the sudden and serious increase in Allied 
heavy bomber losses. Routine Allied photographic reconnaissance 
originally discovered the installation in January 1942. French resistance 
forces were sent to investigate. They confirmed the site as well as a 
garrison troop strength of nearly 200 enemy signal, support. and security 
troops. They also reported that the nearby beach was not mined. 
It was the intelligence and urgent need to protect Allied planes that resulted 
in the commando raid that night. Once on the ground, the commandos 
moved quickly and split into three equal groups. The first group secured 
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the beach. The second group spread out and took up positions to act as a 
reserve or blocking force. The last group, the collection team and a special 
radar technical expert. moved forward to take the target. 
The collection team slipped through enemy defender positions, entered the 
installation, and found the radar. They used hacksaws, crowbars, and 
precision hand tools to dismantle the main components. As each part of 
the radar was exposed, it was sketched and photographed. The team also 
captured a German signalman-the radar operator. 
When they finished, the team destroyed what they couldn't take with them 
and bega n their move to the beach under progressively heavy fire. The 
surviving commandos were picked up by Allied landing craft and escaped 
across the Channel to England. 
Exactly three and one-half hours after the mission began it was over. 
Although two men were killed, six wounded, and six more listed as missing 
in action, the raid was deemed a great success. Not only was it the first 
raid on the continent following the disaster at Dunkirk but also it resulted in 
the successful capture of a valuable piece of enemy material-material that 
later proved to be of vital TECHINT interest. 
Allied TECHINT experts examined the material as soon as they got it. The 
exploitation of this radar, along with the sketches and the photographs, 
quickly began to provide valuable TECH INT. For example, just from the 
recovered metal manufacturer's plates, analysts accurately determined 
how many Wuerzburg radars had been produced and their current rate of 
production. When the German signalman was interrogated, he provided 
valuable information about the level of operator skills and operator training. 
Most important. though, TECHINT scientists 
used the captured material to build an operational Wuerzburg radar 
mockup. 
When the mockup was completed, they had a multifrequency radar that 
seemed, at first. to be almost impossible to jam. Scientists went to work to 
develop countermeasures to neutralize the radar's capabilities. Their 
efforts resulted in thin metallic strips cut to different lengths that could be 
dropped from airplanes. These strips reflected radar signals and effectively 
jammed the new radars. They dubbed these strips chaff. CHAFF turned 
out to be one of the most successful countermeasures developed during 
World War II-being particularly useful during the Normandy Invasion. 
THE KOREAN WAR: 
It wasn't until the beginning of the Korean War, when North Korean troops 
in Soviet-designed and Chinese-built armor rolled south, that the United 
States discovered it had little confirmed data on enemy weapons systems. 
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We realized that to be able to develop effective countermeasures, 
TECHINT had to be an ongoing process. As a result. we once again began 
a concerted TECHINT effort. with the Foreign Material Intelligence Branch 
at Aberdeen Proving Grounds training and fielding TECHINT teams to 
Korea. 
In the Korean War, the warfighters found that their 2.36-inch bazooka 
rockets could not penetrate the T-34/85 tanks' frontal armor. With this 
combat deficit identified, commanders began to support the TECHINT 
process by evacuating captured T-34/85 tanks and other material to 
TECHINT elements for exploitation. TECHINT both in the theater and back 
in the United States at the Chrysler Corporation analyzed the captured 
material. The US Army responded by giving combat commanders new 
tactics, a redesigned M-48 tank, and a 3.5-inch bazooka. 
The TECHINT effort also supported the political effort to prove Soviet 
involvement on behalf of the North Korean aggressor. Captured modern 
Soviet weapons were regularly paraded before the UN Security Council as 
evidence of Soviet support. 
THE VIETNAM WAR: 
Following the Korean War, the United States did not disband its TECHINT 
capability completely, as had been done at the conclusion of all previous 
hostilities. But neither did we maintain it at its wartime level. Three small 
TECHINT detachments remained in place at the Army's research and 
development centers. By 1962 two of the detachments merged to form the 
Army's Foreign Science and Technology Center. The third detachment 
established the Missile Intelligence Agency at Redstone 
Arsenal. The Surgeon General also operated a Medical Intelligence 
Center at Fort Detrick, MD. 
An agency called the Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) came 
into being in 1966. Its wartime mission was to manage, coordinate, and 
analyze captured enemy equipment (CEE), and technical captured enemy 
documents (CEDs). The CMEC did this on a tactical level by dispatching 
teams of experts and analysts into the tactical zone of each corps. These 
teams analyzed captured materiel in the field and recommended 
countermeasures to tactical commanders. American personnel working in 
the CMEC were assigned to Delta Company, 519th MI Battalion. 
The North Vietnamese employed Soviet designed man-portable systems 
with considerable success. The Soviet AT-3 Sagger antitank guided 
missile (ATGM) was used against South Vietnamese armored vehicles, 
communications bunkers, and even small outposts. In addition, the SA-7 
heat-seeking surface-to-air missile (SAM) was employed and became an 
even more serious threat because it could disrupt allied control of the air 
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space over the battlefield. Lastly, the 122-mm rocket was employed as the 
North Vietnamese Army's (NVA) primary artillery weapon in a variety of 
configurations. While samples of these weapons undoubtedly fell into the 
hands of the South Vietnamese, nothing was done with them because of 
the September 1969 inactivation of American TECHINT units in Vietnam. 
And, by October 1971, the 55th Military Intelligence Detachment, a corps 
support unit with a TECHINT capability, had also been inactivated. 
GRENADA (OPERATION URGENT FURY): 
Following the commitment of US forces to Grenada on 25 October 1983, 
large quantities of foreign military equipment were discovered thus 
requiring TECHINT support. 
Two elements of the 203d MI Battalion, 513th MI Group, were deployed to 
Grenada. Five soldiers participated as members of a Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) Team formed at the request of the Commander in Chief, 
Atlantic (CINCLANT) operational commander for URGENT FURY. The first 
element arrived in Grenada on 31 October 1983 and was tasked to identify, 
sort, and provide approximate inventories of foreign material and to 
establish priorities for shipment to the United States. Nineteen other 
soldiers established the 203d MI Battalion (Forward) and operated a 
modified CMEC. Together the 203d soldiers type-classified and developed 
inventories; assisted combat units in searches for materiel; operated a 
collection point for CEE and captured enemy materiel (CEM); and shipped 
appropriate items to the continental United States (CONUS). 
In 1985 the 203d MI Battalion was redesignated the Foreign Materiel 
Intelligence Group. In 1989 it was again redesignated as the Foreign 
Materiel Intelligence Battalion (FMIB). 
THE GULF WAR (OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM): 
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were the largest battlefield 
TECHINT operations since the Vietnam War, and the largest joint and 
combined TECHINT operations since World War II. The Joint Captured 
Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC) was formed with the Army's FMIB to 
serve as the nucleus and headquarters. Augmentation to the FMIB 
included TECHINT personnel from every element of the Department of 
Defense (DOD), the national S& TI community, Great Britain, Canada, and 
Australia. 
During Sadaam Hussein's attack on the Saudi Arabian city of Khafji in 
February 1991, a previously unseen and highly modified tank was 
captured. This tank, a modified T-55, had vastly improved external armor 
and possibly new fire control, weapons, and optical systems. A team from 
the JCMEC was dispatched forward to conduct a hasty exploitation and to 
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find out if this tank required a tactical capabilities reassessment. In 
layman's terms, could this new tank, with its improved armor, defeat a 
broader array of friendly weaponry? Within 2 days, the TECHINT collection 
team soldiers, analysts at the JCMEC, and national S& TI agencies in the 
United States were able to report their findings to the theater commander 
and his staff. 
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM produced the largest amount of 
CEM in the shortest amount of time since World War II. As a result of 
lessons learned from prior deployments, TECHINT provided 
unprecedented timely and accurate information to the warfighter and the 
national S&TI community. 
SOMALIA (OPERATION RESTORE HOPE): 
On 4 December 1992, the FMIB alerted a TECHINT liaison element (LNE) 
for deployment in support of the US Marine Corps (USMC) II Expeditionary 
Force, the core headquarters for Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia. 
The TECHINT LNE deployed to Somalia on 16 December and established 
operations at the US Embassy compound in southwest Mogadishu on 18 
December. The TECHINT LNE made several significant contributions to 
the operations and intelligence efforts in Somalia. 
On 21 December, the LNE accompanied a delegation from the JTF 
Somalia headquarters on a tour of compounds controlled by rival warlords 
in Mogadishu. During the 5 to 10 minutes the LNE was inside of each of 
the five compounds, the TECHINT LNE personnel compiled lists of the 
foreign and US weapons, equipment, and ordnance controlled by the 
warlords. This order of battle (OB) intelligence was key in planning the 
eventual US forces attack against one of those compounds. 
After determining there was no theater-wide plan for the collection and 
processing of CEM, the TECHINT LNE established the Centralized 
Weapons Collection Center (CWCC). In conjunction with explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel, the CWCC processed, screened for 
intelligence value, and disposed of thousands of captured weapons and 
hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition. 
On 6 January, several SA-7 man-portable SAMs were captured in the 
Mogadishu area. In conjunction with EOD personnel, and with input from 
the US Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), the TECHINT LNE 
reported that the missiles were functional. This intelligence prompted a 
change in the air defense artillery (ADA) threat status and flight operations 
in Somalia. 
On 14 January, several French MILAN antitank missiles were captured in 
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the Mogadishu area. The TECHINT LNE conducted testing and evaluation 
of captured missiles with personnel from the French contingent 
of Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) Somalia. The missiles were 
functional and capable of defeating all but the heaviest armor in the Somali 
theater of operations. 
HAITI (OPERATIONS RESTORE DEMOCRACY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY): 
In September 1994 FMIB deployed a 14-soldier TECHINT contingency 
support detachment (CSD) and a 2-soldier LNE in support of US 
Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY. TECHINT LNE personnel, in 
conjunction with JTF 180 and JTF 190 planners, developed handling and 
processing procedures for CEM, including weapons received as part of the 
"Cash for Guns" program. 
The CSD established the JCMEC (Forward) in Port-au-Prince. The CSD 
screened, processed, and inventoried over 10,000 weapons and thousands 
of rounds of ammunition by hand without the benefit of materiel-handling 
equipment. The resulting database provided OB analysts a tool for 
assessing the threat to US forces as well as the success of the "Cash for 
Guns" program. Additionally, the "by serial number" inventory was 
forwarded to national law enforcement agencies via Clliaison channels to 
aid in arms smuggling investigations. 
At the time of redeployment. CSD personnel had accomplished all 
assigned national TECHINT collection requirements, and through 
intelligence discipline integration, played key roles in various signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
1-8 
The historical experience of the nation in times of peace and war clearly 
demonstrates the need for a fully operational Army TECHINT capability. A 
robust TECHINT collection and analysis capability, with dynamic links to 
S& TI centers in the United States is especially vital in the future's 
technologically sophisticated battlefield. This capability is required to 
correctly portray the battlespace for warfighting commanders. Furthermore, 
TECHINT enhances force protection. To neglect TECHINT during the 
planning and execution of Army operations invites the possibility of 
technological surprise. 
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Chapter 2 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
TECHINT is the end product of a complex process. It is the result of 
collecting, analyzing, and processing information on foreign technological 
developments. It is also the result of studying the performance of foreign 
materiel and its operational capabilities. 
TECHINT has two goals: 
• To ensure the US armed forces maintain technological advantage 
against any adversary. 
• To provide tailored, timely, and accurate TECHINT support to the 
warfighter throughout the entire range of military operations. 
This support includes providing US forces information and training on 
foreign weapons systems to an extent that allows use of the CEE. The 
TECHINT system accomplishes both missions. 
THE S&TI COMMUNITY 
The S& TI community satisfies the nation's overall TECHINT objectives 
during peacetime, and the strategic TECHINT requirements in wartime. 
The S& TI community starts at the DOD level. Figure 2-1 shows this 
orga nizationa I structure. 
S& TI is designed to track and analyze foreign technological developments. 
It is used to analyze the performance and operational capabilities of foreign 
materiel that may have military application. 
Although the primary function of the S& TI community is to satisfy strategic 
TECHINT objectives, it also makes significant contributions toward fulfilling 
operational and tactical TECHINT requirements. Strategic communications 
between battlefield TECHINT units and S& TI centers allow the use of their 
comprehensive databases and expertise to rapidly satisfy the TECHINT 
requirements of the warfighter. 
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2-2 
I 
ONI-23 
FM 34-54 
STRUCTURE 
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: 
DIA manages and reviews overall TECHINT activities throughout DOD 
during peacetime and war. The S& TI directorate within DIA is the action 
element for TECHINT. This directorate coordinates with external 
TECHINT agencies on nonpolicy matters concerning the production of 
S&TI. 
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC). AFMIC based at 
Fort Detrick, MD, is a DOD intelligence production center under control of 
DIA. AFMIC is responsible for exploiting foreign medical materiel. The 
director supports the Army Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program (FMEP) 
and Army medical R&D requirements. The director coordinates with the 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT) in planning, programming, 
and budgeting. AFMIC-
• Studies and reports foreign medical S& TI and general medical 
intelligence to DOD and other Federal agencies. 
• Studies and reports foreign biological warfare S& TI capabilities. 
• Administers the DOD Foreign Medical Materiel Exploitation Program 
(FMMEP). 
• Provides "quick response" foreign medical intelligence support to DOD 
and other Federal agencies. 
• Maintains a mutually beneficial S& TI exchange with the US Army 
Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to complement Army 
capabilities. 
Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC). MSIC, based at Redstone 
Arsenal, AL. is a DOD intelligence production center under control of DIA 
and supports the FMEP. The MSIC acquires, produces, maintains, and 
disseminates S& TI pertaining to missile and space weapons systems, 
subsystems, components, and activities. The S& TI produced at MSIC also 
covers foreign state-of-the-art technology and research applicable to 
missiles. MSIC analyzes-
• Directed energy weapons. 
• Antisatellite technology. 
• Tactical air defense. 
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• Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). 
• Antitank guided missiles (A TGMs). 
Defense HUMINT Service (DHS). DHS conducts worldwide HUMINT 
operations in support of foreign materiel acquisition and exploitation. 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA): 
NSA is the SIGINT organization of the US Government. It is responsible 
for exploiting cryptologic and electronic warfare (EW) materiel. 
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA): 
DARPA is the central R&D organization for DOD. It manages and directs 
selected basic and applied R&D projects for DOD and pursues research 
and technology where risk and payoff are both very high and where 
success may provide dramatic advances for traditional military roles and 
missions. DARPA sponsors R&D in all aspects of TECHINT, including 
imagery intelligence (IMINT), SIGINT, HUMINT, and measurement and 
signature intelligence (MASINT). For the latest description of DARPA 
projects, visit the DARPA World Wide Web site on the Internet: 
http://www.arpa.mil/. 
AIR FORCE: 
NAVY: 
National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC). NAIC is the primary DOD 
agency producing foreign aerospace S& TI. It satisfies DIA requirements 
and supports the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 
(AFACSI). NAIC acquires, analyzes, produces, and disseminates S& TI 
related to current and future enemy aerospace capabilities. 
Naval EOD Technical Division and Fire Support and Armament 
Command EOD. These are the primary training centers of all Joint EOD 
personnel. Augmented by Army EOD specialists from Picatinny Arsenal. 
they act as primary centers establishing identification, render safe 
procedures (RSPs) and demolition procedures for foreign ordnance. 
Office of Naval Intelligence. The Navy proponent for TECHINT in the 
Office of Naval Intelligence (aNI) is designated ONI-23. ONI-23 provides 
ARMY: 
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S& TI on technical characteristics and capabilities of foreign naval forces 
and merchant systems. It provides S& TI support to the Commander of 
the ONI and the Chief of Naval Operations. 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ODCSINT). Although 
ODCSINT does not produce intelligence, it does have general staff 
responsibility for all Army TECHINT activities. The ODCSINT-
• Formulates policies and procedures for S& TI activities. 
• Supervises and carries out the Army S& TI program. 
• Coordinates Department of the Army (DA) staff and major subordinate 
command requirements for TECHINT. 
• Is responsible for the Army Foreign Materiel Program (FMP). 
US Army Materiel Command (AMC). AMC is a major Army command 
(MACOM) with a significant support role in TECHINT. Among AMC 
elements are a series of research, development. and engineering centers 
(RDECs), the Army Research Laboratory System, and the US Army Test 
and Evaluation Command (TECOM). Each plays a role in wartime in 
conducting highly technical evaluations of foreign equipment. In 
peacetime, the AMC conducts foreign materiel exploitation (FME) on 
equipment purchased by each laboratory and RDEC for the intelligence 
community and for DOD as part of the International Materiel Evaluation 
Program (IMEP). 
AMC's Foreign Ordnance exploitation team is at the Fire Support 
Armaments Center (FSAC) EOD (Picatinny Arsenal). They exploit foreign 
ground ordnance and develop RSP for foreign ordnance. They also 
prepare detailed intelligence reports to support EOD, Intelligence, and US 
munitions developer communities. 
Additionally, AMC operates the Scientific Intelligence Center Europe 
(STICEUR) and Scientific Intelligence Center Far East (STICFE) with the 
purpose of overtly collecting information on foreign technical developments 
by attending arms shows and technology exhibitions. 
AMC's Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) is the 
headquarters for the US Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU). This unit has 
the mission to collect and escort nuclear, biological. and chemical (NBC) 
samples from the battlefield to CONUS for testing and evaluation. 
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US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)_ Under the 
direction of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), INSCOM is 
responsible for peacetime TECHINT operations. Headquarters, INSCOM, 
fulfills its responsibilities through its TECHINT oversight function and 
manages the Army's Foreign Materiel for Training (FMT) Program and 
FMEP. It does this by-
• Providing the interface with strategic S& TI agencies in support of 
foreign materiel exploitation. 
• Organizing, training, and equipping echelons above corps (EAC) 
TECHINT organizations during peacetime. 
Headquarters, INSCOM, controls two organizations that facilitate 
TECHINT: National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) and the 203d MI 
Battalion. 
National Ground Intelligence Center: 
Headquarters, INSCOM, exercises direct operational control over the 
NGIC. NGIC produces and maintains intelligence on foreign scientific 
developments, ground force weapons systems, and associated 
technologies. NGIC analysis includes, but is not limited to, military 
communications-electronics (C-E) systems which include-
• Types of aircraft used by foreign ground forces (usually rotary wing). 
• NBC systems. 
• Basic research in civilian technologies with possible military 
applications. 
Z03d Milita[}' Intelligence Battalion: 
The 203d MI Battalion, headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, is 
the only AC TECHINT battalion. The 203d MI Battalion is subordinate to 
the Force Projection Brigade (FPB) supporting national level S& TI. It-
• Conducts TECHINT and MASINT collection and reporting in support of 
validated S& TI objectives and MASINT data requirements (MDRs). 
• Acts as the HQDA executive agent for foreign materiel used for training 
purposes. 
• Conducts formalized TECHINT and MASINT training for DOD analysts 
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and RC TECHINT personnel. 
• Supports INSCOM's foreign materiel acquisition (FMA) operations and 
FME operations as directed. 
• Supports the Technical Reconnaissance and Surveillance (TECRAS) 
Program through its MASINT detachment. See Appendix A for MASINT 
support to TECHINT operations. 
All TECHINT assets that reside in the RC are Wartraced to the 203d MI 
Battalion. Their primary peacetime mission focuses on training. However, 
certain RC TECHINT units and individuals are tasked to augment real 
world S& TI missions. 
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Chapter 3 
BATTLEFIELD TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes battlefield TECHINT operations, functions, and 
procedures. Battlefield TECHINT operations consist of collection, hasty 
exploitation, initial TECHINT reporting, analysis, evacuation (as necessary), 
detailed exploitation and analysis, and production and dissemination of final 
TECHINT products. The term "battlefield" includes any area of operation 
that US forces occupy while conducting the full range of military operations. 
Battlefield TECHINT can start with one conscientious soldier identifying 
something new in the area of operations and taking the proper steps to 
report it. The information or item is initially exploited to ascertain if it 
represents an advantage for the enemy. If it does, the information or item 
then undergoes increasing levels of analysis until a countermeasure is 
developed and the technological advantage is neutralized. While a single 
weapon or technology seldom means the difference between final victory or 
defeat. it can give one side a battlefield advantage. 
A mutually dependent relationship exists between the support the 
warfighter gets from the TECHINT process and the support TECHINT gets 
from the warfighter. Operational and tactical commanders identify, capture, 
protect. and evacuate CEM that undergoes analysis for TECHINT value. 
TECHINT analysts receive CEM, conduct detailed exploitation, and 
recommend countermeasures to overcome an enemy's technological 
advantage. 
Another result of this analysis is the development of a new US technology 
or an enhancement to an existing technology. In any case the end result is 
the neutralization of the adversary's technological advantage. 
Commanders further ensure the success of the process by demanding 
TECHINT support to accomplish their assigned missions. 
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Figure 3-1. TECHINT operations. 
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The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) mission during conflict and war is to 
provide near-real-time (NRT) intelligence derived from the exploitation of 
weapons, equipment. and other materiel found, captured, or acquired within 
the theater area of operations. This includes all items of an S& T nature. 
This battalion is the centerpiece of the theater TECHINT mission; task-
organizing personnel and equipment to support several echelons. Figure 
3-2 shows the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) organization. The HHC and 
the TECHINT Exploitation Company form the CMEC. This union is 
discussed below. 
TECHINT 
Exploitation 
Company 
COMMANDER 
203d MI BN 
(TECHINT) 
TECHINT 
Collection 
Company 
C Det 
NTC 
(Collection) 
D Det 
(MASINT) 
1* JCMEC I or 1* CJCMEC I 
TECHINT 
Collection 
Team 
LNO 
NGIC 
LEGEND: 
* Joint and/or combined operations. 
Figure 3-2. The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) organization. 
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HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (HHC): 
HHC conducts normal service support operations. In addition, its 
personnel may be tasked to perform duties as LN Es at various echelons. The S4 
section, besides its normal maintenance and logistics staff 
responsibilities, also plays a significant role in the TECHINT concept of 
operations. The S4-
• Conducts warehouse operations for all CEE maintained at the CMEC. 
• Monitors CEE at the Corps level collection points. 
• Monitors captured ammunition and ordnance at Corps ammunition 
points. 
• Assists in the transportation and tracking of equipment from theater to 
CONUS. 
TECHINT EXPLOITATION COMPANY: 
The TECHINT Exploitation Company consists of TECHINT collection 
managers and senior technical analysts in weapons and armaments, 
mobility systems, EW and communications systems, and chemical. 
medical, and logistics systems. 
Duringjoint and/or combined operations the CMEC may receive joint 
and/or combined augmentees. In this case, the CMEC is redesignated as 
the JCMEC or Combined Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center 
(CJCMEC). In all three configurations, the CMEC is commanded by the 
Commander, 203d MI Battalion. See Appendix B for JCMEC operations 
and responsibilities. 
TECHINT COLLECTION COMPANY: 
The TECHINT Collection Company consists of three TECHINT collection 
teams that normally are attached one per Corps MI brigade. The teams' 
mission is to conduct the initial identification and exploitation of foreign 
equipment in support of the Corps and, when directed, theater and national 
requirements. Additionally, the teams help monitor evacuation of the 
equipment off the battlefield. 
The MI Team (TECHINT) (Collection) serves as the intelligence collection 
system for the battalion. It consists of TECHINT-qualified soldiers trained in 
the military occupational specialties (MOSs) shown in Figure 3-3. These 
teams, trained in TECHINT analysis, deploy forward of the JCMEC 
into the Corps area and receive their taskings from the CMEC through 
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TECHINT LNEs at the Corps G2. CEE is stored in the theater COSCOM. 
NTC AND MASINT DETACHMENTS: 
The Naval Technical Center (NTC) TECHINT Detachment, currently 
C Detachment, 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) , is similar to the TECHINT 
Collection Company in its mission to conduct initial identification and 
exploitation of foreign equipment in support of Corps, theater, and national 
requirements. It is organized similar to the TECHINT collection teams 
that are subordinate to the TECHINT Collection Company. During wartime 
or contingency it would have the same command and control relationships as a TECHINT 
collection team. It also has the additional mission of supporting INSCOM's FMT Program at the 
National Training 
33T3 
Electronic 
Warfare 
9183 
Medical 
Materiel 
9684 
Intelligence 
Analyst 
Center. 
The MASINT Detachment attaches MASINT analysts to the TECHINT 
collection teams and also provides senior analysts to the TECHINT 
Collection Company. 
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Figure 3-3. TECHINT team organization. 
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BATTLEFIELD TECHINT CHANNELS 
The battlefield TECHINT channels are designed to support both operational 
and tactical levels of war. They support warfighting commanders at all 
levels (see Figure 2-1). 
EAC TECHINT support consists of the Joint Technical Intelligence Branch 
(JTIB) located at the Theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), the CMEC 
formed around the 203d MI Battalion, and TECHINT LNEs located at 
various EAC analysis and control elements (ACEs). These EAC TECHINT 
assets provide general support to the theater. 
Echelons corps and below (ECB) TECHINT support initially consists of 
TECHINT collection teams and TECHINT LNEs detached from the 203d MI 
Battalion. At a minimum, one TECHINT collection team is attached to each 
Corps MI Brigade. The team takes operational direction from the G2 via the 
TECHINT liaison officer (LNO) in providing direct support to ECB units from 
forward locations on the battlefield. A TECHINT LNE is attached to each 
Corps G2 or component equivalent. Upon mobilization, RC TECHINT units 
augment the 203d MI Battalion. 
Regardless of the echelon, TECHINT elements are equipped to give the 
supported commander timely, relevant. accurate, and predictive information 
and recommended countermeasures based on CEM exploitation. This 
exploitation includes identifying, analyzing, and coordinating the evacuation 
of CEE, CEO, and other CEM. See 
Appendix C for procedures for handling and evacuating CEM. 
JOINT TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 
The JTIB is formed during joint operations. The JTIB is located at the 
Theater JIC and is composed of military and civilian TECHINT subject 
matter experts (SMEs). The JTIB chief is normally the DIA representative 
and serves as the senior advisor on TECHINT matters to the Theater 
Commander and the J2. 
The JTI B conducts the following missions: 
• Coordinates all national. operational, and tactical TECHINT 
requirements for the theater. 
• Develops the theater TECHINT collection plan. 
• Coordinates with the J2 and the JCMEC to execute all TECHINT 
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requirements. 
• Provides liaison and coordination support for the JCMEC and the 
TECHINT collection teams at the JTF level. 
CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER 
The main effort of the TECHINT mission is executed through a CMEC 
formed from TECHINT personnel from the 203d MI Battalion. The CMEC is 
the first major processor of CEM of TECHINT value. The CMEC-
• Exploits CEM based on national, Theater, and supported commanders' 
requirements. 
• Produces TECHINT reports (including countermeasures) for tactical 
commanders. 
• In coordination with EOD, provides render safe procedures (RSPs) for 
foreign munitions to combat units. 
• Coordinates the safe handling and evacuation of CEM. 
• Coordinates evacuation of special-interest CEM from ECB locations to 
the CMEC. 
• Supervises evacuation of CEM from theater to CONUS. 
• Coordinates with the Theater or Joint Interrogation Facility for the 
selection and technical interrogation of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) 
assessed to have TECHINT-related knowledge. TECHINT analysts 
may assist interrogators and strategic debriefers during interrogation of a 
wide range of HUMINT sources of TECHINT interest by conducting 
"quarterback" debriefing operations with the debriefers. 
• Provides accountability for CEE and CEDs within the theater TECHINT 
structure. 
• Recommends CEM disposition to the Theater and Corps commands. 
• Maintains the theater TECHINT database. 
• Maintains the theater S& TI and battlefield TECHINT requirements. 
The CMEC normally is located in the theater rear area near main supply 
routes (MSRs) and air and sea ports to accommodate rapid evacuation of 
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equipment. Every effort should be made to collocate the CMEC with the 
Theater Interrogation Facility to enhance the integration of HUMINT and 
TECHINT operations. 
Additionally, being collocated provides a single geographical area where 
subordinate units bring captured personnel and CEM, as well as 
consolidating many transportation and security requirements. Regardless of 
its location, it is fully equipped with sensitive and sophisticated test and 
communication equipment. Analyst teams use this equipment to perform 
detailed in-theater exploitations. 
The CMEC can also organize a team from organic CMEC assets to meet 
immediate requirements of echelons without TECHINT support. These 
teams can deploy forward or support rear area units as required. 
JCMEC AND CJCMEC 
The JCMEC and CJCMEC are organized and conduct the same missions 
as the CMEC. The JCMEC and CJCMEC differ as follows. They-
• Allow a free flow of information, reports, and TECHINT exploitation 
summaries between joint forces and/or allies; this is because the 
intelligence support staff is joint and/or combined. 
• Coordinate scientific exploitation assistance from joint and/or allied 
TECHINT analysts. 
• May provide direct support US and allied TECHINT teams to joint and/or 
allied ECB units as required. 
TECHINT LIAISON ELEMENTS 
The TECHINT LNEs are composed of TECHINT personnel from the 203d MI 
Battalion. The LNEs serve as advisors on all TECHINT-related matters. 
The TECHINT LNEs provide coordination and tasking support for the CMEC 
and the theater TECHINT effort. The TECHINT LNEs consist of one to three 
TECHINT personnel. Figure 3-4 shows the possible locations of TECHINT 
LNEs if deployed as part of a JTF. 
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Figure 3-4. Possible locations of TECHINT LNEs when supporting a JTF. 
CORPS CMEC (FORWARD) 
------------------------------------------~ 
An RC TECHINT section may staff a Corps level CMEC (Forward) normally 
located at the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) area 
Class VII collection point. Its primary mission is to inventory and identify 
CEE located at the COS COM Class VII collection point and screen it for 
items of TECHINT value. 
After identifying an item of TECHINT value, the CMEC (Forward) 
coordinates with the Corps G4 through the supporting TECHINT LNE for the 
transportation of the item back to the CMEC. The CMEC (Forward) 
supports the movement of the CEE by packing or crating it when required. 
The RC TECHINT section conducts preliminary exploitation and reporting 
on the identified materiel and assists the Corps TECHINT teams as 
required. 
The RC TECHINT section normally consists of 15 personnel with organic 
transportation. The section's detailed analysis of CEE may be limited due to 
number of personnel and organic equipment. 
BATTLEFIELD TECHINT COLLECTION TEAMS 
The 203d MI Battalion provides direct support TECHINT collection teams to 
ECB MI Brigades or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) intelligence 
elements. These teams are mobile and organized according to available 
resources and subordinate command requirements. 
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TECHINT collection teams perform their mission as a tactical extension of 
the CMEC. They concentrate on the initial identification and exploitation of 
CEM and provide TECHINT assistance to Corps and Division G2s. Detailed 
analysis by these teams is limited due to personnel limitations and lack of 
extensive diagnostic equipment. The TECHINT collection team normally will 
have 14 TECHINT analysts and 2 MASINT analysts. 
TECHINT collection teams are usually staffed with analysts capable of 
exploiting threat equipment and documents in eight functional areas: 
C-E, automation systems, weapons, munitions, NBC, medical. mobility, and 
signatures analysis. The areas are described below: 
• C-E TECHINT is the analysis and exploitation of foreign and threat 
communications, computers, radars, intercept and jamming equipment. 
and like systems, including electro-optic and directed-energy 
technology. 
• Automation systems TECHINT is the analysis and exploitation of foreign 
automation hardware and software. 
• Weapons TECHINT involves the analysis of threat weapons and 
weapon systems, including rocket. tube artillery, mortars, small arms, 
A TGMs, other missiles, and associated fire control. 
• Munitions TECHINT involves the analysis of threat munitions including 
missiles, NBC munitions, direct and indirect fire weapons ammunition, 
explosives, and mines. 
• NBC TECHINT is based on the analysis of threat offensive and 
defensive NBC material including NBC samples, flame materials, and 
obscurants. This analysis determines threat strengths and vulnerabilities 
in relation to NBC operations. 
• Medical TECHINT focuses on the identification, evaluation, and 
exploitation of medical materiel. general purpose systems modified for 
medical support. and biological agents sampling. 
• Mobility TECHINT exploits threat vehicles, engineer equipment. 
materiel handling equipment. and power generation. Mobility TECHINT 
determines the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the enemy to maneuver 
and support its combat forces on the battlefield. 
• Signatures analysis involves collecting and analyzing the acoustic, 
infrared, and hyperspectral and seismic signatures of foreign equipment. 
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Historical Vignette 
The XVIII Airborne Corps in support of a JTF is engaged in military operations in the country of 
Zula. During search operations, Company A of the 1 st Battalion, 25th Infantry, discovers a 
recently vacated facility that contains chemicals. 
The commander notifies the 1 st Battalion 52 and secures the facility until a permanent security 
force arrives. The Battalion 52 notifies the Brigade 52, who in turn requests that the battlefield 
TECHINT collection team investigates the facility. 
The battlefield TECHINT collection team arrives at the facility and does a cursory evaluation. 
Upon initial identification, several chemical samples are removed and transported to the Corps 
CMEC (Forward). The battlefield TECHINT collection team submits a report through channels to 
the JTF J2 stating that certain suspect chemicals have been found; they've been identified as 
nerve gas; they will be moved to the Corps CMEC (Forward), and the team will confirm its initial 
findings in a follow-up report within 4 hours. 
Upon receipt. the Corps CMEC (Forward) coordinates with the Corps G4, through the supporting 
TECHINT LNE, to transport the chemicals to the Corps CMEC. 
If identification is made at the Corps CMEC, then the Corps G2 submits a report through the 
Corps ACE to the JTF J2, for dissemination to the XVIII Airborne Corps G2, 1 st Brigade 52, and 
1 st Battalion 52 for further dissemination to the Commander of Company A (the unit that found 
the chemicals). The Corps G2 also provides the report to other commanders and staffs within 
the AO. If identification or further analysis is required, the Corps CMEC coordinates the safe 
handling and evacuation of chemicals to CONU5 for identification and reporting. 
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The five-step process known as the intelligence cycle is applied to 
TECHINT operations to ensure synchronization with the overall all-source 
intelligence mission and collection plan. 
PLAN AND DIRECT 
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB ) is the primary intelligence 
task which helps the J2/G2 focus and direct this step of TECHINT and the 
remaining steps of the intelligence cycle. Figure 4-1 shows an example of 
planning and directing. 
Coordinates captured 
equipment priorities 
TRANSPORTATION 
Tasks collectors and evacuators 
Develops transportation plans 
Develops and disseminates 
mission taskings 
UNIT Executes mission taskings 
Figure 4-1. Planning and directing. 
The JTIB develops the commander's TECHINT priority intelligence 
requirements (PIR), TECHINT information requirements (IR), and specific 
information requests (SIR). The JTIB helps develop TECHINT 
commander's critical information requirements (CCI R) and SI R of a 
TECHINT nature. The JTIB ensures requirements are closely coordinated 
with combatant command J2, or theater Army G2 as well as major 
subordinate commands; for example, corps G2. The JTIB then integrates 
and deconflicts these CCI Rand SI R with other items of special interest to 
the S& TI community and develops a prioritized TECHINT collection list. 
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The TECHINT CCIR and SIR and the prioritized TECHINT collection list 
normally are found in the TECHINT Appendix to the Intelligence Annex to 
the operations order (OPORD) at all echelons maneuver brigade or group 
and above. 
Through all-source analysis, the JTIB and JCMEC template are where 
items of TECHINT interest are most likely to be found on the battlefield. 
This is referred to as "TECHINT templating." Appropriate units are notified, 
through intelligence, that these items may be within their areas of 
operations and are tasked for collection through collection management 
channels. The taskings must be translated into terms that combat. support. 
a nd specific collectors ca n understa nd. 
The taskings should include a TECHINT target folder (TTF). Figure 4-2 
shows an example of a TTF. At a minimum, the TTF should include a 
description of the item, with what major combat systems the item is 
associated, as well as handling instructions, reporting instructions, and a 
photograph or sketch if available. The JCMEC and Corps level CMEC 
(Forward) are responsible for producing TTFs. 
1. General information: 
4-2 
a. Target folder inventorylindex. 
b. Record of changes/updates. 
c. Validation/review sheet. 
d. Target identification data-
(1) Name. 
(2) Description. 
(3) Photographs or sketches (imagery showing location on major end 
item ifTECHINT item is sUbcomponent). 
(4) Country of origin. 
(5) Other equipment associated with materiel. 
(6) General description/significance (brief explanation of importance of 
materiel in terms of direct results should its use be denied partially 
or totally). 
(7) Type of unit materiel is associated with (unit designation if available). 
(8) Disposition instructions. 
(9) References. 
Figure 4-2. TECHINT target folder. 
Additionally, the JCMEC must develop TECHINT-related indicators and 
SOR for other intelligence disciplines to augment and complement the 
single-source TECHINT effort. One example would be the development of 
TECHINT-related screening questions for EPWs as they are processed. 
Another might be to request that imagery analysts keep an 
COLLECT 
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eye out for a suspected external modification on a particular model of 
main battle tank during the normal course of their duty. 
TECHINT collection is acquiring foreign materiel, associated technical 
documents, or other information of TECHINT interest and providing these to 
the processing and production elements. It includes the maneuver and 
positioning of intelligence assets to locations favorable to satisfying 
TECHINT collection objectives. 
All TECHINT collection is guided by CCIR. SIR. and the TECHINT 
collection list. Battlefield TECHINT collection includes capturing, reporting, 
and evacuating CEM. For that reason, tactical TECHINT and intelligence 
planners must include a CEM appendix in the Logistics Annex to the 
OPORD. Logistics is critical in TECHINT collection operations. 
Forward deployed units capture or collect items of known or possible 
TECHINT interest. Capturing units will normally safeguard CEM and report 
it through intelligence channels to the first TECHINT element in the 
reporting chain, normally the TECHINT LNE at Corps G2. The Corps 
TECHINT LNE then forwards the report simultaneously to the JCMEC and 
JTIB and verifies if the type of materiel captured is required. Further 
disposition is determined, appropriate coordination is made by the Corps 
TECHINT LNE with G2/G3 staff, and the capturing unit receives guidance 
through operational (G3/S3) channels. Figure 4-3 describes the flow of 
CEM guidance and decisions. 
A TECHINT collection team may be sent forward to confirm the 
identification and conduct initial exploitation of the materiel at the site. 
Often the items of TECHINT value are subcomponents of major end items. 
In this case, the collection team removes and evacuates the items using 
organic transportation, as shown in Figure 4-4. 
The capturing unit may be ordered to evacuate the materiel with its organic 
equipment. In this instance, they will receive detailed instructions from the 
Corps LNE or direct support TECHINT collection team via G3/S3 channels. 
The Corps LNE or TECHINT collection team moves to the materiel's 
location at the Corps CEM collection point when the materiel is not taken 
directly to a Corps CMEC (Forward) or Theater JCMEC. 
TECHINT collection can prove to be a significant force protection multiplier. 
One example is TECHINT team identification of NBC materiel prior to 
transport. handling, or destruction of munitions or samples. 
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The G2 determines whether the captured item 
is of possible TECHINT interest and coordinates 
its evacuation priority with the G3. 
The G2 coordinates TECHINT 
team taskings, which could 
include on-site exploitation 
or evacuation oversight. 
The G3 approves its priority 
and tasks assets to 
evacuate it. 
The G4 provides disposition 
instructions to the MMC. 
1 t The G2 coordinates t '---- transportation .-/ 1 requirements with the G4. 
The TECHINT teams assist with 
special handling and shipping 
procedures. 
The MMC passes disposition 
instructions to the maintenance 
element doing the evacuation. 
The maintenance element 
requests shipping 
instructions from the 
transportation inventory. 
The G4 provides transportation 
priority to the transportation 
officer. 
The transportation officer 
performs foreign equipment 
inventory. 
! 
The transportation officer 
authorizes and arranges 
for pickup. 
Figure 4-3. Flow of CEM guidance and decisions. 
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Figure 4-4. Transportation operations. 
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PROCESS 
PRODUCE 
Processing is the conversion of collected information into a suitable form 
that can be readily used to produce intelligence. Processing includes data 
from conversion, photographic development. and transcription and 
translation of foreign language materiel. Effective processing management 
ensures that critical information is extracted and processed ahead of 
information of lesser immediate value. Reports are generated and sent to 
all appropriate theater and national assets during this process. 
TECHINT processing starts with the capture of a piece of equipment of 
TECHINT value. This confirms that the enemy is indeed employing this 
materiel. A TECHINT collection team normally conducts a hasty 
exploitation at the capture site. After the hasty exploitation, a decision is 
made at the JCMEC or JTIB as to whether the process continues. If it 
does, the items are sent to the Corps CMEC (Forward) or Theater JCMEC. 
If the item is deemed to yield no immediate tactical intelligence value, it may 
still be evacuated to the S& TI centers in CON US for further analysis if the 
systems represent a change in the technological posture of an enemy. 
Producing involves the integration, evaluation, analysis, and synthesis of 
information from single or multiple sources into intelligence. At the tactical 
level, time constraints and demands of the battle tend to make the 
processing and producing steps indistinguishable. 
TECHINT reports (along with interrogation reports from EPWs with 
TECHINT knowledge) and digital imagery both funnel into the JCMEC 
where they undergo the dynamics of production mentioned above. They 
are then sent to the JTIB and Theater ACE as a single-source TECHINT 
product. 
DISSEMINATE 
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Dissemination is the timely conveyance of intelligence to users in an easily 
consumable form. The diversity of forms and means requires 
interoperability among command, control. communications, and intelligence 
(C3 1) systems. TECHINT reporting from JCMEC to the Theater ACE will be 
conducted through existing communications links (See Appendix B for 
communications architecture). 
The JCMEC sends its completed products to the JTIB and to the Theater 
ACE. This report is based on the standard intelligence information report 
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(IIR) format. TECHINT reports are then disseminated through two 
channels. The ACE fuses the TECHINT single-source product into its all-
source reports and disseminates them through normal J2/G2/S2 channels. 
While the TECHINT single-source product is being integrated into the ACE 
all-source product the JTIB disseminates the single-source TECHINT 
product through TECHINT communications channels to the national S& TI 
centers in CONUS. This ensures both the rapid dissemination of TECHINT 
and the fusion of TECHINT into all-source products. 
The intelligence cycle is a continuous process in which steps are executed 
concurrently, although not always sequentially. For example, while new 
information is being collected to satisfy one set of TECHINT requirements, 
a new TECHINT item may be reported on the battlefield. The JTIB plans 
and redirects efforts while the intelligence produced from the previously 
collected materiel or information is disseminated. One or several iterations 
of the intelligence cycle may be conducted depending on the time 
constraints of the mission. 
BATTLEFIELD TECHINT REPORTING SEQUENCE 
THE CAPTURE: 
A soldier either captures or observes an item of possible TECHINT interest 
and does not tamper with it. The soldier quickly reports the encounter via 
the size, activity, location, unit time, and equipment (SALUTE) spot report 
format through the chain of command to the Battalion S2. The soldier then 
either safeguards the items or continues the mission as directed (see 
Figure 3-1). 
BATTALION S2: 
The battalion S2 coordinates security or continued observation of the item 
with the S3 and ensures the item is not tampered with in any way. 
WARNING 
Components, control knobs, and switches on 
C-E equipment MUST NOT be touched until the 
equipment is photographed or positions 
recorded by TECH INT or other trained 
personnel to avoid the possibility of immediate 
personal iniurv or damaqe to equipment. 
The battalion S2 reports the items in the SALUTE format to the brigade S2, 
and continues security or observation of the items until receiving further 
instructions. When possible, the capturing units identify associated items 
requiring immediate screening for combat information by other supporting 
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MI elements. This could include C-E systems, code books, or technical 
documents such as operator manuals. 
TECHINT LNE: 
The TECHINT LNE at Corps (or lowest level) receives the SALUTE report 
through intelligence reporting channels. He then compares report 
information with outstanding requirements to see if collection is necessary. 
Depending on the priority of the requirement and tactical situation, the 
Corps LNE may-
• Coordinate with the G3 and MI Brigade Commander to dispatch the 
Corps direct support TECHINT collection team to the capture site. 
• Give further instructions for exploitation and/or evacuation procedures 
to the capturing unit S2. 
If an intelligence requirement no longer exists for the captured equipment. 
the LNE informs the capturing S2 who disposes of the materiel within 
normal logistics channels. 
In any case, the Corps TECHINT LNE forwards an information copy of the 
SALUTE report with details of initial actions taken to the JTIB, JCMEC, and 
other TECHINT LNEs. 
BATTLEFIELD TECHINT ANALYSIS 
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Once a TECHINT unit takes custody of a TECHINT item, battlefield 
TECHINT exploitation begins. TECHINT analysts and specialists use 
checklists established by S& TI agencies and the JCMEC to exploit each 
type of threat equipment for which requirements exist. S& TI and the 
JCMEC develop battlefield exploitation procedures from four sources: 
• The US Army Test and Evaluation Command's international test 
operation procedures. 
• Coordination with S& TI analysts. 
• Theater and Corps TECHINT requirements. 
• Their own experience. 
Exploitation procedures are standardized yet constantly updated and 
included in different exploitation plans based on the type of equipment or 
documents being exploited. These plans steer the analysis process. 
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As the materiel moves through the TECHINT chain, each succeeding level 
of the exploitation process is completed. TECHINT units maintain 
procedures and plans for sampling, exploiting, and handling materiel in the 
following categories: 
• Missile guidance systems, warheads, fuses, and propellants. 
• Munitions, mines, explosives, and their effects. 
• Direct and indirect fire systems of all types and their effects. 
• Tracked and wheeled vehicles and transports. 
• Various types of armor, radios, and radar. 
• EW, intercept. and jamming equipment. 
• Communications, antenna, relay, and telephone equipment. 
• Teletypes. 
• Directed energy weapons. 
• Automated data processing (ADP) hardware and software. 
• NBC offensive and defensive equipment. 
• Tactical aviation. 
• Medical equipment capabilities and vulnerabilities. 
Although exploitation plans are extremely useful, it is the analyst who 
determines the actual steps to use in each procedure. Analysis always 
begins with what is, and what is not. known about the piece of equipment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
This chapter outlines the various responsibilities of each staff element in 
units on the battlefield when supporting the overall battlefield TECHINT 
effort. Battlefield TECHINT elements are resourced and responsible for 
collecting and processing CEM. Yet to work properly, the battlefield 
TECHINT structure relies on many other units for mission support. such as 
combat units which capture items, and the transportation units which 
evacuate items of TECHINT interest. Figure 5-1 shows staff 
responsibilities. 
STAFF SECTIONS 
The duties of coordination staff sections and how they relate to TECHINT 
direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination are 
discussed below. From the Jl/Gl to the J5/G5, every staff section 
contributes in some way to the successful production and use of TECHINT. 
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J1/G1, PERSONNEL 
The Jl/Gl is the principal staff element for the commander on all matters 
concerning human resources. The Jl/Gl 's involvement in the battlefield 
TECHINT effort is a result of their primary staff responsibilities for-
• Planning and handling EPW evacuation and processing. The prisoner 
evacuation channel is one of the richest sources of CEM. All Jl/Gl 
annexes to OPORDs and operations plans (OPLANs) need to state that 
all CEE will be inspected by TECHINT personnel, and/or be transported 
to the Corps Captured Equipment Point by the transportation unit within 
the Corps. 
• Directing the command surgeon in captured medical supply disposition 
and medical intelligence responsibilities. 
• Coordinating with the J3/G3 to identify and assign special duty 
personnel such as JCMEC translators and SMEs. 
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STAFF INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
Figure 5-1. Staff sections res-ponsib1TitTes.-
The J2/G2 is the principal staff section for the commander on all 
intelligence matters and, as such, has primary responsibility for the 
command's battlefield TECHINT effort. The J2/G2's primary battlefield 
TECHINT responsibilities include, but are not limited to-
• Providing staff supervision over captured and detained persons with 
S& T expertise and exploiting CEM. 
• Supervising battlefield TECHINT planning, directing, processing, 
producing, and disseminating. 
• Exercising staff supervision over the JCMEC or attached battlefield 
TECHINT team operations. 
• Coordinating battlefield TECHINT collection tasking, with the J3/G3, MI, 
EOO, NBC, and other combat and combat support units. 
• Coordinating with the JCMEC to provide instructions to units capturing 
enemy materiel, captured medical materiel exploitation, evacuation, and 
disposition with the command surgeon. 
• Coordinating CEM evacuation with the J4/G4. This includes 
coordinating transportation priorities, disposition, and opportunities to 
screen CEM in logistic channels. 
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• Coordinating with the J5/G5 the TECHINT screening of materiel 
obtained from local nationals, displaced persons, and civilian detainees. 
• Coordinating with the staff judge advocate (SJA) to ensure compliance 
with the Geneva Conventions regarding exploitation of captured 
personnel and materiel. Ensure that the SJA includes instructions on 
CEM in the legal annex to OPORDs and OPLANs regarding war 
trophies and souvenirs. 
• Coordinating with the military historical officer to ensure all items of 
possible historical value are initially screened for TECHINT value. 
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J3/G3, OPERATIONS 
The J3/G3 is the principal staff section for the commander in matters 
concerning operations, plans, organization, and training. The J3/G3's 
involvement in the battlefield TECHINT effort is a result of their primary 
staff responsibilities. As they relate to battlefield TECHINT, these 
responsibilities include-
• Coordinating terrain management and clearance or movement issues 
for TECHINT teams to move about the battlefield as missions dictate. 
• Exercising primary staff responsibility over the supporting aviation, 
chemical, engineer, fire support coordination officers, and the provost 
marshal (PM). 
• Preparing, coordinating, and publishing the command standing 
operating procedures (SOPs), OPLANs, and OPORDs. This includes 
instructions for handling CEM, such as collection, reporting, 
exploitation, evacuation, and disposition. 
• Reviewing subordinate command SOPs, OPLANs, and OPORDs to 
ensure provisions for battlefield TECHINT are included. 
• Incorporating TECHINT into current and future operations and plans. 
• Assigning, attaching, and detaching battlefield TECHINT assets to 
subordinate and adjacent commands. 
• Advising the commander on friendly use of CEM. This includes to 
whom the materiel should be allocated, such as irregular or other local 
national forces. 
• Training US troops in the safe disposition and use of CEM. 
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ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J4/G4, LOGISTICS 
The J4/G4 is the principal staff section for the commander in matters 
concerning supply, maintenance, transportation, and services. As the 
logistical planner, the J4/G4 conducts vital coordination for the TECHINT 
system. This includes-
• Exercising primary staff responsibility over the EOD officer and the 
transportation officer. 
• Coordinating with the Support Command Commander, who is 
responsible for logistical support operations; and the J3/G3 for support 
of battlefield TECHINT collection operations. 
• Coordinating and developing command policy for the evacuation and 
disposition of CEM. Give particular attention to "back-haul" 
transportation plans for CEM. 
• Ensuring that the Service Support Annex to the OPORD has an 
appendix that addresses CEM. 
• Recommending to the J3/G3 the MSR and the main evacuation route of 
EPWs and CEM. 
• Supervising the establishment and the operation of CEM collection 
points in the unit support area, normally near the Class VII collection 
point. 
• Coordinating the setup and support of the JCMEC and CMEC 
(Forward) at the Corps collection points. 
• Ensuring inventory and storage location records are properly 
maintained and are reported through materiel management centers 
(MMC) and TECHINT or JCMEC channels. 
• Recommending policies and procedures for the use of captured 
nonintelligence-value equipment and providing technical staff 
assistance to the command's MI unit. 
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J5/G5, CIVIL AFFAIRS 
The J5/G5 is the commander's principal staff officer in all matters 
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concerning civilians and their impact on military operations. This includes 
the political, economic, and social effects of military operations on civilian 
personnel. The JS/GS's involvement in the battlefield TECHINT effort is a 
result of their primary coordinating staff responsibilities for civilian liaison 
and Civil Affairs (CA). These responsibilities include-
• Supervising CA functions of the command regarding care and handling 
of displaced persons, refugees, and any incidental foreign S& T materiel 
CA personnel may secure. 
• Ensuring inclusion of TECHINT collection and notification procedures in 
all CA SOPs, OPLANs, and OPORDs. 
• Coordinating with the command's battlefield TECHINT unit for the 
screening, exploitation, and evacuation of any CA-secured CEM. 
• Coordinating with the J2/G2 and J4/G4 for the return of CEM to the 
civilian populace. 
SPECIAL STAFF OFFICERS 
Because TECH INT covers such a broad spectrum of disciplines, activities, 
and operations performed on the battlefield, the following special staff 
officers also play an important role in battlefield TECH INT. 
AVIATION OFFICER: 
• Coordinates with staff movement and transportation personnel for air 
evacuations of CEM and chemical and biological (CB) samples. 
CHEMICAL OFFICER: 
• Advises the commander on NBC intelligence matters. 
• Recommends employment of chemical troops in support of battlefield 
TECHINT teams, analysis, and collection operations. 
• Plays a key role in the success of the CB sampling mission; ensures 
that the mission is explained in the chemical Annex of the OPORD. 
ENGINEER OFFICER: 
• Plans and constructs engineering requirements. 
• Incorporates battlefield TECHINT analyses and studies regarding 
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mobility and survivability characteristics of enemy weapon systems into 
these OPLANs and OPOROs. 
• Provides construction support to JCMEC activities. 
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL OFFICER: 
• Establishes, operates, and supervises EOO-related TECHINT reporting 
procedures; includes these reporting procedures in the EOO portion of 
theOPLAN. 
• Coordinates with EOO TECHINT personnel at the JTIB, JCMEC, and 
TECHINT collection teams for dissemination of EOO TECHINT 
information. 
PROVOST MARSHAL: 
• Provides security for designated units, facilities, and convoys, including 
CEM, along the evacuation route and for TECHINT facilities when 
tasked by the J3/G3. 
• Coordinates with customs for the TECHINT screening of all CEM found 
at US redeployment or staging sites. 
• Establishes procedures to ensure military police confiscate, tag, report. 
and turn over to TECHINT personnel new or unidentified CEM 
discovered incidental to EPW handling operations. 
THEATER AND SUPPORTING COMMAND SURGEON: 
• Uses TECHINT when advising the commander on medical effects of 
NBC weapons on personnel. 
• Coordinates with the theater chemical officer to implement CB sampling 
procedures. 
• Includes CB sampling procedures in the medical portion of the OPLAN. 
• Coordinates TECHINT support to examine and process captured 
medical supplies and equipment; this includes planning and 
coordinating medical laboratories and personnel to assist in sample 
analyses. 
• Recommends medically related TECHINT PIR and IR to the J2/G2. 
• Coordinates the analysis of biological warfare agent specimens 
collected on the battlefield at the theater medical laboratory. 
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Coordinates with the J2/G2 and J3/G3 and provides countermeasures, 
quarantine recommendations, and other appropriate actions to 
safeguard friendly forces. 
AMMUNITION OFFICER: 
• Establishes policies for the safe storage and accountability of foreign 
munitions; also is responsible for the safety certification of foreign 
munitions designated for reissue to friendly troops. 
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE: 
• Coordinates the Theater war souvenir policy with the JCMEC 
Commander, JTIB, and the J2. This policy is determined by the 
deploying commander, based upon recommendations from JAG, G4, 
and TECHINT procedures. 
• Advises on legal matters concerning the movement of CEM out of the 
Theater. 
UNITS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
This section describes the responsibilities and duties of specific 
organizations and units on the battlefield that support TECHINT operations. 
JOINT CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER: 
The JCMEC's primary function is processing CEM into combat information 
and TECH INT. The JCMEC is organized around the 203d MI Battalion. 
When it is further augmented by experts from other nations, it becomes a 
CJCMEC. Regardless of the command or echelon it supports, it has the 
same capabilities. The JCMEC-
• Exploits CEE, CEO, and CEM. 
• Produces TECHINT reports, that include countermeasures, for tactical 
commanders. 
• Provides studies, OPLANs, OPOROs, maps, and special reports to 
disseminate the JCMEC findings. 
• Provides RSPs to combat units for found enemy weapons and enemy 
munitions, with coordination through joint EOO. 
• Coordinates the safe handling and evacuation of CEM with EOO 
elements. 
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• Coordinates evacuation of special-interest CEM from ECB locations to 
JCMEC. 
• Supervises evacuation of CEM from theater to CONUS. 
• Coordinates with the joint interrogation facility the selection of EPWs for 
TECHINT exploitation. Supplies interrogators with TECHINT 
requirements for EPW interrogation. 
• Provides accountability for CEM within the theater TECHINT structure. 
• Recommends CEM disposition to the Theater and Corps commands. 
• Maintains the theater TECHINT database. 
• Maintains S& TI and battlefield PIR IR and list of special interest items. 
CAPTURING UNITS: 
Combat units are usually the first to encounter new or modified threat 
materiel. However, other units such as engineers, military police, NBC 
teams, and logistic units may also encounter or capture such materiel. This 
materiel often comes with operating instructions and other technical 
documents. The intelligence officer at each echelon coordinates with 
J2/G2/S2 regarding TECHINT and captured or encountered threat materiel 
and documents. Together, they establish unit security, RSPs, reporting, 
and dissemination procedures for CEM. 
Capturing units must strive not to destroy TECHINT materiel known or 
believed to answer PIR IR special interest lists, or unidentified or new 
items before receiving disposition instructions. CEM and logistics 
complexes must be safeguarded and reported through intelligence 
channels. Captured items known or believed to answer TECHINT 
requirements are reported via SALUTE format to higher command normally 
to the Corps TECHINT LNE. 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNITS: 
The attachments of TECHINT teams less operational control (OPCON) to 
MI units (for example, one TECHINT team per corps MI brigade) enhances 
TECHINT operations, as well as improves coordination and synergy among 
all MI disciplines. MI units are normally best able to provide administrative 
and logistical support to forward deployed TECHINT teams due to like 
missions and collocation. 
All MI units are responsible for establishing SOPs and having procedures 
for handling, screening, and reporting TECHINT-related items or 
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information encountered incidental to normal organizational activities. 
The following items relate to enemy C-E systems: 
• Code books. 
• Frequency tables. 
• C-E operations instructions. 
• C-E standing instructions. 
• Cryptographic data. 
• Cryptographic items. 
• Encrypted items. 
• C-E hardware or software. 
• Examples of materiel, including CEE and CED, requiring immediate MI 
screening. 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: 
Special Operations Forces consist of special forces and ranger units, 
special operations aviation units, psychological operations (PSYOP) teams, 
and CA elements. 
Special Forces and Ranger Units. These forces usually operate deep in 
enemy-controlled areas. This means they are generally the first to 
discover, identify, and provide information on a variety of TECHINT-related 
CEE, CEDs, or facilities. They can provide-
• New or previously unacquired materiel. 
• Locations of enemy materiel. 
• Other technical data. 
• Capture of enemy S& T personnel. 
Special Operations Aviation Units. Special operations aviation units 
provide aviation support to units conducting special operations missions 
usually deep within enemy-controlled areas. These units can provide 
technical data on enemy radars, as well as on observed enemy equipment. 
Incidental to assigned air missions, special operations aviation units can 
often "back-haul" limited amounts of priority CEM to rear areas. 
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Psychological Operations Teams. PSYOP personnel support theater, 
corps, and division. Historically, PSYOP has supported TECHINT 
collection through creative PSYOP designed to secure TECHINT-related 
CEM, information, and/or personnel. 
An example of a PSYOP success comes from the Korean War. A North 
Korean pilot was paid a $100,000 bounty for flying his Soviet MiG-15 to the 
south, after the bounty was offered by leaflet and radio. The benefits were 
enormous. The Communists grounded all MiG flights for eight days; and 
getting the MiG turned out to be a TECHINTwindfal1. 
PSYOP specifically designed to provide TECHINT occurred during the 
Vietnam War. A PSYOP campaign encouraged enemy soldiers to 
surrender with their weapons and equipment intact; rewards were offered 
and paid to Viet Cong and NVA troops who did this. This type of campaign 
not only reduced the number of weapons available to the enemy but also 
provided a continuous source of materiel for the CMEC to exploit. 
Civil Affairs Elements. These elements provide support to tactica I and 
operational commanders by coordinating between military forces, civil 
authorities, and area of operations personnel. CA support to the battlefield 
TECHINT process includes-
• Providing SMEs to assist in the TECHINT analysis of food and 
agriculture; public communications, health, transportation, and supply; 
public works and utilities; and centers of commerce and industry. 
• Securing TECHINT-related materiel and foreign experts having CA 
wartime responsibility for civil administration and refugee handling. 
ENGINEER TOPOGRAPHIC AND TERRAIN UNITS: 
These units are responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating 
topographic information and terrain intelligence. They normally function at 
theater, corps, and division levels. TECHINT units use engineer 
topographic and terrain products to support TECHINT collection planning. 
Engineers also support analysis and exploitation of CEM and facilities 
when this materiel is within their field of expertise. 
MILITARY POLICE: 
The military police fulfill a wide range of duties on the battlefield, to include 
providing route security for evacuating CEM and handling EPWs. In 
performance of these duties they often confiscate CEM from EPWs. 
Military police follow specific procedures for notifying MI personnel of 
equipment or documents of intelligence interest discovered incidental to 
EPW handling operations. 
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If not done previously, military police mark or tag all CEM and personnel in 
their custody. Since EPWs and materiel may become separated, military 
police use a three-part capture tag to clearly identify which prisoner the 
CEM came from. Accurate identification of the capture tag helps TECHINT 
analysts and interrogators match materiel with associated EPWs. It also 
makes it easier to return certain property to the EPW. (See Appendix C for 
an example of an EPW capture tag.) 
NBC RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS: 
NBC reconnaissance teams locate, identify, and mark contaminated areas. 
They collect. identify, and evacuate suspected samples of nuclear 
materials and CB warfare agents. This function is an important 
supplement to normal TECHINT collection capabilities. Collecting, 
handling, storing, and shipping these samples must be done using SOPs 
developed in a coordinated effort between the command surgeon, the staff 
NBC officer, and the staff S2. All parties involved must ensure they 
maintain a legal chain of custody of NBC samples for later possible war 
crimes processing. 
MEDICAL UNITS: 
Combat zone and communications zone medical support units are capable 
of giving specialized medical, laboratory, and medical intelligence 
assistance to TECHINT and other MI disciplines. The medical unit's S2 
coordinates this assistance to MI units. 
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL: 
One of the most critical and early sources of TECHINT on the battlefield is 
explosive ordnance. To safely exploit this source, EOO units provide 
specially trained personnel to support TECHINT collection teams and units 
in the area of operations. EOO personnel examine existing 
databases and prepare reports on new and unusual items of explosive 
ordnance for TECHINT purposes. 
TECHINT personnel should be familiar with EOO activities, capabilities, 
and responsibilities, as described in AR 75-15. Foreign explosive 
ordnance is extremely important to TECHINT analysts. TECHINT 
personnel coordinate closely with EOO personnel for proper disposal and 
evacuation of explosive ordnance, particularly when conducting initial 
inspections during hasty exploitations of CEM on the battlefield. 
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DANGER 
Exercise extreme care and awareness when 
encountering possible booby-trapped CEM. 
Materiel may be booby trapped and cause 
immediate death or permanent injury. 
Only EOD personnel actually handle explosive ordnance. Conversely, 
EOD units must notify TECHINT personnel of the types and locations of 
foreign equipment and munitions they encounter. 
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Appendix A 
MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
MISSION 
This appendix describes the MASINT mission, organization, 
responsibilities, and their relevance to TECH INT. Specific definitions are in 
the glossary. This appendix delineates MASINT's dual mission of 
supporting the S& TI community as well as providing unique time-critical 
information to the supported tactical commander that contributes to 
battlespace dominance. 
PEACETIME: 
WARTIME: 
The mission of MASINT operations in peacetime includes fulfillment of 
intelligence collection and transition to war requirements. Army MASINT 
efforts are focused at EAC MI force at the force projection brigades. 
Technical reconnaissance and surveillance (TECRAS) systems fielded at 
EAC demonstrate the feasibility of MASINT support at that level. 
Successful demonstration is expected to lead to the development of tactical 
intelligence and related activities (TIARA) systems and their progressive 
fielding at appropriate EAC and ECB units. EAC conducts operations to 
fulfill collection requirements levied by the Army component command, 
theater, DOD, or national levels. The force projection brigade's mission 
includes the collection of S& TI to support baseline signature requirements 
for reprogrammable munitions in support of Army, DOD, and national 
requirements. 
In addition to its contributions to S& TI, MASINT also serves the warfighting 
commander. MASINT collection of threat battlefield equipment signatures 
aids in the prevention of technological surprise and is critical to US ability to 
produce effective countermeasures. Continued signature collection by 
MASINT sensors permits reprogramming of precision-guided, smart. or 
brilliant munitions. Specific MASINT missions are to-
• Detect. identify, and locate targets with sufficient timeliness and 
accuracy for operational planning, targeting, and combat action. 
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• Support IPB. 
• Support force protection via identification, friend or foe (I FF) systems. 
• Support terrain visualization and geographic intelligence. 
• Provide intelligence on threat signatures and equipment and 
technological advances not discernible by other intelligence collection 
means. 
• Support indications and warnings (I&W) intelligence in peacetime and 
provide an indication of threat escalation from conventional to nuclear 
war. 
• Provide intelligence to support the commanders' demands for situation 
development, target development, battle damage assessment (BDA), 
and intelligence operations in close, deep, and rear operations. 
• Provide information to detect or confirm enemy deception operations. 
• Provide information of threat strategic facilities, such as power plants, 
design bureaus, production facilities, proving grounds, and test areas. 
• Provide commanders with information of friendly signature profiles. 
This information will be used for IFF to minimize fratricide and to alter 
signatures for operations security (OPSEC) or friendly deception 
operations. 
ORGANIZATION 
The Army's MASINT organization is shown at Figure 2-1. 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
Figure A-1 shows the responsible agencies, along with their MASINT 
functions. 
AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY 
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DIA, Central MASINT Office 
HQDA, DCSINT 
AMC, DCSINT 
INSCOM, DCSOPS 
NGIC Signatures Division 
Force Projection Brigades 
Executive agent for MAS INT. 
Functional manager of TECRAS Program. 
Materiel developer. 
Manages and oversees operational MASINT 
EAC collection operations. 
Develops operational requirements 
documents and mission needs statements. 
Primary consumer of TECRAS data. 
Ensure national MASINT sensors are tasked 
to support commander's PIR. Serve as focal 
point for collection management and 
dissemination for MAS INT. 
Collect baseline signatures in support of the 
TECRAS Program. 
Augment the Theater IPC upon request. 
Act as the conduit for fielding selected RDTE 
MASINT systems. 
Figure A-1. HQDA agencies and their MASINT responsibilities. 
DEFINITIONS 
The definitions for MASINT and electro-optical intelligence (ELECTRO-
OPTINT), as defined in JCS Publication 1-02, are shown in the terms and 
definitions section of the glossary. 
ELECTRO-OPTINT: 
ELECTRO-OPTINT may provide detailed information on the radiant 
intensities, dynamic motion, spectral and spatial characteristics, and the 
materials composition of the targeted objective. Electro-optical data 
collected has broad applications to a variety of tasks. Data may be 
collected by a variety of optically sensitive devices, such as radiometers, 
spectrometers, non-literal imaging systems, lasers or laser radar -laser 
detection and ranging (LlDAR). 
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RADAR INTELLIGENCE (RADINT): 
RADINT is the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of radar 
energy reflected (re-radiated) from a target or objective. Instruments for 
active target illuminations may include monostatic or bistatic, line-of-sight 
(LOS) phased array, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and over-the-horizon 
systems. RADINT collection provides information on radar cross-sections, 
tracking, precise spatial measurements of components, motion, and radar 
reflectance and absorption characteristics for dynamic targets and 
objectives. 
RADIO FREQUENCY INTELLIGENCE: 
This includes radio frequency/electromagnetic pulse intelligence 
(RF IEMPINT) and unintentional radiation intelligence (RINT). 
• RF/EMPINT is the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of 
radio frequency electromagnetic pulse emissions associated with 
nuclear testing or other high energy events for the purpose of 
determining power levels, operating characteristics, and signatures of 
advanced technologic weapons, power, or propulsion systems. 
• RINT is the integration and specialized application of multiple MASINT 
collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation techniques against 
unintentional radiation sources that are incidental to the design and 
operating characteristics of military and civil propulsion units, power 
sources, weapons systems, electronic systems, machinery, equipment. 
or instruments. These techniques may be valuable in detecting, 
tracking, and monitoring a variety of activities of interest. 
GEOPHYSICAL INTELLIGENCE: 
This is the collection, processing, exploitation, and analysis of emitted or 
reflected sounds, pressure waves, or vibration in the atmosphere 
(acoustic), in the water (acoustical intelligence), or in the earth's surface 
(seismic). Acoustic and seismic sensors may be valuable in target 
detection and classification, measuring aircraft and ship performance 
characteristics, detecting weapons testing and large military movements. 
MATERIALS INTELLIGENCE: 
This is the physical collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of 
atmospheric trace elements; gaseous, liquid, or solid particulate; effluents; 
or debris. Materials intelligence has specific applications to NBC warfare, 
military and civil production, and economic and environmental problems. 
NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE (NUCINT): 
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NUCINT is intelligence information derived from the collection and analysis 
of radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources, such as 
nuclear weapons, processes, materials, devices, or facilities. Nuclear 
monitoring includes nuclear radiation detection, identification, and 
characterization of sources and events. Data exploitation results in nuclear 
signature of weapons or materials. 
TECHNICAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE: 
TECRAS is DA's special program using a low density of instrumented 
collection sensors which provide a quick-reaction capability for collection. 
ARMY REPROGRAMMING ANALYSIS TEAM (ARAT): 
The ARAT is involved in altered signatures identification and associated 
weapon systems impact. The US Army target sensing systems (TSSs) 
incorporate software algorithms used to make threat identification based on 
embedded preprogrammed threat parameter data. 
As the threat capabilities change, or as new threats become operational, 
there is a risk that these systems will not correctly identify the threats. To 
the extent the threat is misidentified, incorrect countermeasures may be 
implemented putting friendly forces at risk. 
Reprogramming the weapon systems provides the commander an 
essential element in battle space dominance by allowing him to defeat 
enemy countermeasures. The production centers and the intermediate 
processing centers (IPCs) validate suspected change signatures or 
countermeasures. The ARA T receives data upon which the threat change 
is identified and system assessments made. The ARA T determines impact 
of validated threat changes on assigned Army equipment and weapon 
systems and develops a suitable and achievable counter to the changes. 
The mission requirements center (MRC) within the systems manager's 
organization determines requirements for Army systems. The software 
support center (SSC) is responsible for developing the change program 
and validating the change. 
CONCLUSIONS 
MASINT's chief contribution to the Army to date has been support to force 
modernization, a role which is likely to continue. However, it is also an 
evolving discipline which holds significant potential for warfighting 
intelligence as adversaries develop means to deceive or evade imagery 
A-5 
FM 34-54 
A-6 
and signals sensors. 
Much can be gained by integrating MASINT and TECH INT. The disciplines 
are not competing but complementary. Many MASINT technologies and 
subdisciplines lend themselves towards bringing traditional TECHINT into 
the information age. Sensors are used to derive 
information in NRT, so that it can be fed to the supported commander in 
time to effect the decision cycle. 
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Appendix B 
JCMEC OPERATIONS 
This appendix provides an overview of JCMEC operations and 
responsibilities; it is used as an example for an annex to a combatant 
command's TTP document. Each reference to the "supported Theater 
Commander" may be replaced by the appropriate unified or joint combatant 
command acronym (for example, ACOM, PACOM, CENTCOM). 
INTRODUCTION 
The JCMEC (in part or whole) normally will be established for any operation 
where significant amounts or types of CEM will be available and/or require 
field exploitation. The supported Theater commander has the mission of 
establishing and operating a JCMEC through the 203d MI Battalion 
(TECHINT), FPB, and provides for the day-to-day operation of the JCMEC 
to include administration, logistics, systems, communications, and 
maintenance. 
The supported Theater commander also has staff responsibility for-
• Ensuring security of the materiel. 
• Arranging for the evacuation and movement of CEM. 
• Providing legal guidance concerning disposition of certain CEM, 
structures, and facilities. 
• Coordinating for EOD. 
• Coordinating the issue of CEM to US forces. 
The Theater J2 exercises operational control of the JCMEC through the 
JTIB located at the JIC. The JTIB consists of the senior TECHINT 
representatives from DIA's Technical Directorate and Service TECHINT 
organizations (National Ground, Air, and Maritime Intelligence Centers as 
needed). The JTIB will be augmented with an LNE from the 203d MI 
Battalion (TECHINT). 
The purpose of a JCMEC is to provide a central in-theater location for the 
collection, safeguarding, identification, battlefield exploitation and 
reporting, and destruction and/or evacuation of specified captured foreign 
and US manufactured materiel. The JTIB-
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• Provides TECHINT advice and assistance to the Theater J2. 
• Acts as the TECHINT collection manager for the Theater J2. 
The JCMEC will be sited by the supported Theater commander. The site 
should facilitate evacuating, storing, and shipping CEM. The JCMEC also 
will-
• Locate to facilitate security. 
• Ensure safety for nearby forces and the local populace. 
• Provide easy access to communications, transportation, and other 
support facilities. 
• Locate near the Theater ordnance storage site. 
JCMEC facilities have common site selection criteria and complementary 
functions which provide efficient allocation of assets for evacuation, 
movement. safeguarding, and exploitation of EPWs and CEM. 
JCMEC will be staffed by the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) and augmented 
by selected service technical representatives and support personnel. 
Through the supported Theater commander, the JCMEC will have support 
from military police or security forces, ground and aviation transportation 
elements, EOD, and other activities as needed. 
In accordance with DOD directives, service regulations, and other 
established policies, all units will collect. identify, tag, secure, and evacuate 
CEM to designated collection points. 
In coordination with the JCMEC, and through technical teams and liaisons, 
Corps and equivalent units will transport or arrange for the transportation of 
selected items to the JCMEC. In cases of the reported capture of 
designated CEM of high TECHINT priority and/or time sensitivity, a 
TECHINT collection team will be deployed to the capture site to conduct 
initial exploitation and then coordinate and prepare the materiel for hasty 
evacuation directly to the JCMEC. 
JCMEC will function as the Theater's central captured materiel exploitation 
facility. As such it will-
• Establish procedures for the exploitation, destruction, or other 
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disposition of CEM in coordination with the J4. 
• Recommend the theater souvenir and war trophy policy, to include 
demilitarization procedures. 
• Issue and provide training on the operation of CEM to U5 forces, allied, 
and host nation forces based upon J3 requirements and priorities. 
• Return specified CEM to the sovereign nation at the end of the conflict 
as directed. 
ORGANIZATION 
The JCMEC and its components can and will be tailored for each operation 
depending on types and quantities of CEM. Although operationally 
responsible through the supported Theater commander for the JCMEC, the 
commander and deputy are responsible to the J2 through the JTIB for 
intelligence collection management and oversight of the JCMEC. Figure B-
1 shows the JCMEC organization. Following are specific functions of the 
JCMEC components. 
COMMANDER AND THE DEPUTY: 
The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) commander is dual hatted also as the 
JCMEC commander and is assisted by a deputy, battalion 53, or Executive 
Officer (XO). The commander will tailor the CMECs to meet the worldwide 
mission. 
LIAISON ELEMENTS: 
FME LNEs will be attached to each component G2, Air Force and Navy 
Intelligence, and Corps, or the equivalent subordinate command. These 
LNEs will advise the supported command on CEM handling, control, and 
evacuation procedures and coordinate these efforts with the JCMEC. 
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SUPPORT CENTER 
(SUPCEN) 
JCMEC 
COMMANDER 
OPERATIONS CENTER 
(OPCEN) 
EXPLOITATION CENTER 
(EXCEN) 
SIGNAL CENTER 
(SIGCEN) 
COLLECTION COMPANY 
Warehouse Section - Ground Exploitation 
Element 
- Collection Teams X 3 
(Detached 1 Team or 
Corps) 
B-4 
Air and Missile 
Exploitation Element 
Maritime Exploitation 
Element 
Medical and NBC 
Exploitation Element 
C-E and lEW Exploitation 
Element 
CM&D Element 
EOD Detachment 
(Augment Collection 
Teams) 
Figure 8-1. Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC) organization. 
OPERATIONS CENTER (OPCEN): 
The OPCEN director works directly for the JCMEC commander. The 
OPCEN is responsible for planning and coordinating all current and 
projected JCMEC operations, to include deploying TECHINT 
collection teams and maintaining the current intelligence situation. 
SUPPORT CENTER (SUPCEN): 
The SUPCEN director works directly for the JCMEC commander. The 
SUPCEN provides administrative and logistics support to all JCMEC 
elements. 
The warehouse section chief works directly for the SUPCEN director. This 
section maintains all records on CEM, structures, and facilities that are 
processed through or by the JCMEC. Specifically, the Warehouse 
Section-
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• Serves as the point of contact (POC) for the various units or 
organizations delivering and/or transferring materiel. 
• Ensures that documents, manuals, inventory records, and other related 
items are cataloged and properly exploited. 
• Ensures exploitation elements are informed of materiel and documents 
received at the J CM E C. 
• Coordinates and monitors the shipping of materiel to CONUS and/or 
issuance to US forces, allies, or host nation as directed. 
EXPLOITATION CENTER (EXCEN): 
The EXCEN director works directly for the JCMEC commander. The 
EXCEN director prioritizes, coordinates, and deconflicts the efforts of his 
subordinate elements based on the JCMEC commander's guidance. 
Elements subordinate to the EXCEN director and their functions are as 
follows: 
• Ground Exploitation Element. This element processes validated 
requirements; exploits captured ground materiel (to include helicopters 
and ground-based missile systems); produces tactical TECHINT 
reports; ensures that reports are forwarded to the CM&D section 
expeditiously; and participates in technical interrogations in 
coordination with the joint interrogation facility. 
• Air and Missile Exploitation Element. The structure and functions are 
the same as for the Ground Exploitation Element except that the focus 
is on aviation (aircraft, air delivered weapons systems, and associated 
radar and tracking systems) and missile-related materiel. 
• Maritime Exploitation Element. The structure and function are the same 
as the Ground Exploitation Element except that the focus is on naval 
and marine materiel (to include naval mines, vessels, naval aviation, 
and naval-related missile systems). 
• Medical and NBC Exploitation Element. This element's function, in 
addition to exploitation and reporting on NBC weapons and materiel, is 
to be responsible for removal and shipment of samples from the area of 
operation. This element will ship suspected samples to the Theater 
Army Medical Laboratory (TAML), if available, or to CONUS- based 
laboratories for analysis. 
• C-E and lEW Exploitation Element. This element focuses on 
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communications, computers, intelligence and electronic warfare (lEW), 
and related systems. 
• CM&D Element. The collection management and dissemination 
(CM&D) element provides a single POC to ensure that effective 
coordination is maintained between the JCMEC and the numerous 
component. theater, national. allied, and host government 
units. This element will ensure the receipt and satisfaction of all 
requirements. Specific functions are as follows: 
Operate joint and Army automated file servers and associated work 
stations that are used for receiving requirements and disseminating 
technical reports. Figure B-2 shows the TECHINT communications 
architecture. 
Coordinate directly with the J2 TECHINT collection manager for 
receipt of validated requirements (collection and production). 
Ensure that exploitation elements receive these requirements; 
monitor the status of the requirements; and close them when 
appropriate. 
Take reports from the elements and ensure that they are 
disseminated expeditiously to units and organizations that need the 
information. Dissemination can be by any or all means; for 
example, secure voice, facsimile, message, Joint Deployable 
Intelligence Support System (JDISS). Information should be given 
the widest dissemination possible. 
SIGNAL CENTER (SIGCEN): 
The SIGCEN director works directly for the JCMEC commander. The 
SIGCEN provides communications, systems, and related maintenance 
support to all of the JCMEC elements. It acts as the focal point for all 
communications in and out of the JCMEC. 
COLLECTION COMPANY: 
The commander of the TECHINT Collection Company works directly for the 
JCMEC commander. This company is augmented by a Joint EOD 
detachment and forward deploys three TECHINT collection teams. The 
collection teams assist in recovering, processing, tagging, and shipping 
materiel to the JCMEC. They also perform screening and make field 
assessments of "first seen" materiel encountered by US personnel. 
The EOD detachment consists of personnel from the Services who are 
familiar with weapons systems, ammunition, and ordnance related to their 
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Figure 8-2. TECHINT communications architecture. 
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respective areas. This detachment works for the TECHINT Collection 
Company commander but provides EOD support to all JCMEC elements. 
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES: 
There will be times and places where other US, allied, or host nation 
government agencies, organizations, or elements may be required to 
support the foreign materiel efforts of the JCMEC. 
COMMUNICATIONS 
The supported commander provides communications for the JCMEC. The 
J2/G2 validates all requirements and coordinates with the J6 to ensure that 
the required bandwidth and types of circuits are provided. 
Normal JCMEC operations will require the following minimum intelligence 
processors and connective communications capabilities: 
• J DISS and/or a compatible file server and workstations. This system is 
essential for access to databases, collection and production 
requirements processing, and dissemination. Since there will be a 
requirement for a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), 
and split-based operations to and from Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 
both DSNET 1 and DSNET 3 connectivity with a minimum of 32 Kb 
bandwith will be essential. 
• Disk operating system (DOS) stand-alone terminals for report writing 
and records administration. 
• Automated message access. 
• Dial-up STU-III secure telephone. 
• Classified and unclassified facsimile. 
• Other specialized communications as required to support the forward 
teams (such as tactical high frequency, ultra high frequency, super high 
frequency, and satellite communications [SATCOMj). 
OTHER REQUIREMENTS 
See DIAMs 58-4, 58-13, and 75-1 and references herein for procedures 
and requirements for identifying, safeguarding, controlling, and disposing of 
CEM. 
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Appendix C 
HANDLING AND EVACUATION 
This appendix covers the procedures for handling and evacuating routine 
CEM, as well as TECHINT CEM. Some basic guidelines and procedures 
on how to handle TECHINT interest items follow: 
• CEM evacuation channels and handling procedures are usually the 
same as similar US end items. A captured tank generally will go to the 
same location as a US tank at the Class VII point. (Definitions for 
classes of supply are in the glossary.) 
• The element requiring a specific type item is responsible for 
coordinating and tasking evacuation and handling. 
• As time permits, as much CEM should be collected from the battlefield 
and taken to the echelon's CEM points for disposition. 
• The capturing unit always notifies higher command of capture and then 
safeguards the known or possible TECHINT item, if possible, until 
higher command provides disposition instructions. 
• All echelons will establish CEM points and keep logistical and 
intelligence channels informed of their status. 
• Special handling and evacuation procedures are often situation 
dependent and cannot always be included in SOPs and OPORDs. 
The plans, policies, and procedures for evacuating foreign materiel are 
prescribed by joint, unified, and theater headquarters. These plans are 
based on DA and DOD policies and guidance. Each command echelon in 
theater must ensure that its plans comply with theater directives and the 
Joint TECHINT plan. The final disposition of CEM and associated technical 
documents rests with the theater commander. 
As stated before, the CMEC is responsible for coordinating the handling 
and evacuation of CEM of TECHINT value. Routine CEM evacuation 
guidance, such as raw material found in railroad yards, is best established 
in advance in the command's various OPORDs and SOPs. CEM should be 
policed off the battlefield to the prescribed collection points as soon as 
possible. Special situations, as in the case of high priority TECHINT 
c-, 
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interest items, require active coordination among the JCMEC and the 
command's different assets to move the item quickly. 
Coordinating and tasking is the job of the echelon commander's staff for 
normal CEM movement. Their ability to coordinate between the logistic 
units that move the item and the specialist elements such as TECHINT, 
EOD, and NBC is the key to the reuse, intelligence exploitation, and 
removal of CEM. 
LOGISTIC CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS 
C-2 
Logistic assets will evacuate CEM to the collection points, Corps CMEC 
(Forward), theater CMEC, or CONUS. They do this according to available 
assets and the priorities set by the commander and staff. The J4/G4 is the 
principal staff element charged with coordinating this task. The 
command surgeon, responsible for medical items, coordinates disposition 
of Class VIII not of TECHINT value. 
The J4/G4 provides staff guidance to the MMC and the movement control 
office (MCO) or the movement control center (MCC). The MMC controls 
combat service support (CSS) and maintenance inventories and is the 
management arm that ensures proper accountability of CEM during transit. 
The support commands are the Division Support Command (DISCOM), 
COSCOM, and Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). They 
exercise command and control over supporting units in carrying out the 
directives issued by the J4/G4. The division medical supply officer (DMSO) 
or the medical, supply, optical, and maintenance (MEDSOM) are the first 
elements that manage the command's collection, inventory, and evacuation 
procedures and functions for captured medical materiel. 
The MMC manages the command's collection, inventory, and evacuation 
functions. This includes the operation of the CEM point. The MMC 
operations staff is organized by function and commodity, Class I through 
Class VII, and Class IX materiels. CEM will normally be managed by the 
Class VII operations staff. The MMC keeps the records of the CEM at the 
CEM point. TECHINT elements, such as the Corps CMEC (Forward) or 
TECHINT teams, would provide support to logistical personnel operating 
the CEM point for identification of CEM. 
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TRANSPORTATION PLANNING AND ALLOCATION 
The J4/G4 coordinates logistic support for evacuation of CEM operations 
by developing a command transportation plan. The command 
transportation officer and the movement control element use the 
transportation plan to task individual transportation units. Transportation 
elements can be effectively used to backhaul CEM to the CEM points on 
their return trips from forward units. Transportation elements are tasked to 
support critical TECHINT missions when required. 
EVACUATION CHANNELS 
As stated in the introduction, US forces will usually evacuate CEM along 
the same channels as like US items. The system must. however, have the 
flexibility to evacuate high priority intelligence items directly from division 
collection points to the Theater CMEC and CONUS when required. This 
evacuation will be described in the logistical and intelligence appendixes to 
OPLANs. The routine evacuation channels are described below. Figures 
C-1 to C-4 provide examples of evacuation channels for CEM. 
Abandoned or unserviceable US and captured foreign materiel are 
evacuated to each echelon's collection points for classification, 
segregation, and disposition. Collection points operate wherever needed 
throughout the theater of operations and should always be planned for 
ahead of time. In stability and support operations (SASO), it may take more 
time to evacuate larger items due to limited resources and environment. 
In the Corps area, at least one materiel collection point is established. 
Other points are established in the TAACOM. Collection points in the 
communications zone (COMMZ) are generally operated by the collection 
and classification element of the general support maintenance battalion 
near the Class VII point. 
In the division areas, DISCOM maintenance companies operate CEM 
points. During offensive operations, these points will be temporary until the 
Corps elements take control. CEM is handled and processed the same 
way as similar US items. 
Salvage points, including Class VII, established by related supply units are 
located near unit maintenance collection points. These two points handle 
the collection, classification, inventory, and disposition of Classes II, VII, 
and IX materiel. The heavy division and Corps have the most 
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Figure C-1. Evacuation of captured petroleum, oils, and lubricants. 
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Figure C-2. Evacuation of captured ammunition and explosives. 
C-4 
~~ ______________ E_V __ A~C_U~A_T_I~O~N ____________ __ 
Figure C-3. Captured medical materiel evacuation system. 
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Figure C-4. Evacuation of captured aviation items. 
FM 34-54 
C-5 
FM 34-54 
C-6 
suitable assets for evacuation of large amounts of foreign materiel, such 
as tanks. The process is much the same in the light divisions. However, 
evacuation of the heavier items will be normally handled by COSCOM 
assets since the division lacks heavy transportation elements. 
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) units establish their own collection 
sites to handle captured POL materiel. Supply units can also establish 
POL collection sites. Commanders will test and use captured POL at the 
lowest echelon possible. Samples will always be taken and sent to the 
Corps CMEC or TECHINT collection teams. 
Class V ordnance, including missiles, is evacuated through conventional 
ammunition supply points (ASPs). Ammunition supply units will establish 
their own collection sites to handle captured Class V. It is critical that the 
CEM ASPs provide a detailed inventory of ammunition to logistical and 
intelligence channels. TECHINT elements must move assets to the CEM 
ASP to assist in identifying ammunition of intelligence value. 
Class VIII medical items are evacuated through established medical supply 
points, the DMSO, and the MEDSOM elements. TECHINT elements must 
have full access to the medical materiel to identify items of medical value. 
Captured aviation items, especially airframes, are evacuated to either the 
Class VIII CEM collection points, or the nearest aviation units airfield. 
All CEM, except NBC hazardous materiel and war trophies, that require 
evacuation to CONUS are eventually shipped to the Transportation Officer, 
Military Operations Division, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
The personnel, activities, and elements responsible for the recovery and 
evacuation of CEM are usually the same as those responsible for 
handling like US items. A good example is the military police 
responsibilities. 
Since military police are responsible for controlling prisoners, they have 
similar evacuation responsibilities for EPW and CEM. MI interrogators and 
TECHINT analysts exploit these sources of intelligence along the 
evacuation chain. 
THE CAPTURING UNIT 
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The capturing unit always is responsible for reporting, safeguarding, and 
initiating accountability of CEM. The capturing unit reports the capture with 
a SALUTE report (see Figure E-1). It safeguards the materiel. within its 
mission parameters, until relieved or as long as possible. It initiates 
accountability by marking and tagging the item according to established 
procedures. 
The capturing unit may be tasked to move CEM wanted for intelligence 
exploitation to a collection point. If the capturing unit is tasked with 
evacuation, it coordinates any assistance with the command responsible 
for direct support maintenance at their echelon. 
The capturing unit may be tasked with the destruction of the item. This may 
require coordination with either EOD or NBC assets to do it safely. It is 
illegal to destroy captured enemy medical materiel. According to the Laws 
of Land Warfare, if friendly forces cannot use it for EPWs, refugees, 
and indigenous population, the medical materiel will remain in place and 
unharmed. 
The capturing unit must report the discovery of unusual mechanisms used 
as booby traps through intelligence channels to the nearest TECHINT 
element and EOD by SALUTE report. Countermeasures must be 
coordinated with EOD personnel. EOD personnel are responsible for the 
final disposition of explosive components or hazardous materials 
associated with such devices and recovered ammunition. 
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL 
As discussed, TECHINT units have a profound interest in foreign explosive 
ordnance. The assistance of EOD personnel in the examination, 
movement. and evacuation of explosive ordnance cannot be 
overemphasized. All items of foreign ordnance should first be rendered 
safe by EOD personnel. If this is not feasible, the item should be rendered 
safe in place by any destructive method that minimizes damage to the 
item. 
Collection of TECHINT data may require dismantling of ordnance and 
stripping fuses and other dangerous components. These operations will 
be performed only by experienced personnel. Dismantling and stripping 
are conducted only in response to a specific requirement for such action. 
The request must be placed through TECHINT and EOD staffs. Only 
trained weapons and munitions specialists should analyze or test 
captured mines and booby traps. 
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C-B 
DANGER 
Exercise extreme caution when encountering taut 
wire, pull releases, or similar devices due to the 
possibility of immediate death or permanent injury. 
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL 
All CB hazardous items are handled and shipped in accordance with 
command SOPs, national policy, and theater TECHINT plan. Evacuation is 
best handled after coordination with either an NBC reconnaissance team, 
NBC qualified TECHINT team, or a task-organized medical element. NBC 
samples, after theater tactical exploitation, will be shipped to CONUS 
laboratories. 
TECHINT ELEMENTS ECB, EAC, AND THE CMEC 
When evacuation is either unknown or is delayed, TECHINT personnel will 
be tasked to perform onsite analysis. This can provide immediate tactical 
information and countermeasures vital to the combat force commander. 
Onsite analysis also ensures the recovery of intact components which 
become useless once wires are clipped and subcomponents have been 
disturbed. This type of analysis is limited by the battlefield situation and 
available assets. 
During onsite analysis, TECHINT teams look for-
• Equipment operational characteristics, performance, capabilities, and 
vulnerabilities. 
• New weapons and devices. 
• Modifications. 
• Possible countermeasures. 
• Identification and proper handling of radioactive materiel. 
• Specific orientation and siting of equipment. 
• Recovery and evacuation of explosive ordnance and NBC munitions. 
At times, a large number of like items will be acquired. The TECHINT 
teams or elements must have the opportunity to examine the materiel 
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thoroughly. They will be especially interested in any modifications done to 
the equipment. 
TECHINT teams may also be tasked to supervise the materiel handling and 
evacuation onsite. The Corps TECHINT LNE or theater TECHINT 
elements will coordinate with appropriate staffs to evaluate the need to use 
TECHINT personnel to-
• Supervise the evacuation. 
• Arrange necessary technical escorts to the Corps CMEC (Forward), 
CMEC, or CONUS. 
TECHINT elements are capable of coordinating the handling and shipping 
with necessary medical, intelligence, NBC, and strategic level elements for 
captured CB materiel. 
MARKING AND TAGGING 
Labeling CEM properly is vital to the timely exploitation of the item. It 
speeds up the often slow process of producing effective countermeasures 
for the soldier in combat. Proper labeling provides the analyst information 
necessary for the item's timely exploitation. It also allows interrogators and 
TECHINT elements to match up knowledgeable prisoners with the CEM 
from which they became separated in the evacuation process. 
RESPONSIBILITIES: 
The capturing unit is responsible for properly marking and tagging CEM. 
The responsibilities must be clearly established by command SOP. The 
equipment and document tags accompany the materiel to its final 
destination. Article 103 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is printed on 
the reverse side of the tag to prevent indiscriminate tampering. 
As part of core training, all personnel should be instructed on how to tag 
CEM. They should know the consequences when personnel and 
equipment are not properly tagged. Training should stress protecting and 
preserving the original markings on materiel at the time of capture. 
Weather-resistant capture tags are used. They are normally produced 
within the theater. They are securely attached to the item itself and to the 
shipping container. If weather-resistant tags are not available, use any 
material (for example, rations packing) on which pertinent capture data 
ca n be recorded. 
There are two procedures for marking and tagging CEM. The procedure 
used depends on whether or not the captured item is associated with a 
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captured person. 
CEM WITH EPWs: 
For CEM with personnel, tag the captured person and any associated CEM 
with the three-part tag (Form PE 96C-18). An example of this tag is at 
Figure CoS. 
CEM BY ITSELF: 
For CEM by itself, tag the piece of equipment and associated document 
with the tag shown at Figure C-6. Be careful to use this tag to label ON L Y 
items captured with or known to be associated with a particular EPW. In 
addition, label all documents believed to be of a technical nature (such as 
operator manuals) with the flag word 'TECH DOC." An example is shown in 
Figure C-7. 
ATTACH TO PW 
gATE OF CAPTURE 
NAME 
SERIAL NUMBER 
RANK I 
DATE OF BIRTH 
UNIT I 
LOCATIUN OF CAPTURE 
CAPTURING UNIT I I 
SPECIAL CIRCUMST ANCes Of CAPTURE 
I I 
W(;APON5/00CUMENTS 
--fORWARD TO UNIT 
I I 
DATE OF CAPTURE I 
NAME I 
SERIAL NUMIIER 
RANI( I 
DATE Of BIRTH UNIT I 1 __________ _ 
LOCATION OF CAPTURE 
CAPTURING UNIT I I ____ _ 
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE 
I I 
- 1 - I 
NATO UNCLAs.sIFIEO 
Surch Thoroughly 
, I 
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I 
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I I 
EvacuOl" ROipidly 
, I 
Segregate by Category 
, I 
Sif~uOIrd from Oan!ler/E~ape 
( I 
P W 
-
Figure C-S. Front and reverse sides of an EPW tag. 
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Figure C-S. Front and reverse Sides of a CEE tag. 
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Figure C-7. Example of a CEE tag flagged for TECHDOCs. 
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SECURITY AND ESCORT 
Many items of foreign materiel acquired by US forces and determined to be 
of TECHINT value require safeguarding in storage as well as during 
evacuation. Such items may be sensitive due to their criticality or because 
of the US classification assigned. At all stages during the 
exploitation process, CEM will be placed under guard to prevent looting, 
misuse, or destruction. 
Initially, the capturing unit is responsible for safeguarding materiel. based 
on instruction from the next higher headquarters. When foreign materiel is 
sensitive or of special value, military police elements normally provide 
physical security during its evacuation. 
RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS 
Technical publications and manuscripts of concern to TECHINT relate to 
the technical design or operation of the materiel. Such documents may be 
acquired from the materiel to which they refer. Therefore, it is essential that 
TECHINT personnel coordinate with interrogation elements to exchange 
information about related documents. 
CEM BY ITSELF: 
All enemy documents captured on the battlefield are sent immediately to 
the first intelligence staff officer in the chain. The S2/G2 routes all CEDs 
to the nearest interrogation element for tactical exploitation. Interrogators 
screen the documents for immediate information and forward them to 
higher command, as required. 
In any case, all known or suspected technical documents are marked 
'TECH DOC" and treated with highest priority and forwarded through 
intelligence channels to the higher command until their value has been 
determined. 
CEM ASSOCIATED WITH EPWs: 
Documents obtained through liaison with interrogation elements should be 
accompanied by pertinent interrogation reports. These reports can be in-
• SALUTE reports. 
• Tactical interrogation reports. 
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• Special interrogation reports. 
• Intelligence information reports. 
• Biographic reports in accordance with DIAM 58-13. 
• Knowledgeability briefs. 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND OTHER ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND 
DOCUMENTS 
TECHINT units use special procedures for handling captured C-E 
equipment and documents. These items are tagged and evacuated to the 
nearest target exploitation (TAREX) element as soon as possible after the 
initial tactical exploitation. 
WAR TROPHIES 
Foreign equipment is frequently a target of souvenir hunters. An effective 
war trophy policy must be established to ensure that these items are not 
retained by the capturing unit. 
FOREIGN MATERIEL NUMBERING SYSTEM 
It is the responsibility of the COS COM and Theater support command to 
tag all CEE that is sent to them in accordance with the foreign materiel 
numbering system. All inventories of CEE will use this system to keep 
track of materiel. 
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THIS APPENDIX COMPLIES WITH STANAG 2044 
AND IMPLEMENTS STANAG 2084_ 
Appendix D 
INTELLIGENCE ANNEX WITH TECHINT INPUT 
INTRODUCTION 
This appendix provides examples of TECHINT input to an intelligence 
annex and TECHINT-related tabs to that annex. The TECHINT appendix is 
used-
• As the primary example for the J4/G4 appendix on captured weapons. 
• As the example for the Jl/Gl appendix on equipment taken from 
EPWs. (See Figures C-l through C-3 for CEE and EPW tags.) 
THEATER ARMY INTELLIGENCE ANNEX: 
Figure 0-1 shows input for TECHINT operations. This example is tailored 
for a Theater Army headquarters. All headquarters, however, should 
include TECHINT operations input. 
1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. 
2. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. 
a. PIR: 
(1) Does the enemy have significant quantities of night vision devices? 
(2) Is there unusual or unexplained damage to US equipment and materiel? 
(3) Has there been unexpected defensive and/or offensive capabilities of enemy 
equipment? 
b. IR: 
(1) What are the capabilities and/or limitations of the AT-5 ATGM? 
3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS. 
Figure 0-1. Example of an extract from a Theater Army Intelligence Annex. 
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a. General: Capture of any enemy materiel will be immediately reported through 
intelligence channels in accordance with priorities described below. 
(1) 15th Corps. Priority of collection on foreign equipment is T-64B, AT-5, and SA-13. 
(2) 25th Corps. Priority of collection on foreign equipment is BTR-70, BMP-1. and 
individual protective vest (body armor). 
(3) 23d MI Brigade (EAC). 
(a) 1st Battalion. 
(b) 2d Battalion. 
(c) 3d Battalion. 
lOne TECHINT collection team and TECHINT LNE to operate within each 
corps area, attached to each corps MI brigade (command less OPCON). 
2 Screening and exploitation of captured I EW priorities described in FM 
34-54, Appendix B . 
.3. Fully integrate TECHINT operations and teams with lEW and EPW 
operations. 
4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL. 
a. Personnel. 
b. Documents. 
c. Materiel. 
(1) All materiel will be reported in accordance with procedures and priorities described in 
Appendix _, TECH INT. 
(2) All materiel will be evacuated to the nearest collection point and held for TECHINT 
screening in accordance with Appendix _, TECHINT. 
(3) Items designated by TECHINT personnel as possessing intelligence value will be 
evacuated to destinations designated by TECHINT personnel in accordance with priorities 
described in Appendix _, TECH INT. 
Figure D-1. Example of an extract from a Theater Army Intelligence Annex (continued). 
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(4) No materiel will be diverted for other uses until screened and released by TECHINT 
personnel. 
5_ REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION_ All equipment-related intelligence, SALUTE, and 
EPW reports will include the J2/G2 and CMEC as an addressee. 
Figure 0-1. Example of an extract from a Theater Army Intelligence Annex (continued). 
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(TAB B) JOINT THEATER TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE APPENDIX: 
Figure D-2 is an example of a Joint Theater TECHINT appendix. It shows 
how CEM must be handled, reported, and disposed of. 
Appendix_, TECHINT, to Annex~ Intelligence, to OPLAN/OPORD_. 
REFERENCES: 
a. OPLAN 
b. FM 34-54. 
c. FM 3-19-1. 
d. Chemical and Biological Sampling, Transport. and Evaluation Management 
Procedures, dated February 1986. 
1. PURPOSE: This appendix establishes policy and prescribes responsibilities and 
procedures for the proper handling, reporting, intelligence assessment. and disposition of CEM. 
Additionally, it establishes the procedures for the safe and expedient collection of suspected CB 
agents to the laboratory for processing, analysis, and identification. 
2. POLICY: 
a. The J2 controls and directs the theater captured materiel exploitation program. The 
CMEC OPCON to the J2 carries out exploitation activities. 
b. The CMEC will be formed from elements of the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT), 
MI Brigade. 
c. The J2 exercises staff responsibility over the intelligence exploitation of 
CEM throughout the area of operations and establishes requirements for evacuation of specific 
items to CONUS for further exploitation. An LNE from the JCMEC will be located in the J2. 
d. Commander, 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT)-
(1) Establishes the CMEC and attaches a TECHINT team to each Corps; positions 
an LNE with the J2, each Corps G2, the theater MI Brigade, and theater interrogation. 
(2) In coordination with the Theater/Army Surgeon General. advises the J2/G2 on all 
matters of CB sampling. 
Figure 0-2. Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix. 
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(3) Recommends a theater souvenir and war trophy policy in accordance with 
FM 34-54, Appendix C. 
e. TheJ3-
(1) In coordination with the J2, approves requests and assigns priorities for issue 
of CEM to US units engaged in special missions or training based on the following prioritized 
uses of ca ptured materiel: 
(a) Intelligence. 
(b) Special warfare. 
(c) Special Operation Forces. 
(d) Issue to friendly forces. 
(e) Internal defense. 
(n Substitutes or supplements to US equipment. 
(g) Distribution to friendly foreign units or groups. 
(2) Coordinates provisions of EOD support as required in the exploitation of CEM 
in accordance with AR 75-15 and to fill requirements stated by the J2. 
f. The J4 exercises staff supervision over the evacuation and movement of CEM of 
intelligence value in the theater to the JCMEC, and coordinates evacuation of high priority items 
back to CONUS. 
g. The Staff Judge Advocate provides legal guidance concerning the disposition of 
certain categories of enemy materiel, structures, and facilities. 
h. See Tab D of this appendix for CB sampling responsibilities. 
3. RESPONSIBILITIES: 
a. The CMEC is charged with the conduct and coordination of assessment of CEM 
within the command. Support in the assessment of enemy naval and aerodynamic systems 
and materiel will be provided by intelligence personnel from the Navy and Air Force 
components attached to the CMEC. The scope of responsibilities include: 
(1) Assign an LNE to the J2, G2, and the theater interrogation facility. 
Figure 0-2. Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix (continued) . 
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(2) Deploy TECHINT collection teams forward to each deployed Corps to conduct 
preliminary screening of evacuated materiel and to respond to targets of opportunity which 
cannot be processed in a normal manner. 
(3) Receive and process validated intelligence requirements for items of enemy 
materiel. 
(4) Participate in the technical interrogation of EPWs and assist in screening 
CEDs. 
(5) Examine and evaluate TECHINT reporting and classification of CEM. 
(6) Participate with TAREX elements to fully integrate the exploitation of specified 
C-E items. 
(7) Participate with medical, NBC, and Special Operations units for coordinating 
the delivery of CB samples through MI channels to the TAML. 
b. Subordinate Commands: 
(1) Each Corps will-
(a) Designate and operate collection points. Report locations of collection 
points where CEM will be stored and amounts and types stored at each location. Forward 
reports to Cdr, CMEC, with an information copy to the J2/G2 and J4/G4s. The collection point 
will receive, store and, only upon direction, dispose or issue CEM. 
(b) Designate and operate ammunition storage areas for the storage of 
captured ammunition and explosive items, as required. Store captured chemical munitions 
similarly to like US chemical munitions. Report locations of ammunition storage areas and 
amounts and types stored to Cdr, CMEC, with an information copy to J2/G2 and J4/G4. 
(c) Provide necessary logistics support. as required, to evacuate CEM and CB 
samples needed for intelligence operations, or other purposes, from collection points to the 
CMEC. 
(d) Ensure all CEM is promptly tagged. 
(e) Provide logistics and administrative support for all TECHINT assets 
operating within their areas. 
(2) NBC reconnaissance units, Special Operations units, and medical units are 
responsible for the transfer of CB samples to TEUs or TECHINT collection teams at Corps, or 
directly to the TAM L. 
Figure 0-2. Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix (continued) . 
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4_ PROCEDURES: 
a. Procedures for handling and processing CEM. 
(1) The recovery and evacuation of CEM is a command responsibility at all levels. 
The prescribed method of evacuation is through normal logistics channels and in accordance 
with priorities established in Tab A and Tab B to this Appendix. 
(2) Enemy materiel captured by US military personnel is the property of the United 
States and must be protected from pilferage, cannibalizing, and souvenir hunters. 
Commanders at all levels will provide adequate security for CEM until it has been screened by 
TECHINT personnel. 
(3) Specific intelligence collection requirements and Top Ten End Item 
requirements items of enemy materiel for which the tactical commander and intelligence 
agencies have a need are listed at Tab A and Tab B to this Appendix. These Tabs will be 
published upon execution of the OPLAN. 
(a) When items listed in Tab A and Tab B or any of their updates are captured 
or otherwise obtained, commanders will ensure that the acquisition is reported through 
intelligence channels to the Corps TECHINT LNE to Cdr, CMEC, with an information copy to 
J2/G2. 
(b) Report as in (a) above (at a PRIORITY precedence) the capture of 
standard types of foreign materiel that have been apparently modified in a major way or are 
having a greater impact on combat operations than expected. These items will be evacuated to 
COSCOM collection points by available backhaul capabilities on a PRIORITY basis. 
Equipment will be held pending further disposition instructions from the J2 through the Corps 
TECHINT LNE. 
(c) The capture of items listed in Tab A and Tab B will be reported by 
IMMEDIATE precedence through intelligence channels and expeditiously evacuated to at least 
the supporting collection point to await further disposition instructions from J2. 
(d) Report as in (a) above (at a ROUTINE precedence) all CEM. These items 
will be evacuated to collection points by available backhaul capabilities on a space-available 
basis. They will be held at the collection point until screened by TECHINT personnel. 
Disposition will be per paragraph 4d below. 
(e) The J2, in coordination with the J4, is the focal point for evacuation of key 
items of intelligence interest to CONUS for national exploitation. 
Figure 0-2. Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix (continued) . 
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(4) The assessment of CEM below division and separate brigade levels will be 
limited. Their primary responsibility is the recovery, reporting the capture, and initial evacuation 
of enemy materiel from the capture location to the nearest collection point. Exception is for 
medical supplies which will be handled through medical supply channels. Significant items of 
CEM which cannot be evacuated, either because of the tactical situation or due to their size, will 
be left in place and reported immediately. 
(5) Assessment of CEM at division and separate brigade level is performed by 
intelligence and operations personnel to the extent necessary to determine the immediate 
tactical significance of the materiel. Assessment at this level does not replace the need for 
detailed evaluation and analysis of CEM by technical specialists from the JCMEC. For this 
reason, the prompt evacuation of significant items of CEM must not be delayed. 
(6) Screening and preliminary field assessment of CEM is performed by JCMEC 
TECHINT collection teams. These teams will operate in the Corps areas and are attached 
(command less OPCON) to the Corps MI Brigade. When required, these teams can also 
provide assistance to capturing units. Assessment functions are normally carried out at the 
Corps support area collection points. Items of intelligence interest or items needed to fill other 
requirements by the JCMEC are selected for evacuation. Selected items will be evacuated to 
the JCMEC, or a designated location, by collection point personnel through logistics channels. 
(7) Selected CEM evacuated to the CMEC is subjected to detailed examination 
and evaluation to-
(a) Determine enemy materiel threats, performance capabilities, and limitations. 
(b) Produce information from which military countermeasures may be 
developed. 
(c) Provide inputs continuously to the national and integrated S& TI Program in 
accordance with DIA and Theater policies. 
(d) Provide intelligence that can be of timely use to the tactical commander. 
b. Materiel Requiring Special Handling. 
(1) C-E Equipment. All CEM in this category must be evacuated immediately with 
their dial settings, frequencies, and so forth, and recorded and sent to the supporting EW unit by 
the quickest and most secure means possible. All such materiel will be evacuated to Corps 
support area collection points for screening by TECHINT and other specialized personnel. 
Figure 0-2. Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix (continued) . 
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(2) Ammunition and Explosives. The complete recovery and expeditious 
evacuation of enemy ammunition and components is essential to the identification of known or 
new enemy weapons systems and the threat posed by each. EOD teams are responsible for 
preparing PRETECHREPs on first-time-seen enemy ammunition or explosives. If there are no 
TECHINT personnel to assist in the area, EOD teams will also be responsible for preparing 
COMTECHREPs. 
(3) Medical Materiel. Medical materiel normally will not be destroyed. It will be left 
in place if it cannot be evacuated. It will be handled in accordance with normal Class VIII 
procedures. 
(4) Significant Items: All intelligence requirements specified in Tab A and Tab B 
will be afforded special handling as described in paragraph 4a above. 
(5) Technical Documents: Captured or recovered technical documents consist of 
firing tables, logbooks, packing slips, and other documentation. If the tactical situation does not 
permit the equipment to be evacuated, the documents will be forwarded to the JCMEC and will 
include a description of the equipment. 
(6) CB Samples. See Tab D to this appendix. 
c. Requirements. 
(1) DIA provides national intelligence requirements for CEM to the Theater. In-
theater intelligence requirements for enemy materiel are submitted through J2 and G2. 
(2) In-theater operational and training requirements for other than Army 
subordinate units are submitted through J3 to the J2 for review, approval. and assignment of 
priority. 
(3) The intelligence requirements are published in Tab A and Tab B. 
d. Disposition. 
(1) Items required in support of operational requirements or for distribution to host-
country forces will be separately designated by the J3. Tab C to this Appendix contains such 
equipment. 
(2) Items determined by the J2 to have no intelligence significance and by the J3 to 
have no operational need will then be identified and reported through logistics channels to the 
J4. Items will be retained within designated collection points for further disposition by the J4. 
No items will be released for war trophies until released by J2. 
Figure 0-2. Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix (continued) . 
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e. Destruction. The destruction of CEM, excluding medical items, will be accomplished 
only in the event that recapture is imminent. due to its location, or in those cases where materiel 
is declared by EOD or TECHINT personnel to be hazardous to the safety of troops. In the 
event destruction of materiel is necessary, all factory markings should be carefully recorded 
and photographs taken, if possible, before the materiel is destroyed. Medical items normally 
will not be destroyed, but left in place. 
OFFICIAL: 
TABS: 
A = Top Ten Priority Items (TBP) 
B = General Collection Requirements (TBP) 
C = Equipment Releasable to Allies (TBP) 
D = Chemical. Biological, and Biomedical Sampling 
Figure 0-2. Example of a Joint Theater TECHINT Appendix (continued) . 
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(TAB D) CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL SAMPLING PROCEDURES: 
Figure D-3 is an example of a Tab D to a TECHINT Appendix of a Theater 
Army Intelligence Annex. It shows disposition instructions for CB samples. 
1. PURPOSE: To establish the procedures for the safe and expedient collection and 
evacuation of suspected CB agents to the laboratory for processing, analysis, and identification. 
2. RESPONSIBILITY: 
a. The Cdr, JCMEC, with the Army and Theater Surgeon General. are responsible for 
advising the J2/G2 and J3/G3 on all matters of CB samplings. 
b. Corps G2, SOCCENT J2, MARCENT G2, Navy intelligence, and Air Force intelligence 
will be responsible for transferring samples to MI channels via TEU teams or TECHINT 
collection teams. 
c. Medical personnel will coordinate with combat units and Graves Registration Service 
units through local medical units and hospitals for obtaining biomedical samples, for the 
expedient transfer of personnel deceased as a result of a CB attack. 
d. The Cdr, JCMEC, will be responsible for coordinating shipment of suspected biological 
samples to the TAML for preliminary analysis, and suspected chemical or biological-chemical 
mixed to CONUS-based laboratories. 
e. The TEU is responsible for coordinating shipment to the US Army Chemical Research 
Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, if it is a 
chemical sample; or to the US Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USARIID) at 
Fort Detrick, MD, if it is a combination CB sample or if it is a suspected biological sample only. 
3. SAMPLING RESPONSIBILITY: Samples suspected of containing CB agents are divided 
into environmental and biomedical samples on the basis of their origin. Both medical and 
nonmedical teams are responsible for collecting samples suspected of containing CB agents. 
a. ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES. Environmental CB agent samples are collected in the 
field. They include samples like aerosols or vapors; liquids other than water, soil. vegetation; 
water; used chemical equipment; and ordnance. The acquisition of these samples is the 
responsibility of-
(1) NBC reconnaissance teams. 
Figure D-3. Example of a TAB D to a TECHINT Appendix of 
a Theater Army Intelligence Annex. 
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(2) Technical escort field teams. 
(3) TECHINT collection teams. 
(4) Preventative medicine units (potable water sources only). 
(5) Special operation teams. 
b. BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES. Biomedical samples are derived primarily from acutely ill 
soldiers who exhibit symptoms of CB agent intoxication or from personnel who were killed in an 
attack. Collection of the biomedical samples will be the responsibility of personnel in-
(1) Battalion-level medical units. 
(2) Division-level medical treatment facilities. 
(3) Combat support hospitals. 
(4) Evacuation hospitals. 
(5) Theater medical hospitals. 
(6) NBC reconnaissance teams (small animals only). 
(7) Technical escort field teams. 
(8) TECHINT collection teams. 
4. SAMPLING: Sampling will be initiated if the following are observed: 
a. Significant numbers of unexplained sickness or death of personnel or animals occur. 
b. Ordnance (munitions) are found which contain known or suspected CB agents. 
c. An attack is suspected or is known to have occurred but the causative agent cannot be 
identified. 
D-12 
d. The widespread outbreak of unusual mission-degrading behavior occurs. 
e. Sampling of known identified agents to verify first use is required. 
Figure D-3. Example of a TAB D to a TECHINT Appendix of 
a Theater Army Intelligence Annex (continued). 
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5_ PROCEDURES: 
a. Procedures for the collection, packaging, documentation, and transporting of CB samples 
to laboratories must be precise to ensure the credibility of the analysis conducted on the 
samples. Ensuring the credible analysis of suspected CB samples is critical for both battlefield 
commanders concerned with possible retaliation and contamination avoidance, and medical 
personnel concerned with prophylactic or post-contamination treatments. 
b. When possible, a background sample from "clean" areas beyond the perimeter of the 
attack site should be obtained as baseline data for comparison; collection should be identified to 
sample collected data from contaminated areas and packaged separately. 
c. The best biomedical sample is an acutely ill soldier or a cadaver which is sent back to 
CONUS immediately. A copy of the physical examination or an extract of significant findings 
will be enclosed with biomedical samples. Samples will be collected in triplicate, distributing 
two to CONUS and one to the TAML. 
d. All samples will be forwarded from the TAML to either ERDEC or USAMRIID laboratories 
12 to 24 hours after collection; delay beyond 24 hours rapidly degrades the intelligence value 
of the samples. 
6. NOTIFICATION MESSAGE: A notification message will be sent from the TAML or 
TECHINT unit by PRIORITY precedence upon receipt and screening of samples to the Theater 
Surgeon General, J2, J3, and CDR. ERDEC APG MDIICBATEBII: The notification message 
will contain the following information: 
a. The sample identification number and details which relate to the acquisition of the 
sample. This message will be confirmed to provide the following information: 
(1) Background information. 
(2) Physical description. 
(3) Results of preliminary tests after sample collection. 
(4) Where, when, and under what conditions the sample was acquired. 
(5) Description of incident. 
(6) Casualty symptoms (if applicable). 
(7) Shipment information, such as-
Figure 0-3. Example of a TAB 0 to a TECHINT Appendix of 
a Theater Army Intelligence Annex (continued). 
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(a) Date of shipment. 
(b) Mode of transportation. 
(c) Flight number and destination. 
(d) Estimated time of arrival CONUS. 
(e) Description of shipment (for example, size and weight). 
(n Na mes of escort personnel. 
Figure D-3. Example of a TAB D to a TECHINT Appendix of 
a Theater Army Intelligence Annex (continued). 
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Appendix E 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This appendix describes the nine basic reports, which are listed below, that 
battlefield TECHINT analysts use. 
• SALUTE report (Figure E-1). 
• Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP) (Figure E-2). 
• Complementary Technical Intelligence Report (COMTECHREP) 
(Figures E-3, E-4, and E-5). 
• Detailed Technical Report (DETECHREP). 
• Technical Intelligence Update Report. 
• Technical Intelligence Summary (TECHSUM). 
• Technical Intelligence Report (TIR). 
• Special technical reports. These reports are generated in response to 
requests for information. The formats vary by request and usually 
address a specific question or requirement from a TECHINT consumer. 
• Other equipment information reports. These reports focus on aspects 
of equipment that do not necessarily relate to intelligence needs 
per se. For example, the Theater commander may have a war trophy 
policy that permits units to evacuate certain equipment to their home 
stations for static displays. These reports may include driver's 
instructions, handling considerations, render-safe procedures, and 
demilitarization standards for equipment. 
The SALUTE report is an oral or written report prepared by the acquiring 
units or intermediate command echelons. It is used to report rapidly, by 
electrical or other means, the capture of foreign materiel. These reports are 
forwarded to either the TECHINT LNEs at Corps, other TECHINT LNEs, or 
directly to the JCMEC. As a result of this information, a TECHINT team 
could be dispatched or the CEM could be moved to the 
Corps CMEC or the theater JCMEC. Figure E-1 gives an example of a 
completed SALUTE report. 
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SALUTE REPORT 
TO: G2 V Corps 
FROM: G2 24th Inf Div (Mech) 
DTG: 230900Z Aug 98 
REPORT NO: 07-0623 
1. SIZE: NA. 
2. ACTIVITY: Capture of shoulder-fired laser target designator by 1/64th Armor Bn 2d Bde 
24th Inf Div (Mech) (include capturing unit). 
3. LOCATION: Town of AI-Dahran (UTM EH556937) (as a minimum always give grid 
coordinates) . 
4. UNIT: 3d Republican Guards Regiment (include enemy unit if known). 
5. TIME: Item captured on 230230Z AUG 98 (always use ZULU time). 
6. EQUIPMENT: One laser target designator and sighting device (give best possible 
description) . 
E-2 
Figure E-1. Example of a SALUTE report. 
PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL REPORT 
The PRETECHREP contains a general description of the CEE. It alerts the 
CMEC, other technical elements, and the tactical units to significant 
technical information of immediate tactical importance. It can also be used 
for reporting inventories at collection points through intelligence channels 
so that location, quantities, and type of equipment can be monitored. 
Figure E-2 shows an example of a PRETECHREP. 
Corps TECHINT teams and possibly CMEC teams will prepare a 
PRETECHREP on all CEM after preliminary screening. This report is first 
transmitted by radio directly to the Corps TECHINT LNE, from the captured 
equipment site. It is then forwarded to the CMEC. The report will normally 
be treated as unclassified during this transmission. 
The CMEC's technical analysts determine what is of importance from the 
report, and give the team instructions through the LN E on what items need 
more detailed reporting or evacuation. During this time the team will collect 
all documents off the CEE and will record-
(Classification) 
PRETECHREP 
A. Type of equipment and quantity. 
B. Date and time of capture. 
C. Location (map reference). 
D. Capturing unit and circumstances of capture. 
E. Enemy formation from which captured and origin. 
F. Brief description with serial numbers and, if possible, manufacturer. 
G. Technical characteristics with an immediate value, including information or any 
photographs available. 
H. Time and origin of message. 
I. Present location of CEE. 
(Classification) 
Figure E-2. Format for a PRETECHREP. 
• All radio frequencies of communication equipment. 
• All serial markings of important equipment. 
• The battle damage done to the CEE. 
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These information requirements and actions will be taken at all CEE sites. 
The radio frequencies will be sent only by secured means. 
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT 
The COMTECHREP is categorized by Types A, B, or C, depending on 
what type of CEE is being reported. The COMTECHREP contains a more 
detailed description of the CEE than the PRETECHREP. It alerts the 
JCMEC, other technical elements, and the tactical units to significant 
detailed technical information of immediate tactical and technical 
importance. 
E-3 
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Corps TECHINT teams, and possibly JCMEC teams, will prepare a 
COMTECHREP on all CEM that the JCMEC tells it to do. If the TECHINT 
collection team is out of contact with the JCMEC, it will follow the TECHINT 
collection plan and use its best judgment on reporting. 
This report is first transmitted normally by secure computer data 
transmission over landline to the Corps TECHINT LNE from the team's 
base. If possible, it is transmitted from the CEE site over secure computer 
or radio data transmission via satellite. It is then transmitted to the JCMEC. 
The report normally will be treated as classified during this transmission. 
All electronic images of the CEE and computer scanning of critical CED will 
be transmitted with the COMTECHREP. If data transmission is not on 
hand, the report will be transmitted by the nearest message center at no 
less than PRIORITY precedence. 
COMPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE TECHNICAL 
REPORT - TYPE A 
The COMTECHREP - Type A is provided to Air Force TECHINT 
personnel. Air Force teams usually are not on the scene of captured or 
downed enemy aircraft before destruction, recapture, or loss. Army 
TECHINT personnel usually are the first elements on the scene and will 
examine the CEM and submit a COMTECHREP - Type A. This report often 
constitutes the only information that can be provided to Air Force TECHINT. 
If naval CEM is acquired, the Type A report format can be modified for 
reporting such acquisition. Figure E-3 shows an example of a 
COMTECHREP - Type A. 
(Classification) 
COMTECHREP - TYPE A 
The COMTECHREP - Type A is used to report information about aircraft. The JCMEC normally 
will require this report to be done right after the PRETECHREP on the aircraft. 
A. Type of Aircraft, fixed wing (examples): 
(1) Air-superiority (F-1SC, SU-27 B) 
(2) Multi-role fighter (F-16, MiG-29C) 
(Classification) 
Figure E-3. Format for a COMTECHREP - Type A. 
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(Classification) 
(3) Fighter-bomber (F-111, YAK-141) 
(4) Close Air Support/Ground Attack (A-10, SU-25, SU-22) 
(5) Bomber (B-2, TU-160) 
(6) Observation (OV-10) 
(7) Transport (C-130, IU6) 
(8) Airborne Early Warning (AWACS, Israeli PHZ) 
(9) Electronic Warfare/Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (EA-63, F-4G) 
(10) Special Mission (for example, Intelligence Collection) 
B. General Aircraft Configuration: 
(1) Overall length 
(2) Wingspan 
(3) Wing sweep angle 
(4) Variable geometry wings 
(5) Number of vertical stabilizers and orientation 
(6) Number of seats and orientation 
(7) Number of engines 
(8) Intake type and location 
(9) Landing gear type and orientation 
(10) Distinct control surfaces present (flaperons, elevons) 
(11) Other distinguishing features (wing fences, wingtipwinglets, antennas, canards) 
C. Identifying Marks: 
(1) Fin flashes 
(2) Paint scheme 
(3) Individual or squadron markings 
D. Overall Condition: 
(1) Describe extent of damage and salvageable parts 
(2) Assess cause of crash, if possible 
(3) Did Aircrew survive 
E. Cockpit Avionics (not all equipment is present in every aircraft): 
(1) Type (brand and model) of airborne intercept. bombing and navigation, weather radars 
(2) Type of communications gear, frequency settings if possible 
(3) IFF or Transponder type, settings 
(4) Type EA equipment 
(5) Type of RWR gear 
(6) Type of weapon guidance gear (laser designation equipment. TV guidance 
equipment) 
(Classification) 
Figure E-3. Format for a COMTECHREP-Type A (continued). 
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(Classification) 
(7) Type of I RSTS if present 
(8) Are the following flight controls present: HUD, fly-by-wire controls, MFD, HOTAS (9) 
Type of chaff or flare dispenser system 
F. Armament: 
(1) Number of cannons present. caliber, and location 
(2) Bombs or rockets present 
(3) Air-to-air missiles present 
(4) Air-to-surface missiles present 
(5) Number of launch rails or weapon mounts present and location 
G. General remarks and special points or unusual features not mentioned. 
H. Photos of at least: 
(1) Airframe 
(2) Engine 
(3) All other items that could be of importance 
I. Designation of TECHINT collection team conducting exploitation: 
J. Time and origin of message: 
E-6 
(Classification) 
Figure E-3. Format for a COMTECHREP - Type A (continued). 
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
REPORT - TYPE B 
The COMTECHREP - Type B is used to report information about explosive 
ordnance. TECHINT teams prepare these reports, normally done by the 
EOD member of the team. EOD companies will also prepare them in 
absence of TECHINT personnel or when required by higher headquarters. 
This report must be as complete and detailed as possible. EOD personnel 
prepare and send this report by the fastest means through an EOD control 
unit. The JCMEC coordinates with EOD battalions to receive copies of 
these reports as soon as possible. 
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NOTE: Initial overall classification of EOD Reports. Non-nuclear (COMTECHREP B) will be in 
accordance with OPNAVINST S5513.3B-24.1. 
The initial classification of the COMTECHREP B with RSP is Confidential and will not be released 
to non-US personnel without the written consent of Commanding Officer, NAVEODTECHDIV. 
The release of RSP to non-EOD qualified personnel is forbidden. 
A complete and accurate report is essential; lives of other EOD personnel rely on this report. strive 
for the most complete report possible. However, when a detailed report might result in serious 
delay and the items are of extreme significance, complete as much of the report as possible. 
Items of EOD interest will at a minimum be photographed (with electronic imaging systems if 
available), X-rays (digital) and have detailed drawings with measurements (metric). 
Figure E-4 shows an example of a COMTECHREP - TYPE B. 
The unit completing the report will distribute copies of the COMTECHREP - TYPE B (EOD Report) 
to all deployed US EOD units and provide copies to: 
Commander 
USATECHDET 
2008 Stump Neck Road 
Indian Head, MD 20640 
Commanding Officer 
NAVEODTECHDIV 
2008 Stump Neck Road 
Indian Head, MD 20640 
Commander 
USAARDEC 
ATTN: AMSTA-AR-FSX 
Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000 
Commander 
NGIC 
ATTN: IANGIC-RMS 
220 7th Street. NE 
Charlottesville, VA 22901-5396 
(Confidential when filled in) 
COMTECHREP-TYPE B (EOD Report) 
Section I. (U) DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION 
1. (U) IDENTIFICATION. See Figure _ for physical appearance and dimensions. 
NOTE: This will be an external view (when possible) and not show internal components. 
a. (U) Designation. Ordnance designation (if known) with transliteration of foreign alphabet. 
Example: M45. 
b. (U) Type. Used to summarize the key functional aspects of the items. 
Example: This is a High Explosive Rocket Assist (H ERA) projectile. 
Figure E-4. Format for a COMTECHREP - TYPE B. 
E-7 
FM 34-54 
c. (U) Painting and Markings. Record all paintings, surface treatments, and markings. 
d. (U) Features. Point out unique or distinguishing external features of the item that are not 
obvious in the drawings. 
2. (U) DESCRIPTION. 
a. (U) Material. Include information pertaining to the major external components; for 
example, "plastic," "aluminum." 
b. (U) Weight. Give the approximate weight if known. 
3. (U) HAZARDOUS COMPONENTS. 
ITEM QTY LOCATION EXPLOSIVE HE WEIGHT 
List Hazardous components (if known). 
4. (U) FUNCTIONING. Explain the operation of the ordnance, particularly the components of 
the ordnance involved with initiating the explosive train. 
5. (U) APPEARANCE. It must be known for certain that the item is unarmed if the item is to be 
treated as such. 
a. (U) Unarmed Condition. Example: The item is unarmed if not fired. 
b. (U) Armed Condition. Example: Consider the item armed if it has been fired. 
Section II. (C) EOD PROCEDURES. (EOD USE ONLY) 
6. (U) RENDER SAFE PROCEDURE FOR THE UNARMED CONDITION. 
a. (C) PROPOSED: (Develop and record prior to completing RSP). 
b. (U) Proceed to disposal. 
7. (U) RENDER SAFE PROCEDURE FOR THE ARMED CONDITION WARNINGS. 
a. (C) PROPOSED: (Develop and record prior to completing RSP). 
b. (U) Proceed to Disposal. 
continued: 
8. (U) DISPOSAL PROCEDURE. 
Figure E-4. Format for a COMTECHREP - Type B (continued). 
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a. (U) Unarmed. Transport hazardous components to safe disposal area and dispose of by 
detonation. 
b. (C) Armed. 
(1) (Include quantity of explosives used to dispose of item). 
(2) Detonate remotely. 
(Confidential when filled in) 
Figure E-4. Format for a COMTECHREP - Type B (continued). 
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
REPORT - TYPE C 
The COMTECHREP - Type C is used to report items not reported under 
COMTECHREP (Types A and B). COMTECHREP - Type C is submitted 
as soon as possible. Figure E-5 shows an example of a COMTECHREP-
Type C. 
(Classification) 
COMTECHREP - TYPE C 
A. Date found and location (map reference). 
B. Type of equipment and quantity. 
C. Origin. 
D. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details). 
E. Condition of equipment. 
F. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional details). 
G. Recommended disposal. 
H. Name plates photographed. 
I. Photographs taken. 
(Classification) 
Figure E-5. Format for a COMTECHREP - Type C. 
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(Classification) 
J. Other information. 
K. Designation of TECHINT collection team doing this initial exploitation. 
L. Time and origin of message. 
E-10 
(Classification) 
Figure E-5. Format for a COMTECHREP - Type C (continued). 
DETAILED TECHNICAL REPORT 
The DETECHREP normally is prepared at the JCMEC by the Exploitation 
Company, with the assistance of the national S& TI analysis personnel at 
the JCMEC. The DECTECHREP normally is classified. The CM&D 
section of the Exploitation Company sends the DETECHREP through the 
JTIB to the national S& TI community. They also send a summary of the 
report to Theater units. 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE REPORT 
The TECHINT Update Report is a one- to two-paragraph report on an item 
of equipment that has an impact on tactical operations. The report comes 
from information provided in PRETECHREPs and COMTECHREPs, and is 
unclassified. The goal of the report is to reach the lowest level-the 
soldier -with information of value to the soldier. The CM&D section of the 
Operations Company sends the report by electronic message and 
computer data transmission. 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 
The TECHINT Summary is a collection of information on more than one 
item of equipment that has an impact on theater tactical operations. The 
information comes from PRETECHREPs and COMTECHREPs from over a 
period of time or from a large CEE location. The report normally is 
unclassified, but if put into an overall intelligence summary, it can be 
classified. The CM&D section of the Exploitation Company sends the 
report by electronic message and computer data transmission to the JTIB. 
The JTIB then makes dissemination to the lowest possible level with JTF 
C31 assets. 
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TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT 
The TIR is a critical report which goes to the highest levels of the 
intelligence hierarchy. The report comes from information from 
PRETECHREPs, COMTECHREPs, and DETECHREPs. This report is 
always classified and follows the format in DIAM 58-13. The CM&D section 
sends TIRs by electronic message to the JTIB. The JTIB disseminates 
them to the highest and lowest intelligence units and agencies possible. 
E-" 
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Appendix F 
COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION REQUIREMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This appendix includes guidance on how to develop a TECHINT collection 
plan, and a listing of general exploitation categories regarding items of 
interest to battlefield TECH INT. It is included only as a field guide, and is 
not an all-inclusive exploitation plan. 
TECHINT COLLECTION PLAN GUIDANCE 
TECHINT elements are a very limited resource requiring specific collection 
planning to be effective. The most critical TECHINT items for collection are 
found in the TECHINT Appendix to the OPLAN or OPORD. The following 
steps help determine pertinent items in the collection plan before it is 
accepted. 
STEP 1. Identify the equipment OB for the threat; for example, items such 
as individual soldier's equipment, maps, small arms, heavy weapons, and 
explosives. Also include every type of equipment the threat could have on 
the battlefield. This is an ongoing effort, with the OB always being updated. 
In addition to the collection plan, include overlays of locations of ASPs, 
maintenance points, SAMs, communications centers, and other locations 
that contain quantities of equipment for collection. 
STEP 2. In coordination with DIA, national S& TI requirements, and Theater 
and Corps PIR and IR. the TECHINT unit prioritizes collection of items from 
the OB. If coordination is not possible, the equipment that is the greatest 
threat to the conduct of tactical operations is prioritized. 
STEP 3. The DOD Foreign Acquisition List is used to guide TECHINT 
priorities. These collection priorities are published in the Intelligence Annex 
to the OPORD in the form of a collection plan. As collection takes place, 
the updated collection plan is then sent to TECHINT and theater units in 
message format. 
STEP 4. The TECHINT collection requirements are then cross-referenced 
to the known threat OB. TECHINT elements are then tasked, if possible, 
with specific collection of items from the threat units that they are facing. In 
addition, the Corps TECHINT LNE coordinates with the Corps G2 to give 
specific collection requirements to the Corps units. The JTI B coordinates 
F-1 
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with the Theater J2 to give collection requirements to theater units such as 
Special Operations units. 
STEP 5. In addition to the TECHINT collection priority list for equipment 
TECHINT elements are tasked to collect inspect or develop the following 
items: 
• Threat equipment manuals or documents. 
• Threat installations. 
• Listing of TECHINT questions for the interrogation of EPWs. 
• CB laboratories and samples. 
STEP 6. The 203d MI Battalion, in coordination with national S& TI 
agencies, maintains contingency TECHINT collection plans for possible 
threat forces. When a TECHINT element deploys, it is given the TECHINT 
collection plan in order to prepare and train for operations. 
EXPLOITATION PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS 
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GENERAL EXPLOITATION PLAN: 
The JCMEC is expected to conduct this level of exploitation on all 
equipment in theater. The Corps RC TECHINT sections at the CMEC 
conduct this level on equipment that matched the MOSs in their elements. 
The TECHINT collection teams are prepared to do this, but normally would 
not do it on a large scale. 
Preliminary requirements for exploitation include-
• Preliminary photographs of CEM outside and inside (to shows status of 
equipment before assessment). 
• An inventory. 
Examine system for any written information (documents, operator 
manuals, maps), markings, data plates, or operating instructions. 
Identify all individual equipment components requiring separate 
analysis. 
• If equipment requires further analysis beyond initial exploitation, begin 
planning for further detailed exploitation with national S& TI personnel. 
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• The exploitation, with finished report is accomplished within 48 hours. 
The JCMEC normally is the primary center for all detailed exploitations in 
theater. 
Once the general exploitation is accomplished, a more detailed exploitation 
begins. This is in coordination with the national S& TI SME at the JCMEC. 
The plan is provided by the national S& TI community. 
The JCMEC maintains in the Exploitation Company detailed exploitation 
plans for collection priority equipment. These plans are part of the 
contingency database for the threat equipment. The time limit for a detailed 
exploitation is determined by the tactical needs of the theater and national 
requirements. 
F-3 
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Appendix G 
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEXT RECOGNITION 
INTRODUCTION 
When TECHINT personnel are able to correctly identify foreign languages 
used in documents or equipment it has two immediate benefits. First it 
helps identify the equipment or type of document and where or who is using 
it. Second, it ensures that TECHINT personnel request the correct 
linguistic support. 
This appendix contains language identification hints that will enable 
TECHINT personnel to quickly identify some of the many languages used 
in documents, on equipment plates, and on other materiel. TECHINT 
personnel can speed up the entire battlefield TECHINT process by 
following the guidance herein. 
The language identification hints were compiled by NG IC. There are 
thousands of languages and dialects in use in the world today; therefore, 
this material is not complete. The following include examples of the use of 
language identification during TECHINT operations. 
• A TECHINT team discovers an ADA system that looks like a Russian 
ZPU-4 ADA gun. But on closer examination, the technical analysis 
identifies Chinese characters on a data plate and on the tires. This 
could mean that this ADA gun is from China, and this observation 
needs to be reported to TECHINT elements and to the CMEC. 
• TECHINT personnel find a document in Arabic, but the country they are 
in speak and write only Spanish. This document could be of 
intelligence value and would require being reported to TECHINT 
elements and to document exploitation (DOC EX) personnel. 
LANGUAGE SYSTEMS 
The world's written languages can be divided into alphabet languages and 
character languages. The only present-day character system is the 
Chinese system, which has been borrowed by other languages. But there 
are many alphabets. The most important alphabets currently in use are-
• The Roman alphabet (used by English and many other languages). 
G-' 
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• The Cyrillic alphabet (used by Russian, some other Slavic languages, 
and most of the minority languages of Russia). 
• The Arabic alphabet (used in the Middle East and other areas 
influenced by Islam). 
Other alphabets exist. but their use is more restricted. (Figure G-1 shows 
some of these spoken languages and some of the locations where they are 
spoken.) 
• The Hebrew alphabet for Hebrew and Yiddish; the Greek alphabet for 
Greek. 
• The Devanagari alphabet for Sanskrit and other languages of India. 
In addition, there are special alphabets for languages like Georgian, 
Telugu, the other Dravidian languages in southern India, Laos, and other 
languages in southeast Asia, and Amharic in Ethiopia. 
Illustrations of the main alphabets are normally available in standard 
desktop dictionaries. Many unusual scripts are illustrated in Romanization 
Guides, revised and enlarged edition, put out by the Office of the 
Geographer, Directorate for Functional Research, Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research, US Department of State, and the US Board on Geographic 
Names, dated 1 April 1972. 
Reliable detailed information about foreign languages for people who 
cannot actually read them is available in manuals compiled for professional 
librarians. These manuals can be found at your local library. 
ROMAN ALPHABET LANGUAGES 
G-2 
The most complex language recognition problem is to distinguish between 
the numerous languages that use the Roman alphabet. The 26-letter 
alphabet is used here as the basic alphabet. The other Roman alphabet 
languages use these same letters, but many use fewer than 26 and a few 
use more. 
Unfortunately, just because a letter is not used is not a very useful 
language recognition criterion. This is because it is difficult to know 
whether a letter is absent because it is never used or because it simply was 
not needed to write the text in question. 
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Language 
Chinese 
English 
Spanish 
Hindi 
Russian 
Arabic 
Portuguese 
Japanese 
German 
Urdu 
French 
Korean 
Italian 
Vietnamese 
Turkish 
Persian (Farsi, Dari) 
Polish 
Ukrainian 
Rumanian 
Serbian (Croatian) 
Pashto 
Czech (Slovak) 
Dutch 
Hungarian 
Danish (Norwegian) 
Bulgarian 
Swedish 
Belorussian 
Finnish 
Albanian 
Lithuanian 
Latvian 
Location 
People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand 
United States, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand 
Spain, South America, Central America, Mexico 
North Central India 
Soviet Union, Europe 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, South Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Oman, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt. 
Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco 
Portugal, Brazil, Africa, Asia 
Japan 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland 
Pakistan, India 
France, Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Lebanon, Syria, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam 
Korea, China, Japan 
Italy, Switzerland 
Vietnam 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus 
Iran, Afghanistan (Tadzhik, USSR) 
Poland, United States, Soviet Union 
Ukrainian SSR 
Romania, Moldavian SSR 
Yugoslavia 
Afghanistan, Northwest Pakistan 
Czechoslovakia 
Netherlands, Suriname, Belgium 
Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia 
Denmark, Norway 
Bulgaria 
Sweden 
Belorussian SSR 
Finland 
Albania, Yugoslavia 
Lithuanian SSR 
Latvian SSR 
Siovenian Slovenia (Northwest Yugoslavia) 
Estonian Estonian SSR 
Macedonian Macedonia (Yugoslavia) 
Figure G-1. A partial list of spoken languages and locations where they are spoken. 
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DIACRITICS 
Grave <' > 
Hacek <v> 
Tilde <-> 
Dieresis <u> 
Question <?> 
Bar <-> 
Cedilla <1> 
Five of the letters <a, e, i, 0, u> are referred to collectively as "vowels," 
while the rest are called collectively "consonants." The rules designating 
letters as vowels or consonants vary from language to language. Some 
languages, for instance, consider <I>, <r>, or <y> to be vowels. Most of the 
Roman alphabet languages modify letters by putting extra marks above, in, 
or below them. These marks are called diacritics. They are among the 
best criteria for language recognition. 
Figure G-2 shows the principal diacritics used by various languages to 
modify the Roman alphabet. Figure G-3 shows the languages that use 
these diacritics. It also summarizes the occurrence of various diacritics in 
selected Roman alphabet languages and gives examples of letters with 
diacritics on them. The diacritics are divided into three groups, depending 
on whether they are written above, in, or below the letter. They are given 
standard names for convenience; their actual names vary from language to 
language. 
DIACRITICS ABOVE THE LETTER 
Acute <,> Circumflex <A> 
Breve <" > Macron <"> 
Krouzek <0> Dot <.> 
Double Acute <j Apostrophe <'> 
Umlaut <i:b Back Apostrophe <e> 
DIACRITICS IN THE LETTER 
Slash <I> Horn <'> 
DIACRITICS UNDER THE LETTER 
Ogonek < > Comma <,> 
Low Dot <.> 
Figure G-2. Table of diacritics. 
WESTERN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES 
G-4 
Western European languages include those commonly called Romance 
and Germanic languages. 
<' > grave: 
<">acute: 
<A> circumflex: 
<v> hacek: 
< > breve: 
<- > macron: 
<-> tilde: 
<0> krouzek: 
<.> dot: 
<U> dieresis: 
<"> double acute: 
<'> apostrophe: 
<?> question: 
DIACRITICS WRITTEN ABOVE THE LETTER 
French, Italian, Portuguese, Vietnamese, e.g., <1i> 
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Croatian, Czech, French, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Polish <N, 0, S, 
C, Z>, Slovak, Spanish, Portuguese, Vietnamese; e.g., <13, 6> 
French, Italian, Portuguese, Rumanian, Vietnamese, Turkish, e.g.,<1l, 
0> 
Croatian, Czech, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian <S, Z, C>,Slovak, 
Siovenian, e.g., < C, e> 
Rumanian, Turkish, Vietnamese; e.g., <ii, g> 
Latvian, Lithuanian; e.g., <ii, ii> 
Estonian, Portuguese, Spanish, Vietnamese; e.g., <ii, n> 
Czech, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish; e.g., «3, e> 
Lithuanian <e>, Polish, Turkish, e.g., < e, Z> 
Albanian, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Hungarian, Slovak, 
Portuguese <lb, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish; e.g., <ii, e> 
Hungarian; e.g., <6, n> 
Czech, French, Slovak; e.g., <d', f> 
Vietnamese; e.g., <a, e> 
<{> back apostrophe: Latvian; e.g., <g> 
<-> bar: 
<I> slash: 
<>>> horn: 
DIACRITICS WRITTEN IN (OR TOUCHING) THE LETTER 
Croatian, Polish, Vietnamese; e.g., <d,l, a> 
Danish, Norwegian, Polish; e.g., <1, 0> 
Vietnamese; e.g., <ii, 6> 
DIACRITICS WRITTEN UNDER THE SEAT 
<,> cedilla: Albanian, French, Portuguese, Turkish, e.g., «;, p 
<0> ogonek: Lithuanian 
<,> comma: Latvian, Rumanian; e.g., <k, p 
<.> low dot: Vietnamese; e.g., <a, e> 
Figure G-3. The occurrence of diacritics in various languages. 
DISTINGUISHING FRENCH, GERMAN, AND DUTCH 
FRENCH: 
French is generally easiest to recognize because it is so familiar and has 
so many words in common with English. French uses acute < ,> and 
grave <' > on <e>. Acute is not used on any other letters, but grave is used 
occasionally on <a> and <u>. Circumflex <A> is used on <a, e, i, 0, u> and 
cedilla <,> is used under <c>. The French commonly omit 
diacritics over capital letters and in typescript. Definite article forms: Ie, la, 
les. French also uses a trema <oe, "I, e>. 
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GERMAN: 
DUTCH: 
German uses the umlaut < u> on <a, 0, u>. This is the language's only 
diacritic. German also uses a special letter, the Eszett < >, which does not 
begin a word. In regular prose, capitalization is rather frequent since all 
nouns are capitalized. Definite article forms: der, die, das, des, dem, den. 
Dutch can be mistaken for German; however, Dutch does not capitalize its 
nouns in regular prose. Dutch adopted a few diacritical forms from the 
French language. These include: acute <een>; grave <crepe>; 
apostrophe <'t, z'n, d'r, etc.>; dieresis <Belgie>; and sometimes the cedilla 
<,>. Definite article forms: de and he!. 
DISTINGUISHING SPANISH, PORTUGUESE, AND ITALIAN 
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SPANISH: 
For Spanish, look for acutes occasionally over vowels, tilde <-> over <n> 
but not over vowels, no grave accents, and words that end in <n>. For 
Portuguese look for the tilde over <a> and <0> but not over <n>, the cedilla 
under <C>, and some words that end in <m>. For Italian look for occasional 
graves over vowels, no tildes or cedillas, and numerous doubled 
consonants; for example, <tt>, <gg>, <pp>, <VV>, and so forth. Of course, 
look for the definite articles; they are frequently used and mostly different in 
the three languages. 
Spanish uses acute <,> on vowels <a, e, i, 0, u> and tilde <-> on <n>. 
Since the acute marks irregular word accent, there will normally be no more 
than one acute per word and it will appear on the last vowel or third from 
last vowel. Dieresis <u> is used occasionally over <u>. Grave <"> and 
circumflex <A> are not used. Definite article forms: el, la, los, las. 
PORTUGUESE: 
Portuguese uses acute <'>, grave <'>, and circumflex <A> occasionally over 
vowels, and tilde <-> frequently over <a> and <0>. Cedilla <,> is used 
under <c>. Dieresis <U> is used over vowels occasionally. Definite article 
forms: 0, os, a, as. 
ITALIAN: 
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Italian uses acute <,> on <e> and grave <'> on vowels <a, e, i, 0, u> to 
indicate unusual accent. Some type fonts may substitute circumflex <A> for 
grave. Normally there will be no more than one grave per word, and it will 
appear on the last vowel or third from last vowel. Definite article forms: ii, 
10, i, gli, la, Ie. 
NORTHERN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES 
SWEDISH: 
Northern European languages include North Germanic and Slavic, as well 
as unique languages of the Finno-Ugric family. The distinguishing features 
of each are described below. 
Swedish uses dieresis <u> on <a> and <0> and krouzek <0> on <a>. A 
frequent word is och; meaning "and." 
DANISH AND NORWEGIAN: 
FINNISH: 
Danish and Norwegian use the same alphabet as Swedan. They use 
krouzek <0> on <a> and slash <I> on <0>, and a special letter, the ae 
digraph <~, <E>. Written Danish and Norwegian are difficult to tell apart. 
but anyone who can read one can make sense out of the other. A frequent 
word in both languages is og; meaning "and." 
Finnish is very different from the other northern European languages, but it 
is similar to Estonian. Finnish uses dieresis < u> on <a> and <0>. About 60 
percent of the average text consists of vowels (including <y». Look for 
frequent double vowels; <aa>, <ee>, <ii>, etc. 
ESTONIAN: 
Estonian uses tilde <-> on <0>, dieresis < U> on <a, 0, U>, and hacek < v> 
on <s, z> infrequently in foreign words. At first glance Estonian looks very 
much like Finnish, and both are of the Finno-Ugric family. To tell the two 
languages apart. look for <y> (Finnish) or <u> with dieresis (Estonian). 
HUNGARIAN: 
Hungarian uses acute <,> on <a, e, i, 0, U>, dieresis <U> on <0, U>, and 
double acute <,> on <0, u>. These three diacritics are very frequent and 
should all appear in an average paragraph. Definite article forms: a, az. 
Although not Northern European, Hungarian is listed here because it is in 
the Finno-Ugric family. 
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ROMAN ALPHABET SLAVIC LANGUAGES 
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POLISH: 
CZECH: 
SLOVAK: 
It is often difficult to distinguish between the Roman alphabet Slavic 
languages. Of these languages, Polish is easiest to distinguish from the 
rest because it does not use hacek < v>, whereas the others do; and 
because it uses <w> frequently and <v> almost never, whereas the 
opposite situation occurs in the other languages. 
The languages of Czechoslovakia-Czech and Slovak-can be 
distinguished from the Roman alphabet languages of the former 
Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Serbia because Czech and Slovak use acute <'> 
on vowels (including <y» and Croatian and Siovenian do not. Acutes are 
so frequent in Czech and Slovak that the absence of acutes in an average-
length sentence can be taken as a valid negative test. 
The presence of the diacritics listed above for Croatian indicate that it may 
be Croatian; but there is no convenient way to test for Siovenian against 
Croatian. If in doubt between Croatian and Siovenian, assume Croatian 
unless it can be established that the text was published in LjubUana. 
Polish uses acute <,> on <c, n, 0, S, z>; ogonek < ,> on <a, e>; bar <-> 
(occasionally depending on font as a substitute for slash) on <L.1, Z>, such 
as < L. 1, Z>; and < > dot on <z>. Letters <w> and <z> are very frequent in 
Polish, and the <v> almost never occurs. 
Czech uses acute <,> on <a, e, i, 0, u, y>, hacek < v> on <c, d, e, n, r, s, t, 
Z>, krouzek <0> on <u>. The letter <r> with hacek is frequent in Czech and 
lacking in Slovak. 
Slovak uses acute <,> on <a, e, i, I, r, 0, u, y>; dieresis <u> on <a>; 
circumflex <A> on <0>; hacek < v> on <c, d, I, n, s, t, z>; and apostrophe <'> 
on <d, I, t>. The digraph <ie> is fairly frequent in Slovak and very 
infrequent in Czech. Slovak is used in eastern Czechoslovakia. Suspect 
Slovak if Bratislava is the origin. 
CROATIAN: 
Croatian uses acute <,> on <C>, hacek <v> on <c, S, Z>, and bar <-> on 
<d>. Croatian is used in northern and coastal Yugoslavia around the city of 
Zargreb. 
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SLOVENIAN: 
Siovenian uses hacek < v> on <c, S, z> and no other diacritics. Siovenian is 
used in extreme northwest Yugoslavia around the city of LjubUana. 
RUMANIAN: 
Rumanian uses breve <v> on <a>, circumflex <A> on <a, i>, and comma 
<,> under <s, t>. 
ALBANIAN: 
Albanian uses dieresis <u> on <e> and cedilla <,> under <c>. The <e> 
with dieresis is very common. Another recognition mark of Albanian is the 
use of <q> without <u>. 
LITHUANIAN: 
LATVIAN: 
Lithuanian uses hacek < v> on <c, S, Z>, macron <"> on <U>, dot < > on <e>, 
and ogonek <,> under <a, e, i, u>. The frequent occurrence of ogonek is a 
good recognition sign for Lithuanian. 
Latvian uses hacek < v> on <c, S, Z>, macron <"> on <a, e, i, 0, U>, and 
comma <,> under <k, I, n>. Comma is also used under <G> (upper case 
letter only), while back apostrophe <"> is used on <g> (lower case letter 
only). In this case the two marks are variant forms of the same diacritic. 
The macrons and commas are a good recognition sign for Latvian. 
OTHER ROMAN ALPHABET LANGUAGES 
TURKISH: 
Turkish and Vietnamese use the Roman alphabet with unusual diacritics. 
Turkish uses breve <v> on <g>, dieresis <U> on <0, U>, and cedilla <,> on 
<c>. Turkish has two forms of the letter <i>. One has the upper case < > 
and a corresponding lower < > that looks like an "i" without the dot. 
The other letter has the lower case form <i> (the same as English) and a 
corresponding upper case form that looks like English" " with a dot < >. 
Turkish also uses circumflex <A> <Iatif> <Iugat>. 
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VIETNAMESE: 
Vietnamese uses a very complex system of diacritics. It uses breve < v> on 
<a>, circumflex <A> on <a, e, 0>, horn <'> on <0, U>, and bar <-> on <d>. 
In addition to these, the following five diacritics are used with vowels to 
indicate tone: grave <'>, acute <">, low dot <.>, question <?>, and tilde 
<->. Vowels with breve, circumflex, and horn can, and often do, have a 
tone diacritic. So, in Vietnamese, one letter can have two diacritics on it. 
CYRILLIC ALPHABET LANGUAGES 
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The Cyrillic alphabet is used to write Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and 
many minority languages from the former Soviet Union. It is also used to 
write Bulgarian and Serbian. The Cyrillic alphabet and the Roman alphabet 
are both derived from forms of the Greek alphabet so there is a general 
resemblance. Some Cyrillic letters seem to Americans to be backwards or 
oddly shaped. Figure G-4 shows the characters and diacritics not found in 
Russian. With the exception of one letter, ,which is only used sometimes 
in Russian, none of these letters appear in the normal Russian text. 
1. 'h '1,----::-:: ___________ _ 
2. e 8, I i, I i __________ _ 
3. I i, '9' , 
4.tj l), J j,:JD;IL, n. h, ij: IJ.------
BULGARIAN • 
UKRAINIAN 
BELORUSSIAN 
SERBIAN 
* 1l1is letter appears frequently in Bulgarian and rarely in Russian. 
Figure G-4. Distinguishing major Slavic languages from Russian. 
SLAVIC LANGUAGES: 
Figure G-4 gives the simplest recognition guide for identifying documents 
that look like Russian but are actually other Slavic languages or minority 
languages. 
TRANSLITERATION: 
RUSSIAN: 
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Figure G-S shows the different forms of the Cyrillic alphabet for five 
principal Cyrillic alphabet languages and the recommended transliterations 
for each letter. Pay particular attention to the transliteration of Russian. 
These equivalents must be used when reporting on materiel bearing 
Russian nameplates. DO NOT REPORT ON FOREIGN EQUIPMENT 
AND DOCUMENTS USING THE ORIGINAL CYRILLIC CHARACTER. 
The Figure classifies each letter as "C" for consonant or "N" for 
nonconsonant. 
Russian is the most frequently encountered Cyrillic alphabet language and 
should always be the prime suspect. The key to recognizing Russian is the 
fact that it uses both letter 12 and letter 39 and does not use letter 13 at all. 
(See Figure G-S.) 
BULGARIAN: 
Bulgarian is perhaps the second most frequently encountered Cyrillic 
alphabet language and the most difficult for the nonspecialists to 
differentiate from Russian. Bulgarian uses fewer letters than Russian. 
NOTE: In the following discussion, the letters are referred to by their 
numbers on the chart in Figure G-S. 
For example, a letter used often in Russian and never in Bulgarian is the 
letter 39; however, the way to be sure that it is not Bulgarian is to see if the 
letter 38 comes before a consonant or "C" letter. Note that letter 38 is 
frequent in Bulgarian and rare in Russian; moreover, when letter 38 occurs 
in Russian, it always occurs before an "N" letter. 
Proper transliteration is very important. When an analyst reads a Russian 
nameplate and writes down P-l0SA, but it is actually an R-l0SD (P is not P, 
rather 'R" and < > is wrongly symbolized by A); then it results in incorrect 
reporting. 
The column in Figure G-S marked "Other" is not supplied with any 
transliteration equivalents. This column contains similar letters that are 
encountered in the written languages of various minority nationalities in the 
former USSR. These languages belong mainly to the Uralic family or the 
Altaic family, and a Russian linguist will be unable to make any sense out of 
them. Recognition of any documents in these languages as non-Slavic is a 
helpful first step in DOC EX. 
G-" 
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No. 
1_ H 
2. C 
3. C 
4. C 
5. C 
6. C 
Russian 
Aa a 
Ii G b 
U u y 
fr 9 
II JI. d 
7. H E e ely. 
O. H £ e ii/ye 
9. H 
10. C lKxc 
11. C 3 3 
12." H II 
13. " 
14. N 
15. C Ii ia 
16. C 
17. C Kit 
18. C Jl n 
19. C 
20. C MHo 
21. C H II 
22. C 
23. H 00 
24. C n II 
25. C P P 
26. C C c 
zh 
II 
i 
y 
k 
1 
m 
n 
o 
p 
r 
a 
27. C 
28 C 
T T t 
29. H 
30. C 
31. C 
32. C 
33. C 
34. C 
35. C 
36. C 
37. C 
.. 
'Yy u 
c1J+ f 
X x Ich 
l.l II. ta 
1I II ch 
Ww ah 
UJ.w. shch 
lB. N "b. • 
39." blw y 
40." b 10 
H." 33 • 
42. N 10ICJ yu 
43." 51 JI ya 
Ukrainian 
Aa a 
JiG b 
Du v 
fr 9 
.Ll JI. d 
E e a 
e 8 ye 
)I(lK 
3 J 
HII 
11 
II 
fJ Ii 
MM 
HII 
00 
1111 
P- P 
Cc 
zh 
II 
y. 
1 
y1 
y 
k 
1 
m 
n 
o 
p 
r 
a 
Yy u 
"'''' ! X x kh 
U. II. ta 
'l II Ch 
Ww sh 
UJ.w. shch 
blo 
1010 yu 
SI JI ya 
Belorus.ian 
Aa II 
Glib 
U D v 
r. r 9 
J1 JI. d 
E e e/ye 
E e i/ye 
)Kxc 
J 3 
II 
MM 
HII 
00 
111& 
Pp 
Cc 
TT 
Ww 
blw 
bit 
39 
IOtu 
51J1 
zh 
i 
y 
k 
1 
m 
n 
Q 
p 
r 
s 
t 
U· 
• 
f 
Ich 
ta 
Ch 
y 
• 
yu 
Y· 
Bulgarian Serbian other 
Aa 
Ii G 
U u 
r r 
.IlJl. 
a 
b 
v 
9 
d 
Aa 
Ji G 
o u 
r r 
llJl. 
"Ii -Ii 
a 
b 
v 
9 
d 
It 
r r Ii. 
E e e 
)Kxc 
3 3 
HII 
MM 
Ii II 
00 
1111 
)Jp 
Cc 
TT 
Yy 
Ww 
1Uw. 
"b~ 
bit 
10lu 
SIn 
zh 
II 
i 
Y 
k 
1 
m 
n 
o 
p 
r 
s 
)KlIC ! lIUk >IC.lII. 
J'3 Z 3 j :) ~ 
HII 1 A A Ii II 
II I 1 
J J j 
K" k l<I(KK 
Jl JI 1 ./bib 
Jill.. Ij 
fit., m 
H tl n ft " /bI4, irK' 
!-Il'b nj 
00 0 Ode.ea 
Iln p 
P P r 
C cae ~ 
t TT 
lib 
U 'Y Y 
t Tt 
~ 
u ~j-;-jYy 
Yy V., VII 
f tjJ'II 
kh X x 
ta U. II. 
Ch '1'1 
f 
h X ~ 
UI,I 
ah illw 
aht 
yu 
ya 
blw 
Figure G-S. Cyrillic alphabet and transliteration chart. 
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NOTES: 
1. The letters are numbered sequentially for ease of reference. The alphabetic order given is 
the convenient one, which is not necessarily the traditional one. 
2. The letters marked "N" are nonconsonants; and the letters marked "C" are consonants. 
3. Letters 7 and 8 have alternate transliterations for Russian and Belorussian. In all cases, the 
first transliteration is used when the letter occurs after a "C" letter; the second transliteration is 
used in all other cases, including when the letter begins the word. 
4. Letter 8 is not considered a separate letter and its dieresis is often omitted. 
5. Letter 4 is pronounced something like "h" in Ukrainian and Belorussian and "h" is often the 
recommended transliteration. However, transliteration "g" is recommended here to eliminate 
confusion with the letters transliterated "sh" and "zh." 
6. The "Other" category refers to various minority languages in the Soviet Union, many of 
which are Uralic or Altaic languages. 
Figure G-5. Cyrillic alphabet and transliteration chart (continued) . 
UKRAINIAN: 
Ukrainian is distinguished by the use of letters 12 and 13 and the non-use 
of letter 39. Letters 9 and 14 also are unique to Ukrainian, but their 
frequency is low and their absence may be accidental. When Ukrainian is 
identified, pay particular attention to the transliteration of letter 12. The 
recommended transliteration for letter 4 is "g" even though its pronunciation 
is closer to English "h." 
BELORUSSIAN: 
SERBIAN: 
Belorussian is distinguished by the use of letters 13 and 39 and the 
non-use of letter 12. Letter 30 is unique to Belorussian, but its frequency is 
not high enough to use it as an identification sign. As in Ukrainian, letter 4 
in Belorussian is transliterated "g" and pronounced like "h." 
Serbian is spotted easily by the several unique letters it uses: letters 6,16, 
19, 22, 28, and 35. Serbian is conventionally transliterated into Croatian, 
and this is what the chart gives. The diacritics of the Croatian script are 
discussed in the "ROMAN ALPHABET LANGUAGES" section above. 
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MACEDON IAN: 
Macedonian is spoken by perhaps two million people in southeastern 
Yugoslavia. The Macedonian alphabet is similar to the Serbian, except that 
letters 6 and 28 are not used and three other letters are added. The added 
letters are letter 4 with an acute <->, letter 17 with an acute <->, and <S, s>. 
Macedonian language documents are rare. 
ARABIC ALPHABET LANGUAGES 
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The Arabic alphabet has generally followed the spread of Islam and has 
been used to write numerous languages, some of which (notably Turkish) 
no longer use it. This alphabet. appropriately modified, currently is used for 
all the dialects of Arabic and for Persian, Urdu, and other Indo-Iranian 
languages, such as Dari. Pashto, and Kurdish. The Russian and Cyrillic 
alphabets seem even more related to one another when compared to 
Arabic. 
ARABIC AND PERSIAN: 
ARABIC: 
PERSIAN: 
The best distinction a nonlinguist can make is to separate Persian 
documents from Arabic documents. Persian linguists cannot read Arabic, 
and vice versa, unless they know both languages. 
Arabic is spoken over a large area extending from Morocco on the west to 
borders of ancient Persia (modern Iran) on the east. The spoken language 
varies widely in this area, but the written language is fairly standard. Only a 
specialist could hope to distinguish the varieties of Arabic, but a sharp-eyed 
nonlinguist can learn to recognize Arabic and distinguish it from Persian. 
The best indication is perhaps the presence of letter 32, which is not used 
in Persian. The next best indication is perhaps the frequent occurrence of 
the definite article < >, which is spelled with letter 1 (initial) and letter 27 
(initial). A final characteristic is the absence of the special Persian letters: 
letters 3,7,14, and 26. Since this is a negative indication, however, it 
cannot be used by itself to prove that a text is Arabic. 
Persian is used in Iran. It is indicated by the presence of the special 
Persian letters 3, 7, 14, and 26, and by the absence of letter 32. Other 
indications are a paucity of letter 1 and 27 combinations (the Arabic definite 
article) and a slightly different preference in numeral usage. 
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ARABIC NUMERALS: 
DIACRITICS: 
In school, the numerals used in the United States and most of the rest of 
the world are often called "Arabic numerals," but these are not the same 
forms used in Arabic alphabet languages. The real Arabic numerals are 
illustrated in Figure G-6. This figure also shows Arabic and Persian 
variants of the numerals along with their international equivalents. Unlike 
the Arabic alphabet (which is, of course, read from right to left), ARABIC 
NUMERALS ARE READ FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, THE SAME WAY AS 
OUR OWN NUMERALS ARE READ. 
Document collectors should familiarize themselves with the Arabic 
numerals so they can read page numbers in collected documents and 
properly reassemble documents that have come apart. Collectors should 
remember that one of the results of the right-to-Ieft orientation of the Arabic 
alphabet is that the apparent "back" of a document is actually the front. 
Figure G-7 illustrates the Arabic alphabet in its Arabic and Persian variants. 
Notice that each letter has four forms, labeled "alone," "final," "medial," and 
"initial." Notice that "initial" is to the right of "final." These column labels 
indicate two of the main differences between Arabic script and Roman 
script: First. the letters change in order to connect to other letters, and 
second, THE SCRIPT IS WRITTEN FROM RIGHT TO LEFT. 
The letters with asterisks by their numbers cannot connect to a following 
letter. The initial form is used to begin a word or when the letter follows a 
nonconnectable letter. The medial form is used after a connectable letter or 
when it is used by itself; for example, to letter paragraphs in a document. 
Another feature of the Arabic alphabet is the use of diacritics to differentiate 
many of the letters. Figure G-8 illustrates the diacritics used in Arabic and 
Persian. 
Using Figures G-7 and G-8, note that letters 2, 3, 4, 5, 29, and (partially) 33 
have the same base form with the following diacritics: high dot < . >, letter 
29; low dot <$>, letter 2; high double dot <">, letter 4; low double dot < .. >, 
letter 33, initial and medial only; high triple dot < . >, letter 5; and low triple 
dot <,>, letter 3. 
Letter 8 is the base form for another diacritic set: High dot < .>, letter 9; low 
dot <$>, letter 6; low triple dot <,>, letter 7. Letter 10 is the base form, and 
letter 11 adds high dot <.>. Letter 12 is the base form. A Letter 13 adds 
high dot <. >, and letter 14 adds high triple dot < . >. Letter 15 is the base 
form and letter 16 adds high triple dot <' >. 
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Imamatlonal 
a 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Arabm persian International Arabic Persian 
-
• 0 or • 6 ~ f- or ~ 
\ , 7 V V 
T T 8 
" " 
,.. ,.. 9 II , 
t 
_'f-_Of_t 10 , • \ 0 or 1 • _ ....... -
--- ---- ---- --
• ~ or 0 20 T • To or ,.. 
Figure G-6. International, Arabic, and Persian numbers_ 
Letters 17, 19, and 21 are the base forms for letters 18, 20, and 22 
respectively; the added diacritic for all three is high dot < .>. Letters 23 
and 24 have approximately the same base form with high dot < .> on letter 
23 and high double dot <"> on letter 24. Letters 25 and 26 have the same 
base form. Letter 25 uses flag < '> on its initial and medial forms and 
hamza sign <A> on its final and alone forms. 
Letter 26 uses double flag <"> on all its forms and hamza sign <,> on its 
final and alone forms. Letter 31 is the base form, and letter 32 uses high 
double dot <">. For grammatical reasons, letter 32 is not used initially or 
medially. 
SAMPLES OF ARABIC AND PERSIAN 
G-16 
Figure G-9 gives a sample of printed Arabic. Note the frequent 
occurrences of letter 1 and letter 27: the definite article at word beginnings. 
Remember, words begin on the right. The seventh line from the top, for 
instance, has four obvious occurrences and two other occurrences in 
modified forms that have not been discussed here. There are 18 
occurrences of letter 32, at least one occurrence in every line except lines 9 
and 11 and four occurrences in lines 3 and 8. 
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No. Arabic Persian 
Alone Final Medial Initial Alone Final Medial Initial 
1. , \ I I , \ \ , 
2. Y ~ Y ~ 
· I : I 
· 3. ~ 'r : 
• 
-
-
- - • 
-1. ..:.. .::.. : ; ..:.. .::.. : ; 
5. ~ .!.. ! • ..!" .!.. ! . ,I 
6. 
C. (! ~ c. (! ~ ':' ':' 7. 
~ C1. ~ • - - - -
· · 8. C. l: .. • C. l: .. • 9. t ;. ,;.. ~ ;.. . C C. ... 10. .) 
'"" '"" 
.) 
.) 
'"" '"" 
.) 
1l. ~ 
'"" '"" 
~ ~ 
'"" 
.1 ~ 
12. J J J J J J J J j j . 
· 
13. J J J J J J 
. 4 4 
· 
14. -
- - - J J J J 
15. v- Ir .... 
-
..r Ir 
-
-u~ . 
..! ~ . · ..! 16. • U"" -U"" -
17. ~ IJ'" .... ... 1/ IJ'" ..... ... 
J> v4 .,;.. . ~ IJ'" .... · 18. .,I .,I 
19. .1. 1 1& .1. 
.1. 1 1& L 
20. ~ 1& Ii 1; ~ 1& 1& 1; 
2l. t L- A r- t L- A $ 
.t L · Q. t:.. L ;.. Q. A 22. 
23. \oJ ..; A J ~ ~ A J 
24. W J 3 ; W W • J 25. 
.!.l ~ s:: ,5- .!.l ~ , J" 
26. 
- - - - 6' ~ s:- f' 
27. J J 1 J J J 1 J 
28. r .. .. r ~ .. .. (" 29. ~ W . I .J u .:. I . 
30. J 
.J 
.J J J .J .J J 
31. • 001. 4- ,. • 001. 4- It 
32. • 2. - -
- - - -33. loS u I: t I.S u • • 
Figure G-7. The Arabic alphabet. 
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< > High Dot . . < > High Double Dot • < •• > High Triple Dot 
< • > Low Dot < •• > Low Double Dot 
< -:;:::;- > Double Flag High 
< ... > Low Triple Dot 
< > FlagHigh <.s > Hamza Sign Persian 
< > Double Flag Low 
-:;:::;- < I > Hamza Sign Arabic < /' > Flag Low 
Figure G-B. The diacritics of Arabic and Persian. 
1!.o1.J.>. \II ~') A t.. ~liJl ~'.,;J·I JS J 015' .u.u ill~ ;r "'J.-;UJ 
Jl ~~ J ~;~, ~; ~ t..,;AI J)aJJ ..!.lJ..iSJ ~J ~I ~~I~~IJ 
, ;".,wI ~J.l1 ~I_ 4~1 ~ JLJ., ~')L... ~I ~u.~1 JLJ \ Y1\11 ~'rr 
.l..lr. t.. ..L.4 t.-.')L...J .l')L\I· ... 1 t .... ~\.A;LI t~{,~ WliIl . '1 ~Iij " 'I • ~ • V" v- ...r-"" IJ'::' '.J'-"" •• ~~ 
-J~ -~ 01 .:./-! ~ y 0"...1l1 ;1.r4J1 0U J\:J~J ;L\a:.:.1 .:r ~}I Y..l.>J 
.:r t , i.ll1.~ ~ CJr' --All>- ~ 0rlall ;1;411 .:,,1 IcS' - iJJ~1 J~r I.r 'W-~l ~I ~l;.....r:!- J ~~r' _l:}i Jf ~I j~ r~ ~ ~ ~I ;j:--JJ( 
.:rl ~L:-J ~li;J~ .... ):.-.; , ~WI ~L::JI} ~I ~l..ill .:r r-~ 
J:W...:i1 01 ~ J.:l.l I.Sll.Sy..u1 JI;JIJ ~.r. f .;rJ - 0ylill rts:..\lWJ ~I 
~ d> ' ~ ~ ~L.. J::i:i. ~ l.S?,'f .;1 Jf ~ ~6- J I~ ~ 
. t..j~ .'?,'I 0lS ~II..L. 0f w 
Figure G-g. Printed Arabic. 
Figure G-1 0 illustrates typewritten Arabic. Note that lines 1, 2 5, and 10 begin (on the right) with the definite article (letter 1 and I~tt~r 27). There are 20 other obvious occurrences of these letters at the beginning of words and 
several others that are less obvious. Lines 1, 2, and 9 end (on the left) with letter 32. Letter 32 occurs five other times in the sample. Arabic script permits some letters to be stretched in ord~r to even out t~xt on the left. The long lines at the left of the sample are Instances of thiS. 
; . .:t- ~':r.uJ ~1 ~'.'.r!'" I."J~ e:i .ul 
; ;~~, ~~\ ~J-A, ~I~~I ~I 
J' ; ' . .u 1 ,\.Jot V \ / " ~.l W 1 ~ ":Il-A 1 - r ~ 
~ \.\) t" ~ 1 ~ \i \.Jot , T 0 - , T t - V V .l1, .• Jl, 
I~.l,tt rJ 'u-e t ;el 1 U' dJ oi \.Jot c:.li:t ~ ~" y ~ 1 
. . 
\.1 , oi, ~6... .t-~ ~I ,-:-,l:S r.:l.i u.i ,~~ 
J :'i Lr.J. I,.. IS" ~ 1 iJ W I, u.!e,;. I1J,); U ":I 
t'~~ ~ c--w ~ ~ts' i.Wl i,~1 ~~.F­
i ;l-~ 1 U I, ~ 6... • t....... ~ ~ 1 '-:-' bS" r.li ~.J'd~ 
• 
A....-...J 1 IJt J.:i e- -J 1 ;A:- J'" ~ Ji.-.ll ~ ~ I 
...,.-A, - o.d1 ~ ~ r 6.. I,t.u \oJ \S" 1.l1 ~ r-t~ .. JI J L 
Figure G-1 0, Typewritten Arabic, 
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Figure G-11 illustrates printed Persian. Note the double flags < ">, two in 
the first line and eight more in the rest of the sample. Note the low triple 
dots <t>, one in the first line and eight more in the rest of the sample. 
Neither of these diacritics occurs in Arabic. 
0L) ~I J,r! .l!A J)~ Jl;S , . rl\ JL. J') 4. tr~ ol..! jl ~ 
iL...; J.:..:-il,,:i J.J J;:;.jf r.S.J ~!,;~ ~ .W jl ~)'.' ClJ~ y~).) .j\j 
.;-~.) J 4 J.j,~y. • .)~ ~ ~y' tr~ .l..! 0 Lj J') .0 '-'J~ .J ~Ij ~I 
I. r1 ~~ .L J') ~I .l..!.)~ J.J1 Y)l.::- J,..l. jl ~i ~.J J.j).JT ~ 
. . 
~I)') ),) ~I t ~I .J ) ~ ~~ l..... .J ~ r.S'y. ...... li .J o~ W (I "\Y' • ) 
~.J.) .J.' ~.).J-' ) ~I 0',1 \J.,,~ ~ ~ I)') .\..!.) ~ ~,..l. j I .J ..I •• J ,J¥ • ~ cS').'. 
)~ ~ ~,;,_, ~J~ F"" ~ \:..h.I. ·l..!.)4 ~,I ~L.j ).). J.J~ . .eif,l; .... 
L u ~t-Jru ~cl""'"P.-ud5""" tS \y, 61 ;J) ~ ~.) ) ~ .J .) Yo r.S J.:.lA 
cl.Y..~ ~;-: ...... u 0') ~ r.S~. ~l.!.)4 ~;, jl.J .)l:......J ~ .~ r.S'Y. J~.) 
Figure G-11. Printed Persian (arrows Indicate distinguishing features), 
G·19 
FM 34-54 
G-20 
OTHER ARABIC ALPHABET LANGUAGES 
DARI: 
Dari is used in Afghanistan and favored by the government. Since its 
written form is heavily influenced by Persian models, there is no easy way 
for the nonspecialist to distinguish it from Persian. 
KURDISH, PASHTO, AND URDU: 
The other notable Arabic alphabet languages are Kurdish, Pashto, and 
Urdu. Kurdish is spoken by the Kurdish tribes of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. 
Pashto is used widely in Afghanistan, and Urdu is the predominant 
language of Pakistan. These languages contain letters and diacritics not 
listed for Arabic or Persian. If one of these languages is suspected, refer 
the problem to a linguist. 
CHARACTER LANGUAGES 
Character languages use writing systems with symbols that stand for words 
or meaningful elements of words rather than for sounds. Character 
languages, such as hieroglyphic Egyptian, existed in earlier times; but 
today, the only character languages are Chinese and languages that have 
wholly or partially borrowed the Chinese system, such as Japanese and 
Korean. 
DISTINGUISHING CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND KOREAN: 
The easy way to distinguish the three languages is to look for the distinctive 
phonetic symbols of Japanese and Korean. If these symbols are not 
present. conclude that the language is Chinese. Chinese is the model for 
the other two, and these languages borrow freely from Chinese. Figures 
G-12, G-13, and G-14 give sample texts of Chinese, Japanese, and 
Korean. 
Figure G-12 shows Chinese characters. They are more detailed, complex, 
and square or precise than Japanese or Korean. 
Korean and Japanese language texts use Chinese characters whenever it 
might be unclear to use one of their own symbols. This means that the 
higher or more academic a text is the more Chinese characters it will have. 
(tlt~iii]~) :Ilfl:l~t~~HliIili:!F~~HU~t;litl'~o tali'IfFT-JI.-t-~mrtt, -jl.-tA~J{ 
7'eJ&, JJjJl:tAf4o $'CFR#1mtal;. tJilJc~IfFa~tp~~~~~lii"~}"o 
*1S1'fJ ;I:!It'J~tJj(~HIlm ~1!1f~mlU~ ;I:~f:~:IJI:!lRttt:fo I\3;tlilli iIltamA 6V~, i61f;r-!P'~* 
~1~:r~$~)JU;i1arJliI-Wo JIIJ.lilt;l:*TlJ.JfAtStGli, n:=J'l' tfflJ( Frank Wylie) fn-fiili¥I:f. 
( Nan.cy Hodes) #1mT?liililJilJcIfFo ~mi*JIfl!T~*It.J'JiJtSiE1flJ.J*~. *;J;:flI). xti~. 
~b':itt;n. 1:lii4. 1llI~~. ~mJ'.i4. th~;;t. ~-E~. Mil'l!lJilt. !IUllF-~o :tEjliJ~~l;l:J:fttp. iE1!J 
JlJ.rrJ#{~il (Elsie Fa irfax·Cholmeley). tmit~ (Norman Shulman) fn?&J'£:tc~X-.J'*:tStJ~tIil~fll 
tI1Jait.l;H:IJ Ti'fiJ; ~·St(j(J:tU!.o 
*.:jS;M-$.p ll2ia j(IA=H. ~.:jSl&ii. iliijt!:jl;,tF:l t\=r-~, Jtrp'~Ui!iUl~lSCtSif~!:jl, ~lcAn:J 
~!¥Ht IUtJ1 fR, i!!1fl.J1'tultiiiJ. iil)1t~in. »'ft1J1iE~~~Ui-I-=7r~o 
M;-tltiffJi1l~~, iEi&-~·m-1\!.(j(Jj(~iiiJm. /i1!{. JiltiIt. ilJilf. I;.t~Hl~"l~:fIIt.t~"l~O~·$ 
ffliiiJi'ao 
Figure G-12. Sample of Chinese text. 
"i1F1i~r:. I\.t.: A~' r:'i.1j < t" I) ??iJ Q. =; 1l~1!, Jf~FIQJI1'm':li, ~ = .!: I.:I1t.I~I:'It < "'"t' 
bo!>})l. l-tJ. b II~iJjj"'r'IlI!l!:'1l"}..."t'~ 'o!>. ilf ~ tl: r.tJi~/II*If~"~ 1::?~'"(,I;t, 1953 'j1l1!i"'~fT G 
~"n:. i:Ic II' ""': 10 r-i Ill'" ~~tll!II*- r:. tl.t.:"'"t' iJ Q til, jtli4'" rTiEli (, '=> "!>}...'" = .!:. f'1V.!: I~it 
''''1ft-I': ?~'"('-~liIlli"'JtdIUCl Ii: Ui-r:: .!: I::, t.:~h-f~~ '§}7J~'f~ t!~1.t.:. ':~\.I:'?~ ·"('I~. /II!JlJ~ 
i-!il"'tut;lltd127i'I::1\'; (,,,,C,;b.,,t.:.oIill:Ulf'f'o!>.!: ::"!>"t';bQ~:. -t'J1.tlilJlll:', PHJtUJ I":-~II\' 
;N/I ~ i£I ; -C tJCt-l~tillii/) r:. tl.t.: "'"t'Ob ?"(', PJf ... ]rrlUll/S~tl~ c, ? I~F;. -t'''' If I.:: l!i F;. ~1.. '~~I'::b 1.: ." 
"('*"~II""AJ:Ui!!CN"'t.:N.>/iC.;lJ t! 11.t.:. :: "'i!!CiITI': li":- V"'lII!lIIJI~)JlIIi:*c t,,~ 'fiiil!ll.!: ~'? "M'I~ 
IOF;.J1.'O·t.: . 
.!: = ?1>lP1; 11 "'ilia I:: -?tl,"(', ut W-M ~''''jj!IlU::: f~~'il'dr",lJ{ n liJrljj!! L..fliJli ilJ • Vr3Iift"'l!JIJ1I'f' 
,,~ (, '" (, .tlll'! L.."(, llft.:"'"t', HIi < ilf*I'::ll'Ihfi.i£ljJI"'~nlnIlJl L..t.:"'"t' IJ .Q~l, -t''''IIIJ, !nm~'i!~' 
tI'I",j1>'~·U."'i!!CjEl::W ~ ~lfq)ltl (')"10 ?"(,~U.:· C r:. l.::r~I\j)J",iJjj». F;.li:t?::~~ Ii: ViJII L.."('llIiilii'" 
iIiiIH:-lfr L.., ~t.:mihil!:'W;;Ii:-rQ'!: \,.; ;li:lJHl f"ilf(JlI.~(,uw-rQ I':3!? t.:. = ::1':J"3~'"(', ... .::, 
I.I:}... r:. "'f1:~.i2lt ,,, ~':1l:ilii(l'~i!!Cm':W~h-! Q = .!: .!: tL!J, f,l.lIE1lI.:IJ:-t''''Mtll lIUJHtr:.,t\., Ul~iJ)t(II" 
:U,)t:U:M < ~'iIt"'fll!:'i!Il~ QI'::3!? to:. 
Figure G-13. Sample of Japanese text. 
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-f-eJ '-tat ~rnwr' 1Il1S1fl~~ .sJ;7J. i- ;oJ oj ~ tl!ru:7~ JHIJ rlltt*~fi¥f~J jlJflJ 20 -'r'd t.i!:t.* 
.~~ ~1';! 15";i'J: lIti-71i-c9 ~oj ~ rit-f--t'c "~*IfAJ-i- WfU!}710\l 01.!L~-a-'19-. 01 
rir+t.E.. ~~*afAJ~ ~:y. ~e>J~ "d~ ~T~ AfI-V4 ~tIl~ A11 \l M11+.s.~ B!l~ *-
at 1JI: 9J. oS- '1 9-. 
i-°l~..!i!.~, c:loj.s:..k\ {IT -t-lIl.A.~£.k\Sl ..!i!.ijf.iIJ- -i-.... Ist ~PI-lI-i- 7~~12. ~'!l'~'li ~.A.~~.k\-e 
SlJ:lL ~.j,.i'-6J r~"J4 r.~JSl .Jf- 7~~1 "ll.A.~{I~ ~:UI2J~ oj.!::. T-T-ofl:>ll.s:. °J'..!i!.tt <T- ~A-e 
'~1I..q. -f-eJ -qj..2..!t -IT- ~AJtjlo~ 'tl-9-€- i!1@t!'i-i-7~~1.!Z. +1l1973ldoJl r*+ii.E.. ~"*IU4J-i­
'-Il~2. ~ r.-] JUH- ~*'tl- 15ldst .!c.~ irofl °l~o~ ~ .... ~ oja.J~ ~oJI rf.l)~*IUIlJ.9/ ..2..'if-i-
..!i!.°I~1 ~~-a-'19-. +eJv;!~ ..2..e Jl.~+ ~IH9--t- ~r.i~ -&71€-, 1l.!1. B1Jt'F ol'f 9--&-ti€-~:u 
a!'oJ 01 ~71 ofl r"~*if~Jol r~"*if~\J ..!i!.9- 51d 01 'f .... 1 Zl'!}-:>Il lfl. iI ~ '19-. 
G-22 
Figure G-14. Shows Korean with fewer Chinese symbols used. 
CHINESE: 
NOTE: North Korean text seldom has any Chinese characters as a matter 
of official policy. 
Chinese is written with several thousand symbols called characters. 
International numerals are widely used and scientific and technical Chinese 
will contain quoted European words in Roman letters. The characters are 
constructed according to a complex system based on the use of only a few 
different stroke types (less than 10) and a large set of elements called 
"radicals" (about 200). Radicals are made up of one or more elements 
associated with them. These radicals and strokes are used to construct the 
characters. The characters are thought of as occupying a rectangular 
space and good calligraphy allots about the same area to each character, 
regardless of complexity. 
Figure G-15 shows the 50 most common radicals in Chinese. Some will 
occur by themselves as characters. Most will more frequently occur as 
constituents of more complex characters. The People's Republic of China 
has recently changed the form of some of these elements, but most are 
unchanged and the traditional forms still occur even there. 
Except for numerical zeroes and the small circles that are used as 
punctuation marks to indicate the end of a sentence, printed Chinese does 
not have any circles. If the text has a lot of circles and curves, suspect 
some language other than Chinese. 
1 
9 
U 
18 
iJ 
19 
0 
30 
0 
31 
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! rll X q= EI 
*' 
~ ~ ~ fi 32 50 66 93 109 12O 149 [163] 181 
-)( r 8 3 15 n H ~ ~ 37 53 7Z [94] 112 (130) 154 167 (184) 
fA 1 
* 
f f ....f--f- Il r, ~~ 38 60 75 [96) 115 [14O) 157 169 187 
It , IfI ill !Ii ~ fl r'-? f ft'k 40 [61) (85) 102 118 142 159 1[170) 195 
-tit- ----t---t--, f ...L ... J~ f .. ¥-""J-
.0\6 [64) 86 104 119 [145) (162) 173 196 
Figure G-1S. The fifty most common Chinese character radicals. 
JAPANESE: 
Japanese has a mixed writing system. Like the Chinese, the Japanese 
normally use international numerals in their S& T literature; but this is not the 
real reason their writing system is mixed. Japanese writing is mixed 
because, in general, it uses Chinese characters to write the lexical stem of 
nouns and verbs (the part of the word that conveys the basic meaning); and 
a set of phonetic symbols invented in Japan called hiragana to write the 
grammatical affixes of the nouns and verbs as well as entire auxiliary 
words. 
Japanese also use another set of phonetic symbols, also invented in 
Japan, called katakana to write words borrowed from European languages. 
The presence of these katakana symbols distinguishes Japanese. Normal 
prose will contain perhaps 60 to 70 percent hiragana symbols. Unlike 
Chinese characters, hiragana are written with curved strokes. Katakana 
are less frequent. 
The hiragana are illustrated in Figure G-16 and the katakana are illustrated 
in Figure G-17. Pay particular attention to the fifth symbol from the left in 
the bottom row of the hiragana (Figure G-16), the one labeled "no." This 
symbol is used to write a very common grammatical affix. It will almost 
always occur frequently in any Japanese text. 
G-23 
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~I' 1J"l ~ \ r-I t~ I ,~ I ~ I ~ I ~ I b lui SII . UJ JIll h.a mil -.E. Fa 11111 
~l =-c:: 
i 'Iti 
? < '-9 ~ ~ ~~-;-I .:; I ? I 
-!!. b IU UW l1li ,II. mil. , l!! I 11& I (III)" 
~. It. 1tu 4t.1.1 "'%I~J iJ nJ ~~I 
~ c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~I~ ~ , I . -SJ-:;:] ~ ~r  .. yo. J J ~ 
KOREAN: 
'" 
Rgure G-16. The Japanese Hlragana syllabary. 
Figure G-17. The Japanese Katakana syllabary. 
Korean can be written entirely in its native alphabet. Therefore, symbols 
from this script will overwhelmingly predominate in any normal Korean text. 
Chinese characters, however, are considered learned and prestigious, so a 
certain number of them will be encountered in quantities that vary with the 
pretensions of the author. 
The Korean alphabet was developed under the influence of Chinese writing 
models, so to the untrained eye Korean alphabetic writing looks like Chinese 
characters. The letters of European alphabets form words, but the symbols 
of the Korean alphabet are grouped together to form a syllable. This means 
that a Korean word may extend over several groupings. 
Also, while the letters of European words are read horizontally, Korean 
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alphabetic symbols are read vertically-from the top to the bottom of each 
group-with the left preceding the right when the symbols are side-by-side. 
Figure G-18 illustrates the symbols of the Korean alphabet. Pay close 
attention to the second symbol from the left in the third row, the one that 
looks like a circle with a stem at the 12 o'clock position. It is a very frequent 
symbol and does not look like anything that occurs in Chinese or Japanese. 
., H ;; 11: l= T q 
-I 
--------
----
- -
'L. A e II -t "1T" il -4 
-- --
--
-~ 
c 0 .st ;JI ~ 
-
~ ~ 
--------
----
e. ~ ~ ~ .1- 1 ..t AI 
------
-- ----
---
-a ~ 7/ J- ....... II --rf -\-,11--
Figure G-1B. The Korean alphabet. 
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Appendix H 
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE SAMPLING PROCEDURES 
INTRODUCTION 
This appendix provides procedures for the safe and expeditious collection, 
transportation, and receipt of suspected CB agent samples from the 
integrated battlefield to approved CONUS and OCONUS laboratories for 
processing, analysis, and identification. 
BACKGROUND 
During the 1980's, at the time of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and 
the Iran-Iraq War, the ability of US forces to collect and analyze toxic 
agents was questionable. 
In response to this concern, an examination was conducted on the 
mechanisms in place to preserve the integrity of the suspected CB samples 
collected on the battlefield. 
Procedures for collecting, packaging, documenting, and transporting CB 
samples to laboratories must be precise to ensure the credibility of the 
analysis conducted on the samples. 
The credible analysis of suspected CB samples is critical for both battlefield 
commanders concerned with chemical retaliation and contamination 
avoidance, and medical personnel concerned with prophylactic or post-
contamination treatment. 
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
SITUATION: 
Current battle doctrine describes a nonlinear battlefield where the Threat 
NBC weapons are tactically integrated. The principles of NBC 
reconnaissance and detection and TECHINT teams apply equally across 
the battlefield. 
SAMPLING: 
H-1 
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H-2 
Sampling will be initiated when the following are observed: 
• Significant numbers of unexplained sickness or death of personnel or 
animals occur. 
• Ordnance (munitions) are found which contain known or suspected CB 
agents. 
• An attack is suspected or is known to have occurred but the causative 
agent cannot be identified. 
• The widespread outbreak of unusual mission-degrading behavior 
occurs. 
• Sampling of known or identified agents to verify first use is required. 
SAMPLING RESPONSIBILITY: 
Samples suspected of containing CB agents are divided into environmental 
and biomedical samples on the basis of their origin. Both medical and 
nonmedical units and teams have the responsibility for collecting samples 
suspected of containing CB agents. 
• Environmental Samples. Environmental CB agent samples are 
collected in the field. They include samples of aerosols or vapors, 
liquids other than water, soil, vegetation, water, used equipment. and 
ordnance. The acquisition of these samples is the responsibility of-
NBC reconnaissance teams. 
TEU field teams. 
Preventive medicine units (potable water sources only). 
TECHINT collection teams. 
Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) team. 
• Biomedical Samples. Biomedical samples are derived primarily from 
acutely ill soldiers who exhibit symptoms of CB agent intoxication or 
from personnel who were killed in an attack. Collection of the 
biomedical samples will be the responsibility of personnel in-
Battalion-level medical units. 
Division-level medical treatment facilities. 
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Combat support hospitals. 
Evacuation hospitals. 
NBC reconnaissance teams (small animals only). 
TECHINT collection teams. 
BIDS teams. 
SAMPLE ACQUISITION 
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES: 
Responsible personnel for collection: 
• Commander, NBC reconnaissance teams. 
• Commander, TEU. 
Commander, CMEC. 
Commander, preventive medicine units. 
NOTE: When possible, background samples from "clean" areas beyond 
the perimeter of the attack site should be obtained as baseline data for 
comparisons. Collect these identically to samples from contaminated 
areas and package them separately. 
The methodology for collecting environmental samples in order to analyze 
them for CB-agent presence will be specific for the type of sample (for 
example, liquid aerosols or vapors, soil. vegetation, water, other liquids, 
ordnance, equipment). Complete DA Form 1971-6-R for all environmental 
samples. A sample form is at Figure H-1. 
In conjunction with collection of environmental samples, any positive results 
using the chemical agent detector kits should be recorded on 
DA Form 1971-6-R. Sampling will be accomplished as instructed. 
Figure H-2 is an example of an equipment list containing components of 
a suggested environmental sampling kit. (See FM 3-3.) 
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Chemical/Biological Specimen Documentation 
For u •• 01 !N. lorm, ••• FM 3·3: ('" 11I0Il011- ,,,,nov it TRAOOC. 
INSTRucnONS 
Place the biological sample inside a refrigarator, ice chest, or insulated conuiner: and k.eep it as cool as 
ppssible at all times. . 
Speelmen IdentlflcaUon Number: _.....JoO~O:.!oO~1 ______ _ 
Oata and nme Specimen Collected: I ~ 157)0 ~L q Cf 
Reuon for CoUection la .... eho •• !1IoC opp/yJ: 
~ Cham/Blo Attaclc 
o Positive M256 Chemical oatection 
o Soldiers Becoming Sick 
o Other -------------.::IIlI 
location of Attack ~...t...LL.LI.~~...!..!. ___ _ 
Date and nmut Attack 
12.Ii?tr JuL 19 
Tamlin Oucriptlon Ichook !ho .. Chac 
[iZ( Ret 0 Hilla 
DUrban (i3" GraslY 
WallUlar 10" ..... mo.. thot opplyl: 
o Cllar ~ Cloudy 0 Rain DFoo 
o ettam/Blo Alarm Activated 
Positive Recon Team Findings 
Dying 
Cl Jungle o Forlst 
D 0111., _____ _ 
o Snow o Dust D Mist 
o O~er ___________________ ___ 
W."d at CoUeC1ion Sita 10 .... only aMI: 
o None/Calm 0 Mild Bre.ze 
Odor Icho"k ""'0. Chat 'PPIYI: 
o None o SWIat o Fruity 
~ndY OGuata 
~rritating o Plpper o Row.r 
o Changing D O~er _______________________ ___ 
Symptoms Icho. tllo,. tlloe _I'll: 
o ]Jane 
ria'Dizziness 
o Fever 
U2(Headache 
Symptom,: 
D Skin Swelling 
[t('Skin Rash 
D Dark Skin Blotch .. 
o Bleeding Sore. 
Time of On.et: ):A./~OO.:r"-'- '19-
DA Form 1971-6-R. AUG 92 
0 Difficulty Breathing o Blurred Vision 
0 Nause. D Dry Mouth 
D Unconscious 
D Other 
Duration (of Symptom,': /5" ",q,k..@S 
Figure H-1. Sample DA Form 1971-6-R (Chemical/Biological Specimen Documentation). 
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~--
Delivery Method Ie II .... tho .. ,II.t .pp."I: 
o Unknown ~nillerv o Monar o RPCi/Grenade o Rocket 
o Aircraft o Aerosol 0 Generator 0 Other 
State of Agent at Time o! Collection tcheck. only onel: 
o UQuid U('vapor 0 Powder o Solid o Smoke o Mist 
o Cust (cloud) 0 Gel 0 Other 
Description of Sample (check only onel: 
o Vegetation Blomlldical: 0 
~SOil 0 Urine 0 Other Blood o Tissue 
Color of Sample 
Size of Sample 
Other 
Additional Remarks: 
-
DA Form 1971-6-R. AUG 92 
Figure H-1. Sample DA Form 1971-6-R (Chemical/Biological 
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Description: 
labels, paper, pressure sensitive 
Edmont Wilson gloves 8-9 
Edmont Wilson goves 9-9 
tape, pressure, sensitive, adhesive 1" 
pliers #47 8" 
screwdriver, flat tip 1/4 inch 
tongs, Teflon tips 
micro spatula with Teflon ends AF 21-401-S0A 
scissors, universal type 
sterile sampler scoops 2 oz 
spoon spatula with Teflon 
knife, pocket 
PF A sample bottles, 6 oz 
pipet, jumbo transfer type 
pipet, graduated transfer type 
insulated bag, type 1 
insulated bag, type 2 
whirl/pak bag, 6 oz 
ph paper; non-bleeding plastic strip 
5EP-PAK C18 
syringe, hyp 50 or 60 mL 
R3602 clear laboratory tubing 
marking pen, waterproof 
Tenax tubes 
blade surgical knife detach no. 21 
blade surgical as 21 1508 
igloo type container 
ice pack 
pad, non-adherent 3 x 4 100s 
pad, cooling chemical 49 
piglette 
tape, anti seizing 
personal air sampler 
methanol 
distilled water 
matches, waterproof 
myler bags 
Field Expedient Packing Materials 
tin foil 
Saran wrap polyethylene without plasticizers 
Thermos bottles 
pressure sensitive tape 
Cool Paks 
butcher paper 
newspaper 
igloo cooler 
canteens 
Mess kits 
glass bottles 
packing material 
Teflon plumbers tape 
medical supplies 
7530-00-577 -4376 
8415-00-J02-2802 
8415-00-634-4639 
7510-00-582-4772 
8820-00-543-5350 
5120-00-596-5653 
AF 15-202-5 
AF 08-951-30 
AF 14-241-10A 
AF 14-356-10 
511 0-00-526-87 40 
CP J-61 03-50 
AF 13-711-7 
AF 13-711-9A 
AF 01-814-8 
AF 01-814-10 
AF 01-812-68 
5W 8-65271 
6515-00-168-8913 
AF 14-169-38 
AF 13-381 
EC 5T-023 
6515-00-860-0007 
6515-01-009-5297 
CP TR-6345-20 
6510-00-111-0708 
6530-00-133-4299 
8030-00-889-3535 
L55 G4980 + 
GJ4981 
Figure H-2_ Example of an equipment list_ 
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Contaminated sampling equipment not transported with the sample will be 
decontaminated and double wrapped in plastic and undergo a sampling 
protocol to certify the items as "XXX." The XXX refers to decontamination 
to the point that equipment can be reused, but is not releasable from DOD. 
FM 34-54 
Liquid Aerosol and Vapor Samples: 
• Use an electric or hand pump (record the run time for electric pump or 
number of aspirations for hand pump to determine volume), collect the 
liquid aerosol remove (LAR) in two Tenax GC-Type Sorbent Tubes. 
• Return the sampling tube to the piglette, mark on the outside with a 
sample identification code and close the ends tightly. Attach a 
DA Form 1971-6-R. Pack the sample. 
Vegetation Samples: 
• Collect vegetation which appears in any way to be different from 
normal, nearby vegetation (for example, discolored or withered 
vegetation, or vegetation having powder or droplets present). 
• Collect vegetation samples at several locations within suspected 
contaminated areas. 
• Cut several affected leaves and/or a handful of grass. Do not crush the 
sample. Instead, place it in a mylar bag and seal. Collect similar 
reference vegetation from an unaffected area and place it in a separate 
mylar bag and seal it. The minimum sample size of value is three 
leaves or three handfuls of grass. One leaf is of little value (but it is 
better than nothing). Bark is acceptable but not preferred. 
• Mark the bag with a sample identification number. 
Soil Samples: Collect samples from areas stained with oils or powders, 
from areas that are discolored, or from areas that are otherwise different in 
appearance from the surrounding soil. A similar soil sample from an 
unaffected area is required for reference (soil of the same type and texture 
is preferred). The minimum sample volume is approximately that of a 
cigarette pack laying on its side. 
• Use a knife, spoon, spatula, or piece of metal to collect the sample. 
• Place the sample in a mylar bag. 
• Mark the bag with a sample identification number. 
Water Samples: Use the M272 water test kit or other appropriate test kit to 
determine the presence of chemical agents, record the test 
results on a DA Form 1971-6-R. Take samples at standing pools or along 
streams where dead animals are observed. 
H-7 
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H-8 
• Collect bulk water samples (preferred when oily globules or suspended 
solids are present) as follows: 
Skim surface water into Teflon bottle. 
Fill the bottle, screw on the top, and ensure that the seal is leak 
proof with parrafin wax or plumber's antiseize tape. 
Mark a sample identification number on the bottle. 
• When using the SepPak Cartridge for liquid sampling, consider the 
following: 
The C-18 SepPak cartridge extracts and concentrates contaminants 
from a water source. 
Methanol and distilled water are used to prime the SepPak. 
200 milliliter (mL) of sample water is drawn slowly through cartridge 
with a 50 mL syringe. Discard liquid and syringe. 
The cartridge is placed in a Teflon bottle marked with a sample 
identification number. 
• When obtaining a sample of sludge on the shore or in a shallow bottom, 
scoop the top of solids with an open bottle; close the bottle and seal it 
with parrafin wax. Mark the bottle with an identification number. 
Packaging Samples: Place several sample bags in one mylar bag. Place 
the reference samples in a separate mylar bag. Do not overfill. Press 
excess air from the bag and seal the adhesive end. Seal the package with 
tape, and mark sample identification numbers. Include the DA Form 1971-
6-R. 
Packaging Small Animals (Mammals Preferred): Place the animal in a 
mylar bag, press excess air from the bag, and seal it. Mark the bag with 
the sample identification number and place the marked bag into a second 
mylar bag. Press excess air from the bag, seal the adhesive flap, and seal 
the bag with tape. Mark with sample identification numbers and attach the 
DA Form 1971-6-R. 
Packaging Ordnance or Protective Equipment or Clothing: Prior to 
approaching or handling any ordnance, exploded or unexploded, contact 
the EOD unit in the area for assistance. The EOD unit will attempt to 
identify the ordnance by physical characteristics or markings and render it 
safe. If the ordnance is CB in origin, EOD will perform initial packing in the 
FM 34-54 
field and transfer the sample to an MI unit for transfer to CONUS. The 
sample must be marked with a sample identification number and 
documented with the DA Form 1971-6-R and DD Form 1911. 
Protective equipment and clothing from casualties can be an important 
source of a CB agent for identification purposes. To do this, place the 
equipment or clothing in a large mylar bag, fold, expel excess air from the 
bag, and seal it. Mark the bag with a sample identification number. Place 
the bag in a second mylar bag, seal, and mark with a sample identification 
number. Then complete and attach the DA Form 1971-6-R. Finally, 
forward the sample to Technical Intelligence for transfer to Corps G2. 
Document the transfer on DA Form 3147. 
BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES: 
Responsible personnel for collecting samples are located in-
• Battalion-level medical units. 
• Division-level medical treatment facilities. 
• Combat support hospitals. 
• Evacuation hospitals. 
• TECHINT collection teams. In the theater of operations, the TECHINT 
teams will have the capability to obtain biomedical samples from 
patients and cadavers. 
The best biomedical sample is an acutely ill soldier sent back to CONUS 
immediately. DA Form 1971-6-R is to be completed on all biomedical 
samples. In addition, a copy of the physical examination or an extract of 
significant findings are to be enclosed with the biomedical samples. 
Additionally, the following samples should be collected whenever 
casualties occur and should be collected in triplicate, distributing two within 
CONUS and one to the TAML. Once collected, the samples should be 
refrigerated or chilled immediately. DO NOT FREEZE. 
DA Form 1971-6-R will be completed on all biomedical samples. Medical 
personnel should perform biomedical sample collection to obtain a valid 
sample. 
Use the following guidance to collect samples: 
• Collect samples from patients during acute phase and at day 7. 
H-9 
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• Collect urine samples (20 to 50 mL per sample x 3) in urine specimen 
cups, the top secured with wide tape, and placed in individual sealable 
bags. 
• Collect whole blood or serum samples (5 mL per sample x 3) in red-top 
blood tubes and placed in individual, sealable bags. 
• Collect sputum only from acutely ill patients (x 3). They should be 
collected in urine cups. Secure the cup with wide tape and place in 
individual sealable mylar bags. 
• Collect cerebral spinal fluid (2 mL per sample x 3) in red-top blood 
tubes and placed in individual, sealable bags. 
• Take at least 30 grams of organs and tissues (human, post-mortem 
x 3), place in a sterile container in individual, sealable bags, and 
refrigerate immediately: liver, spleen, lung, subcutaneous fat. cerebral 
spinal fluid, kidney, heart. and brain. 
• Collect at least two mediastinal lymph nodes. 
• Take animal tissue samples as a lower priority to human samples. 
Animals should be mammalian (no birds). 
• Once critical and significant biomedical samples are identified in 
OCONUS, these samples should be turned over to the tactical 
intelligence channel for disposition to appropriate laboratories (CONUS 
or OCONUS). 
• Sample and corroborative information is provided for on 
DA Form 1971-6-R. 
Packaging Biomedical Samples: Place the mylar bags or sample 
containers in a plastic bag. Remove excess air and seal tightly. Mark the 
container with a sample identification number. Place 1 to 2 inches of 
packing material (for example vermiculate or foam) around the sample bag 
in a rigid container. Wrap jars, tubes, or specimen cups in bubble wrap or 
other suitable material so they do not move in the container. Place a lid on 
the container and seal with wide tape. Place a warning on the outside of 
the container as follows: 
DANGER 
Do not open. Contains hazardous material or 
suspected CB agents which may cause 
immediate death or personal injury. 
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DISPOSITION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES: 
Place the environmental and biomedical samples in an insulated chest; 
ensure that the sample is packed tightly and an adequate supply of 
refrigerant is available. Seal the chest and label accordingly prior to its 
departure from the OCONUS theater of operation to CONUS. 
The procedure should further meet the specifications contained in 
TM 38-250, paragraph 10-51, for etiologic agents. Document all samples 
with DA Form 1971-6-R. Number the samples. Units are responsible for 
forwarding samples through intelligence channels to Corps G2. Document 
the sample transfer with DA Form 3147. Figures H-3 through H-5 are 
examples of responsibilities, collection guidelines, and identification and 
control for a sample evacuation. 
SAMPLE EVACUATION 
A. RESPONSIBILITY: 
1. Field units are responsible for the transfer of samples to MI channels for forwarding to 
Corps G2. Additional packaging and consolidation of double-contained samples, if required, 
will be accomplished prior to shipping to CONUS. Complete the sample identification. 
Document sample transfers on DA Form 3147. 
2. Corps or Division surgeons are responsible for coordinating the delivery of samples from 
MI channels to Corps G2. The Corps and/or Division Surgeon will coordinate with combat units 
and graves registration units for expedient transfer of personnel deceased as a result of a CB 
attack to battalion, division, or corps level medical units and hospitals for obtaining biomedical 
samples. Document the sample transfers on DA Form 3147. 
3. Corps G2 is responsible for coordinating shipment of samples to approved CONUS and 
OCONUS laboratories and the TAML. as well as dispatching the required notification 
messages. Notification to the US Army Chemical and Biological Agent Technical Evaluation 
Board (CBATEB) of the acquisition of a sample suspected of containing CB agents is requested 
within 1 hour of receipt by Corps G2. 
Figure H-3. Description of responsibilities for a sample evacuation. 
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'IMPORTANT NOTES' 
(a) Properly packaged samples do not constitute a hazard to personnel. 
(b) All outer packaging is to be inspected visually for physical evidence of leakage or 
loss of envelope integrity. 
(c) DO NOT UNWRAP. Overwrap if any irregularities exist. 
(d) If overwrapping is required, provide the time, date, place, and the reason. 
(e) Refrigerate or chill (DO NOT FREEZE) all samples. 
(n Delay must be minimized. 
(g) All samples will be forwarded from the theater to approved CONUS and OCONUS 
laboratories and TAML 12 to 24 hours after collection. Delay beyond 24 hours rapidly 
degrades the operational and intelligence value of the samples. The most efficient means of 
shipment will be used; address all samples to CBATEB, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and 
TAML. 
B. DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED ON ALL SAMPLES: 
1. DA Form 1971-6-R. 
2. DAForm3147. 
C. NOTIFICATION MESSAGE: The notification message sent by Corps G2 should be sent as 
an IMMEDIATE precedence and with appropriate security classification. The action addressee 
is Technical Director, ERDEC APG MDIICBATEBII. The notification message will contain the 
sample identification number and details which relate to the acquisition of the sample. The 
message will be configured to provide the following information: 
1. Background information. 
2. Physical description. 
3. Results of preliminary tests after sample collection. 
4. Where, when, and under what conditions the sample was acquired. 
Figure H-3. Description of responsibilities for a sample evacuation (continued). 
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5. Description of incident. 
6. Casualty symptoms (if applicable). 
7. Shipment information, such as-
(a) Date of shipment. 
(b) Mode of transportation. 
(c) Flight number and destination. 
(d) Estimated time of arrival CONUS. 
(e) Description of shipment (size, weight. and so forth). 
D. NOTIFICATION: Upon receipt of the notification message, the Chairman, CBATEB, is 
responsible for notifying the appropriate agencies. 
REFERENCES: 
1. FM 3-3 Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, 16 Nov 92. 
2. FM 3-5 NBC Decontamination, 17 Nov 93. 
3. FM 3-101-2 NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon Operations Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures, 10 Aug 94. 
4. AR 59-8 Department of Defense (DOD) Common User Airlift. 20 Aug 82. 
5. TM 38-250 Preparing of Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments, 25 Nov 94. 
Figure H-3. Description of responsibilities for a sample evacuation (continued). 
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SAMPLE COLLECTION GUIDELINES 
1. PROTECT YOURSELF: 
Do not handle contaminated samples with your bare hands. If neoprene gloves are not 
available, use a stick or other object to move a sample into a container. Respiratory and/or 
skin protective equipment may also be required. 
2. TAKE THE SAMPLE: 
If an area appears to have been contaminated, use whatever field expediency is necessary 
to get a sample. 
3. LABEL THE SAMPLE: 
Once a sample is collected, the container should be labeled immediately so that it is not 
confused with a nother sa mple. 
4. PROTECT THE SAMPLE: 
Most environmental and biomedical samples should be sealed and chilled to avoid cross-
contamination and decomposition. Samples should not be frozen if possible. Above all, 
avoid freeze-and-thaw situations. 
5. DOCUMENT THE SAMPLE: 
Record the circumstances surrounding the collection of the sample. Data such as how, 
where, when, why, and by whom is required. Diagrams and maps of areas are useful. 
6. FORWARD THE SAMPLE: 
CB samples are time sensitive. They should be reported and forwarded for analysis as 
quickly as possible (within 12 to 24 hours). 
7. PROTECT YOUR SOURCE: 
H-14 
All transactions involving CBW samples are highly sensitive. All knowledge and information 
(written and verbal) pertaining to the source are automatically considered SECRET. All 
samples and associated papers and diagrams, for example, will be released only to 
individuals known to be cleared and having a need to know; and they will be SIGNED FOR. 
All samples and associated papers must remain in the physical custody of authorized US 
persons only. 
Figure H-4. Sample collection guidelines. 
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SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL 
1. Samples acquired by a governmental source or provided by another source must be 
carefully controlled to be of the greatest value. To accomplish this, physical custody of the 
sample is maintained by a government representative. A sample identification number is also 
assigned and affixed to the sample or its container. 
2. To prevent confusion, the sample number must be used when referring to the sample or to 
information concerning its acquisition. A sample number consists of the following elements: 
(a) Country of Acquisition. This is a 2-digit alphabetic code for the country in which the 
sample was collected. The codes are found in DIAM 58-13, Volume II, Section E, dated 28 
March 1988. 
(b) Date Acquired. DTG sample acquired (local or Zulu time, as directed by higher 
headquarters) . 
(c) Sample Sequence Number. This is a 3-digit numerical code which is assigned per 
collector, and begins each collection day. The first sample collected is 001, the second is 002, 
and so forth. 
(d) Unit Identification Code. UIC of the unit that the collector is assigned to. 
(e) Collector Identification. The initials of the collector. 
EXAMPI E 
LA-121300Z FEB 90-002-WH60AA-JD 
LA Sample was acquired in Laos 
121300Z FEB 9 DTG sample was collected 
002 This is the second sample obtained on the date above by the collector 
WH60AA Unit of assignment of collector 
JD The sample was collected by John Doe 
Figure H-5. Sample identification and control. 
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Appendix I 
FACILITY EXPLOITATION CHECKLISTS 
The following sample checklists can be used to guide the actual eyes-on or 
hands-on exploitation of facilities or to guide the interrogation of EPWs with 
knowledge of facilities. 
COLLECTION CHECKLIST-AIRFIELDS 
1. IDENTIFICATION. Local name (both romanized and ideograph) and military designation. 
2. LOCATION. 
a. Map reference. Include series and sheet number(s) of both tactical and air-ground 
series. 
b. Political unit area, nearest town, and specified reference point (both UTM and 
geographic coordinates). 
3. AIRFIELD CATEGORY. Liaison, surveillance, light lift medium lift tactical. or heavy lift. 
4. STATUS. 
5. TYPE. Civilian, military, or joint. 
6. PRINCIPAL USE. 
7. LAYOUT. 
8. ELEVATION (feet and meters). 
9. NUMBER OF RUNWAYS. 
10. EACH RUNWAY. 
a. Identification. 
b. Azimuth. 
c. Length and width. 
d. Surface, base, subbase course (material, thickness, and condition). 
e. Longitudinal grade (minimum and maximum change per 100 feet). 
f. Transverse grade (maximum). 
Figure 1-1. Collection Checklist-Airfields. 
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g. Shoulders, clear area, and overrun (width, transverse grade, and surface material). 
h. Lateral safety zone (width, transverse slope, and obstacles). 
i. End clear zones (length, width, and maximum slope). 
j. Approach zones (length, width, glide slope, and obstacles). 
k. Condition. 
11. EACH TAXIWAY. 
a. Identification. 
b. Azimuth. 
c. Length and width. 
d. Grade (maximum longitudinal and transverse). 
e. Surface, base, subbase material (thickness). 
f. Bearing capacity (pounds per square inch). 
g. Shoulders and clear area (width, transverse grade, surface, and obstacles). 
h. Turn radii. 
i. Condition. 
12. PARKING AND WARM-UP APRONS. 
a. Number. 
b. Total area and individual area. 
c. Description of each apron. 
d. Total capacity (specify aircraft type). 
13. HARDSTANDS. 
a. Total number. 
b. Aircraft capacity (specify). 
c. Description of each hardstand. 
14. PETROLEUM, OIL. AND LUBRICANTS. Describe facilities and storage. 
a. Jet fuel by type (J rating). 
b. Aviation gasoline. 
c. Jet oil. 
d. Aviation oil. 
e. Lubricants. 
f. Pipelines (cross-reference to pipeline collection file). 
15. NAVIGATION FACILITIES. Describe the type offacility. 
16. LIGHTING FACILITIES. Describe all lighting at airfield. 
Figure 1-1. Collection Checklist-Airfields (continued). 
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17. COMMUNICATION FACILITIES. Cross-reference to communication collection file. 
18. MAINTENANCE FACILITIES (aircraft). 
19. OXYGEN AVAILABILITY. 
20. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT. 
a. Crash and fire. 
b. Construction and ground maintenance. 
21. COVERED STORAGE. 
22. SANITATION. 
23. HANGARS. 
a. Number and locations. 
b. Type and material. 
c. Condition. 
24. HOUSING FACILITIES. 
a. Type, location, and number. 
b. Capacity and condition. 
25. MUNITIONS STORAGE. 
a. Type and location. 
b. Cubage, normal use, and condition. 
26. ADMINISTRATION BUILDINGS (identify). 
27. ELECTRICITY. Cross-reference to electric power collection file. 
a. Sources. 
b. Current characteristics. 
28. JET STARTING UNITS. 
29. AUXILIARY POWER UNITS. 
Figure 1-1. Collection Checklist-Airfields (continued). 
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30. ANTI-DETONATION FLUID OR WATER-ALCOHOL. 
a. Type and location. 
b. Quantities. 
31. DEFENSES. 
32. ADJACENT TERRAIN. Cross-reference to appropriate collection files. 
33. MEDICAL FACILITIES. 
a. Type and location. 
b. Capacity and characteristics. 
34. WEATHER FACILITIES. Cross-reference to weather collection file. 
a. Type and location. 
b. Characteristics and condition. 
Figure 1-1. Collection Checklist-Airfields (continued). 
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COLLECTION CHECKLIST-ELECTRIC POWER 
POWERPLANTS 
1. IDENTIFICATION. Local name and military designation. 
a. Map reference. Include series and sheet numbers of both tactical and air-ground 
series. 
b. Political unit area, nearest town, UTM coordinates, and geographical coordinates. 
2. TYPE. Conventional-steam thermal, nuclear-steam thermal. internal combustion-thermal. 
hydro-turbine storage, hydro-turbine run-of-river, solar, wind, tidal, and so forth. 
3. OWNERSHIP. Government or private. 
4. FUNCTION. Public utility, industrial, or both. 
5. AREA SERVED. 
6. PURPOSE. Base load, peak load, or stand-by. 
7. STATISTICS. 
a. Total capacity (kW or kVA) and annual production (kWh). 
b. Generators (numbers, type, and rating of each). 
8. CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS. 
a. Type (direct current; alternating current). 
b. Generating voltage. 
c. Phase and hertz. 
9. OVERALL CONDITION AND AGE. 
10. POWERHOUSE CONSTRUCTION. Material, number of stories, windows, and so forth. 
11. TRANSMISSION LINE CONNECTIONS. Number and voltage. 
12. FUEL DATA (thermal plants only). 
a. Type (by grades). 
b. Quantity used per annum (tons, gallons, cubic feet pounds, and so forth). 
c. Sources. 
Figure 1-2. Collection Checklist-Electric Power. 
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d. Calorific content (conventional-steam). 
e. Waste disposal (nuclear-steam). 
13. BOILER REACTOR OR ENGINE DATA (thermal powerplants only). 
a. Number, manufacturer, and rating (kW; hpj. 
b. Cooling facilities (type and source). 
c. Steam pressure in psi (conventional-steam only). 
d. Efficiency (calories; Btu/kWh) (conventional-steam only). 
e. Operating temperature (conventional-steam only). 
f. Neutron flux (nuclear-steam only). 
g. Shielding and control mechanism (nuclear-steam only). 
14. WATER SOURCE, HYDRO-TURBINE POWERPLANTS. 
a. Identification. 
b. Flow, cubic feet per second (average, minimum, and maximum). 
c. Reservoirs (location, volume, area, head, and so forth). 
d. Dams (name, location, dimensions, diversion canal). 
15. HYDRO-TURBINES (HYDRO-TURBINE POWERPLANTS ONLY). 
a. Type, number, and rating (hp). 
b. Heat (feet; meters) and Flow (cubic meters per second). 
SUBSTATION 
1. IDENTIFICATION. Local name and military designation. 
2. LOCATION. 
a. Map reference. Include series and map sheet numbers of both tactical and air-ground 
series. 
b. Political unit. area, UTM coordinates, and geographic coordinates. 
3. TYPE. Transmission, distribution, or industrial. 
4. FUNCTION. Switching, transforming, converting, or inverting. 
5. OWNERSHIP. Government or private. 
6. TRANSFORMERS. Number, capacity (kVA), and voltage ratio (220/110, and so forth). 
7. CONVERTERS OR INVERTERS. Number and capacity (kW; kVA). 
Figure 1-2. Collection Checklist-Electric Power (continued). 
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8. LINES. Number and voltage (kV). 
9. AREA SERVED. 
TRANSMISSION LINES 
1. LOCATION. (Same as 2 above.) 
2. NUMBER OF LINES. 
3. OWNERSHIP. Government or private. 
4. PLACEMENT. Overhead, underground, submarine cable, and so forth. 
5. WIRE CHARACTERISTICS. 
6. TYPE OF TOWER. Metal, wood, or concrete. 
7. ALIGNMENT AND LENGTH. 
8. VOLTAGE (kV). 
9. PHASE. 
10. MAINTENANCE. Failure causes, effects, and frequency. 
Figure 1-2. Collection Checklist-Electric Power (continued). 
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CHECKLIST-PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS FIELDS 
1. IDENTIFICATION. Local name and military designation. 
2. LOCATION. 
a. Map reference. Include series and sheet numbers of both tactical and air-ground 
series. 
b. Political unit area, nearest town, UTM coordinates, and geographic coordinates. 
3. OWNERSHIP. Government or private. 
4. TYPE. Wet or dry. 
5. AREA EXTENT. 
6. STATUS. Exploited or unexploited. 
7. PRODUCTION. Barrels, tons, cubic feet per time unit. 
8. NUMBER OF PRODUCING WELLS. 
9. PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL PRODUCTION. 
10. PRODUCT. Type and characteristics. 
11. RESERVES. Proven and unproven. 
12. PLANNED EXPANSION. Expected increase, date, and method. 
13. TRANSPORTATION. 
a. Method (pipeline, railroad, road, water). 
b. Identification and destination. 
PROCESSING PLANTS 
1. IDENTIFICATION. (Same as 1 above.) 
2. LOCATION. (Same as 2 above.) 
3. TYPE OF PLANT. Complete, skimming, cracking, distilling, synthetic, and so forth (oil or 
gas). 
Figure 1-3. Checklist-Petroleum and Natural Fields. 
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4. OWNERSHIP. Government or private. 
5. PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL REFINING OR CRACKING CAPACITY. 
6. YEAR COMPLETED. 
7. GENERAL CONDITION. 
8. RATED PRODUCTION CAPACITY. Barrels, tons, cubic feet. per time unit. 
9. EQUIPMENT. 
a. Number and type. 
b. Rated capacity and condition. 
10. OUTPUT. Product. quantity, and quality. 
11. POWER SOURCE. 
12. WATER SOURCE. 
13. TRANSPORTATION. 
a. Raw materials in (identification, method, and origin). 
b. Finished products out (identification, method, and destination). 
14. PLANNED EXPANSION. 
15. BUILDINGS. Type, number, and characteristics. 
STORAGE FACILITIES 
1. IDENTIFICATION. (Same as 1 above.) 
2. LOCATION. (Same as 2 above.) 
3. TYPE. Gas or petroleum. 
4. OWNERSHIP. Government or private. 
5. TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY. Barrels, tons, or cubic meters. 
6. PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL TOTAL. 
Figure 1-3. Checklist-Petroleum and Natural Fields (continued). 
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7. GENERAL CONDITION. 
8. STORAGE TANKS. 
9. STORAGE DRUMS. 
a. Manufacturing (location and capacity). 
b. Cleaning and reclamation (location and capacity). 
c. Filling facilities (location, equipment. and capacity). 
10. TRANSPORTATION. 
a. In (method and origin). 
b. Out (method and destination). 
11. BUILDINGS. Number, type, and characteristic. 
Figure 1-3. Checklist-Petroleum and Natural Fields (continued). 
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FACILITY PHYSICAL SECURITY CHECKLIST 
1. IDENTIFICATION. 
a. Local and official name. 
b. Functional description. 
c. Local address. 
d. Map reference. 
e. Geographic coordinates. 
f. Additional information. 
2. BUILDING DESCRIPTION. 
a. Identification. 
b. Type of construction material. 
c. Type of roof. 
d. Blueprints. 
e. Floor plans. 
f. Description of roof. 
(1) Entrances to building. 
(2) Skylights. 
(3) Air-conditioning ducts. 
(4) Maintenance accesses. 
(5) Elevator shafts. 
(6) Emergency exits and fire escapes. 
(7) Ventilation systems. 
(8) Ladders. 
(9) Additional information. 
g. Entrances to building. 
(1) Main entrance. 
(2) Other entrances or exits. 
(3) Non-standard access points. 
h. Sewage and drainage systems. 
i. Water system. 
j. Interior description of building. 
(1) Floors. 
(2) Corridors. 
(3) Doors. 
(4) Windows. 
Figure 1-4. Facility Physical Security Checklist. 
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(5) Locks. 
(6) Stairways. 
(7) Elevators. 
(8) Physical barriers. 
(9) Lighting 
k. Active security. 
(1 ) Security guards. 
(a) Posts. 
(b) Arms 
(c) Ammunition. 
(d) Riot control devices. 
(e) Additional information. 
(2) Contract watchmen. 
(3) National police agents. 
(4) Additional information. 
I. Communications equipment available. 
MODEL TYPE NUMBER LOCATION FREQUENCY/CHANNELS ANTENNAS 
m. Telephone system. 
n. Emergency lighting and power system. 
o. Additional information. 
3. DESCRIPTION OF GROUNDS. 
a. Structures. 
b. Entrances to grounds. 
c. Perimeter fence. 
d. Terrain. 
e. Vegetation. 
f. Lighting-external. 
g. Map or sketch. 
4. DESCRIPTION OF SURROUNDING AREA (24 Block Area). 
a. Possible observation points. 
b. Relative distances of key terrain. 
c. Additional information. 
Figure 1-4. Facility Physical Security Checklist (continued). 
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5. KEY TERRAIN. 
a. Predominant terrain. 
b. Drop zones. 
c. Landing and Pickup Zones. 
d. Airfields. 
e. Critical lines of communications. 
f. Additional information. 
6. MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
a. Medical staff and facilities. 
b. Civilian hospitals. 
c. Additional information. 
Figure 1-4. Facility Physical Security Checklist (continued). 
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CHECKLIST-RAILWAYS 
1. IDENTIFICATION. Route designation (native, military, or other) and segment being 
studied. 
2. LOCATION. 
a. Map reference. Include series and sheet numbers on both tactical and air-ground 
series. 
b. End points of segment. Political unit. area, UTM coordinates, and geographical 
coordinates. 
3. OWNERSHIP. 
4. TOTAL TRACK LENGTH. Double and single tracks in kilometers. 
5. END POINTS OF DOUBLE TRACK SECTIONS. Location (UTM) and area name. 
6. TRACK. 
a. Gage (millimeters). 
b. Rails. 
c. Roadway (total width and double or single track). 
d. Ditches (depth, width, side slope, lining, condition, cross-section, and structures). 
7. ROADBED. Material. total width, and width of shoulders. 
8. SUBBALLAST. Material and thickness. 
9. BALLAST. Material, size, thickness, and condition. 
10. TIES. Material, length, width, depth, and spacing. 
11. SPACING OF TRACKS. Centerline-to-centerline. 
12. RADIUS OF TIGHTEST CURVE. Location (UTM) and radius. 
13. MAXIMUM GRADE. Direction of travel and location. 
14. BRIDGES. Cross-reference to bridge collection file. 
a. Total number of bridges in segment. 
b. Total length of bridging in segment. 
Figure 1-5. Checklist-Railways. 
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15. FERRIES. Cross-reference to ferry collection file. 
16. TUNNELS, GALLERIES, AND SNOW SHEDS (TGSS). Cross-reference to TGSS 
collection file. 
17. UNDERPASSES. Cross-reference to bridge collection file. 
18. MINIMUM CLEARANCES. Horizontal and vertical. 
19. AXLE LOAD LIMIT. Metric tons. 
FM 34-54 
20. CULVERTS. Location (UTM) and total number, type, construction material, and bypasses. 
21. ELECTRIFICATION. 
a. End points of electrified sections (UTM). 
b. Power feed (overhead or third rail). 
c. Current characteristics (direct current; alternating current). 
d. Source of power. 
22. MAINLINE JUNCTIONS. Location (UTM), identification of connecting line, and type switch. 
23. CROSSOVERS. Location (UTM) and type of switch. 
24. PASSING SIDINGS. Locations (UTM), number, double-end or single-end, length, and type 
of turn. 
25. STATIONS. 
a. Location (local name and UTM coordinates). 
b. Function (passenger, freight. or both). 
c. Facilities. 
26. FREIGHT-HANDLING FACILITIES. 
a. Location (local name and UTM coordinates). 
b. Side-loading platforms (number and length). 
c. End-loading bays. 
d. Sidings with access roads. 
e. Freight sheds. 
Figure 1-5. Checklist-Railways (continued). 
1-15 
FM 34-54 
f. Turntables (number and diameter). 
g. Cranes (type, number, and capacity). 
27. YARDS. 
a. Location (local name and UTM coordinates). 
b. Function (receiving, classification, departure, storage, and so forth). 
c. Hump or flat. 
d. Number of tracks. 
e. Fuel facilities (type of fuel, quantity normally on hand, and maximum storage capacity). 
f. Other facilities (water, sand, compressed air, and so forth). 
g. Electrification (overhead or third rail). 
28. FUEL FACILITIES. 
a. Location (local name and UTM coordinates). 
b. Type of fuel. 
c. Type of storage and capacity. 
d. Quantity of fuel normally on hand. 
e. Method of loading. 
29. REPAIR SHOPS AND LOCOMOTIVE TERMINALS. 
a. Location (local name and UTM coordinates). 
b. Engine house or turntable. 
c. Service facilities. 
30. WATERING FACILITIES. 
a. Location (local name and UTM coordinates). 
b. Source and type of storage. 
31. SIGNALS AND TRAIN CONTROL. Location (UTM) and type. 
32. CRITICAL POINTS. 
a. Type (points subject to rock slides, snow slides, flooding, or subject to interdiction and 
ambush). 
b. Location (local name and UTM coordinates). 
33. USE. Average number of trains per day (both passenger and freight). 
Figure 1-5. Checklist-Railways (continued). 
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34. SECTIONS IN NEED OF REPAIR. Location and nature of repair, and effort required to 
repair. 
35. CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIR EQUIPMENT. 
a. Type and characteristics of equipment. 
b. Location of park where kept (UTM coordinates). 
36. MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE. 
37. PLANNED EXTENSIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS. 
38. MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS. 
39. SAFETY AND SECURITY STANDARDS. 
40. ROLLING STOCK. 
Figure 1-5. Checklist-Railways (continued). 
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CHECKLIST-UNDERGROUND FACILITIES 
1. IDENTIFICATION. Native name, military designation, and tunnel number. 
2. LOCATION OF PORTALS. 
a. Map reference. Include series and sheet numbers of both tactical and air-ground 
series. 
b. Political unit. kilometer points, UTM coordinates, and geographic coordinates. 
c. Landmark reference. Description and location of landmark, and azimuth and distance 
from landmark to nearest portal. 
3. LENGTH (portal to portal). 
4. TYPE. TGSS. 
5. CROSS-SECTION. 
a. Shape (semicircular, elliptical, horseshoe, square with arched ceiling). 
b. Width of traveled way. 
c. Width at widest part. 
d. Height of widest part. 
e. Height of ceiling at center. 
f. Height of ceiling at edge of traveled way. 
g. Rise of arch. 
6. CONSTRUCTIONS (HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL). Type, least clearance, and 
location (meters from nearest portal). 
7. RAILROAD TRACKS. 
a. Number for which tunnel was designed. 
b. Number in use. 
c. Gage. 
d. Center-to-center spacing. 
e. Cross-reference to railway collection file. 
8. HIGHWAY. 
a. Wearing surface (material, thickness, and condition). 
b. Base course. 
c. Subgrade. 
d. Cross-reference to highway collection file. 
Figure 1-6. Checklist-Underground Facilities. 
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9. CHANNEL (water tunnels). 
a. Cross-section dimensioned. 
b. Sides (material and thickness). 
c. Bottom (material and thickness). 
d. Norma I depth. 
e. Normal current velocity. 
10. ALIGNMENT. 
a. Horizontal (position, curve radius, and curve location). 
b. Vertical (grade percent. length, and location). 
11. NUMBER OF MANWAYS. Dimensions and spacing. 
12. OBSTACLE TUNNELED. 
13. PORTAL. Design and material. 
14. LINING MATERIAL. Type, thickness, condition, and points of change. 
15. SHORING AND BRACING. 
a. Location and spacing. 
b. Design. 
c. Materials. 
d. Dimensions of members. 
e. Arrangement and spacing of members. 
16. STRUCTURAL DESIGN, MATERIALS, AND DIMENSIONS OF GALLERIES AND 
SNOWSHEDS. 
17. GEOLOGICAL DATA. 
a. Material through which tunnel passes. 
b. Geology of adjacent areas. 
18. OVERHEAD COVER. Material and depth. 
19. DEMOLITION CHAMBERS. Location and dimensions. 
20. VENTILATION. Description and adequacy. 
Figure 1-6. Checklist-Underground Facilities (continued). 
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21. DRAINAGE. Description, location, and adequacy. 
22. LIGHTING FACILITIES. Type, location, and power source. 
23. YEAR COMPLETED. 
24. BYPASSES. Location, condition, effort required to establish. 
25. ALTERNATE ROUTES. (Cross-reference to highway collection file). 
26. TRAFFIC CONTROL MARKINGS. 
27. APPROACHES. Characteristics, grade, surface, curves, turnouts, and parking areas. 
28. SURFACE FEATURES OVER TUNNELS. Vegetation, structures, and surface 
configuration. 
29. EFFECTS OF CLIMATE AND WEATHER. 
a. Snow blockage (probable occurrence, effects, and duration). 
b. Flooding (periods of occurrence, effects, and duration). 
30. SPECIAL GEOPHYSICAL PHENOMENA. 
31. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO ABOVE-GROUND DEMOLITIONS. 
32. CAMOUFLAGE AND DEFENSES. 
33. PRESENT USE. 
Figure 1-6. Checklist-Underground Facilities (continued). 
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GLOSSARY 
ACRONYMS 
AC Active Component Defense Command 
ACE analysis and control element CCIR commander's critical 
ACOM US Atlantic Command information requirements 
ADA air defense artillery C-E communications-electronics 
ADP automated data processing CED captured enemy document 
AFACSI Air Force Assistant Chief of CEE captured enemy equipment 
Staff for Intelligence CEM captured enemy materiel 
AFMIC Armed Forces Medical CENTCOM US Central Command 
Intelligence Center CHATS CI/HUMINT Automation Tool 
AL Alabama Set 
AMB aviation maintenance battalion CI counterintelligence 
AMC US Army Materiel Command CINCLANT Commander in Chief, Atlantic 
ammo ammunition CJCMEC Combined Joint Captured 
APG Aberdeen Proving Ground Materiel Exploitation Center 
ARAT Army Reprogramming CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force 
Analysis Team CM&D collection management and 
ARCENT US Army Central Command dissemination 
ASP ammunition supply point CMEC Captured Materiel Exploitation 
ATGM antitank guided missile Center 
ATP ammunition transfer point COMTECHREP Complementary Technical 
Aug August Intelligence Report 
AVIM aviation intermediate COMMZ communication zone 
maintenance CONUS continental United States 
AWACS Airborne Early Warning COSCOM Corps Support Command 
AZ Arizona CSA corps storage area 
CSD contingency support 
BDA battle damage assessment detachment 
BIDS Biological Integrated CSS combat service support 
Detection System CWCC Centralized Weapons 
bn battalion Collection Center 
BOS battlefield operating system 
Btu British thermal unit DA Department of the Army 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research 
C31 command, control, Projects Agency 
communications, and DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff, 
intelligence Intelligence 
CA Civil Affairs DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for 
CB chemical and biological Operations 
CBATEB US Army Chemical and DETECHREP Detailed Technical Report 
Biological Agent Technical DHS Defense HUMINT Service 
Evaluation Board DIA Defense I ntelligence Agency 
DIAM Defense I ntelligence Agency 
CBDCOM Chemical and Biological Manual 
Glossary-1 
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DISCOM Division Support Command G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, 
DISE Deploya ble Intelligence Intelligence 
Support Element G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, 
div division Operations 
DMSO division medical supply officer G4 Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, 
DOD Department of Defense Logistics 
DOCEX document exploitation G5 Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 
DOS disk operating system Civil Affairs 
DSNET Defense Secure Network 
DTG date-time group HERA High Explosive Rocket Assist 
DTO district transportation officer HHC headquarters and 
headquarters company 
EA electronic attack HOTAS hands on throttle and stick 
EAC echelons a bove corps HQDA Headquarters, Department of 
EACIC echelons a bove corps the Army 
intelligence center hp horsepower 
ECB echelons corps a nd below HUD heads-up display 
ELECTRO-OPTINT electro-optical intelligence HUMINT human intelligence 
EOD explosive ordnance disposal 
EODTIC Explosive Ordnance Disposal I&W indications and warnings 
Technical Information lEW intelligence and electronic 
Center warfare 
EP electronic protection IFF identification, friend or foe 
EPW enemy prisoner of war IIR intelligence information report 
ERDEC US Army Chemical Research IMEP International Materiel 
Development and Evaluation Program 
Engineering Center IMINT imagery intelligence 
EW electronic warfare inf infantry 
EXCEN exploitation center INSCOM US Army Intelligence and 
Security Command 
FSAC Fire Support Armaments IPB intelligence preparation of the 
Center battlefield 
FMA foreign materiel acquisition IPC intermediate processing 
FME foreign materiel exploitation center 
FMEP Foreign Materiel Exploitation IR information requirements 
Program IRSTS infrared search and track set 
FMMEP Foreign Medical Materiel 
Exploitation Program J1 Assistant Chief of Staff, J1, 
FMIB Foreign Materiel Intelligence Personnel 
Branch J2 Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, 
FMP Foreign Materiel Program Intelligence 
FMT Foreign Materiel for Training J3 Operations Directorate 
FPB Force Projection Brigade J4 Logistics Directorate 
J5 Joint staff plans and policy 
G1 Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, J6 Communications-Electronic 
Personnel Directorate 
JCMEC Joint Captured Materiel 
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Exploitation Center NAIC National Air Intelligence 
JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Center 
Support System NATO North Atlantic Treaty 
JIC Joint Intelligence Center Organization 
JTF Joint Task Force NAVEODTECHDIV Naval EOD Technical Division 
JTIB Joint Technical Intelligence NBC nuclear, biological, and 
Branch chemical 
NETC see NAVEODTECHCEN 
Kb kilobyte NGIC National Ground Intelligence 
kV kilovolt Center 
kVA kilovoltampere NO number 
kW kilowatt NRT near-real time 
kWh kilowatthour NSA National Security Agency 
NTC Naval Technical Center 
LAR liquid aerosol remove NUCINT nuclear intelligence 
LlDAR laser detection and ranging NVA North Vietnamese Army 
LNE liaison element 
LNO liaison officer OB order of battle 
LOS line-of-sight OCONUS outside continental United 
States 
MACOM major Army command ODCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of 
MASINT measurement and signature Staff, Intelligence 
intelligence ONI Office of Naval Intelligence 
MCC movement control center OPCON operationa I control 
MCO movement control office OPCEN operations center 
MD Maryland OPLAN operations plan 
MDR MASINT data requirements OPORD operations order 
mech mechanized OPSEC operations security 
med medical 
MEDLOG medical logistic battalion PACOM US Pacific Command 
MEDSOM medical, supply, optical, and PIR priority intelligence 
maintenance requirements 
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force POC point of contact 
MFD multifunctional display POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants 
MI military intelligence PM provost marshal 
mL milliliter PRETECHREP Preliminary Technical 
MMC materiel management center Intelligence Report 
MOS military occupational specialty PSYOP psychological operations 
MRC mission requirements center psi pounds per square inch 
MSB maintenance support battalion 
MSE mobile subscriber equipment RADINT radar intelligence 
MSIC US Missile and Space 
Intelligence Center 
MSR ma in supply route 
NA not applicable 
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RC Reserve Components STU-III Secure Telephone Unit-Third 
RDTE research, development test Generation 
and evaluation sup supply 
R&D research and development SUPCEN support center 
R&S reconna issa nce and 
surveillance TA Theater Army 
RDEC research, development and TAACOM Theater Army Area Command 
engineering center TAMCA Theater Army Movement 
RF/EMPINT radiofrequencyl Control Agency 
electromagnetic pulse TAML Theater Army Medical 
intelligence Laboratory 
RINT radiation intelligence TAREX target exploitation 
RSP render safe procedure TBP to be published 
RWR radar warning receiver TECHSUM Technical Intelligence 
Summary 
S2 Intelligence Officer (US Army) TECHINT technical intelligence 
S3 Operations and Training TECOM US Army Test and Evaluation 
Officer (US Army) Command 
S4 Supply Officer (US Army) TECRAS technical reconnaissance and 
S&T scientific and technical surveillance 
S&TI scientific and technical TEU US Army Technical Escort 
intelligence Unit 
SALUTE size, activity, location, unit TGSS tunnels, galleries, and snow 
time, equipment (spot report sheds 
format) TIARA tactical intelligence and 
SAM surface-to-air missile related activities 
SAR synthetic aperture radar TIR Technical Intelligence Report 
SASO stability and support TRADOC US Army Training and 
operations Doctrine Command 
SATCOM satellite communications trans tra nsportation 
SCIF Sensitive Compartmented TSS target sensing system 
Information Facility TTF TECHINT target folder 
SIGCEN signal center TTP tactics, techniques, and 
SIGINT signals intelligence procedures 
SIR specific information requests TV television 
SJA Staff Judge Advocate 
SME subject matter expert UAV unmanned aerial 
SOP standing operating procedure vehicle 
SOR specific orders and requests UIC unit identification code 
SRBM short-range ballistic missile US United States 
SSC software support center USAARDEC US Army Armament 
STANAG Standardization Agreement Research, Development 
STICEUR Scientific I ntelligence Center and Engineering Center 
Europe USAF US Air Force 
STICFE Scientific I ntelligence Center USAIC&FH US Army Intelligence Center 
Far East and Fort Huachuca 
Glossary-4 
USAMRIID US Army Medical Research 
Institute of Infectious 
Diseases 
USATECHDET US Army Technical 
Detachment 
USMC US Marine Corps 
UTM 
XO 
FM 34-54 
universal transverse mercator 
Executive Officer 
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acoustic intelligence 
captured enemy document 
captured enemy equipment 
captured enemy materiel 
Class I 
Class II 
Class III 
Class IV 
Class V 
Class VI 
Glossary-& 
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Intelligence derived from the collection and 
processing of acoustic phenomena. 
Documents ca ptured from the enemy. 
Equipment captured from the enemy. 
The combination of documents, equipment. and 
materia I ca ptured from the enemy. 
Subsistence items and gratuitous health and 
welfare items (B-rations; meals, ready to eat; 
fresh fruits; and vegetables). 
Equipment. other than principal items, prescribed 
in authorization and allowance tables (individual 
equipment. clothing items, tentage, tool sets, 
administrative supplies, housekeeping supplies). 
POL. which are petroleum fuels, hydraulic and 
insulating oils, chemical products, antifreeze 
compounds, compressed gases, and coal. 
Class III (bulk) is normally fuel; for example, 
diesel, motor gasoline, and aviation fuel. Class 
III (package) is other elements such as 
lubricants, antifreeze, and fog oil. 
Construction and barrier materials (lumber, 
sandbags, and barbed wire). 
Ammunition (small-arms ammunition, artillery 
rounds, hand grenades, explosives, mines, 
fuzes, detonators, missiles, and bombs, 
including special ammunition-chemical and 
nuclear rounds). 
Personal demand items; the items that are 
normally sold through the exchange system 
Class VII 
Class VIII 
Class IX 
Class X 
combined operations 
communications intelligence 
etiologic agent 
electro-optical intelligence 
foreign materiel 
FM 34-54 
(cigarettes, candy, soap, and so forth, contained 
in ration supplemental sundries packs). 
Major end items (final combinations of items that 
are assembled for their intended use: vehicles, 
self-propelled artillery pieces, missile launchers, 
and major weapon systems-the weapons 
themselves, not the crews). 
Medical material (medicines, stretchers, surgical 
instruments, and medical equipment repair 
parts) . 
Repair parts and components, including kits and 
assemblies, and items required for maintenance 
support of all equipment (batteries, spark plugs, 
and axles). 
Material required to support nonmilitary 
programs; the items used to support CA 
operations (commercial design tractor for use by 
local civilians, farms tools, and so forth). 
Operations conducted by forces of two or more 
allied nations acting together for the 
accomplishment of a single mission. 
Technical and intelligence information 
derived from foreign communications by other 
than the intended recipients. Also called 
COMINT. 
The cause of a disorder or disease as 
determined by medical diagnosis. 
Intelligence other than signal intelligence derived 
from the optical monitoring of the 
electromagnetic spectrum from ultraviolet (0.01 
micrometers) through far infrared (1,000 
micrometers). Also called ELECTRO-OPTINT. 
The collection, processing, exploitation, and 
analysis of emitted or reflected energy across 
the optical portion (infrared, visible, and 
ultraviolet) of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
The all-encompassing term for the weapons 
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Foreign Material Program 
joint operations 
measurement and signature intelligence 
materials 
materiel 
Glossary-8 
systems, equipment apparatus, documents, and 
supplies of a foreign military force or nonmilitary 
orga nization. 
The Army program for exploiting, developing, or 
providing foreign military materiel. commercial 
representations of foreign materiel with potential 
miliary application, related foreign documents in 
the Army inventory, and exploitation reports on 
this materiel of value to US intelligence, RDTE, 
and military planning, operations, and training. 
This includes planning concerning intelligence 
and non-intelligence acquisition requirements, 
management of signature and simulator 
programs, participation in evacuation efforts, and 
support to the Opposing Forces Program. 
The integrated military activities of two or more 
service components-Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marine Corps-of the US military. 
S& TI information obtained by quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, 
wavelength, time dependence, modulation, 
plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from 
specific technical sensors for the purpose of 
identifying any distinctive features associated 
with the source, emitter, or sender and to 
facilitate subsequent identification and/or 
measurement of the same. Also called MAS INT. 
Raw substances, scrap, semifinished and 
finished; supplies. 
All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled 
weapons, aircraft and so forth, and related 
spares, repair parts and support equipment but 
excluding real property, installations, and 
utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, 
and support military activities without distinction 
as to its application for administrative or combat 
purposes. 
medical intelligence 
nuclear intelligence 
radar intelligence 
scientific and technical intelligence 
technical intelligence 
unintentional radiation intelligence 
FM 34-54 
That category of intelligence resulting from 
collection, evaluation, analysis, and 
interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, 
and environmental information which is of 
interest to strategic planning and to military 
medical planning and operations for the 
conservation of the fighting strength of friendly 
forces and the formation of assessments of 
foreign medical capabilities in both military and 
civilian sectors. 
Intelligence information derived from the 
collection and analysis of radiation and other 
effects resulting from radioactive sources. Also 
called NUCINT. 
Intelligence derived from data collected by radar. 
Also called RADINT. 
The product resulting from the collection, 
evaluation, intelligence analysis, and 
interpretation of foreign scientific and technical 
information which covers: a. foreign 
developments in basic applied research and in 
applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific 
and techical characteristics, capabilities, and 
limitations of all foreign military systems, and 
materiel, the research and development related 
thereto, and the production methods employed 
for their manufacture. Also called S& TI. 
Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign 
material, produced for strategic, operational. and 
tactical level commanders. Technical 
intelligence begins when an individual service 
member finds something new on the battlefield 
and takes the proper steps to report it. The item 
is then exploited at succeedingly higher levels 
until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize 
the adversary's technological advantage. Also 
called TECH INT. 
Intelligence derived from the collection and 
analysis of noninformation-bearing elements 
extracted from the electromagnetic energy 
unintentionally emanated by foreign devices, 
equipment, and systems, excluding those 
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generated by the detonation of nuclear weapons. 
Also called RINT. 
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